Edited by a leading exponent of the school, this book offers--in the words of the movement's founders--logical positivism's revolutionary theories on meaning and metaphysics, the nature of logic and mathematics, the foundations of knowledge ...

David J. Kalupahana's Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis has, since its original publication in 1976, offered an unequaled introduction to the philosophical principles and historical development of Buddhism. Now, representing the culmination of Dr. Kalupahana's thirty years of scholarly research and reflection, A History of Buddhist Philosophy builds upon and surpasses that earlier work, providing a completely reconstructed, detailed analysis of both early and later Buddhism.

This indispensable volume is a lucid and faithful account of the Buddha's teachings. "For years," says the "Journal of the Buddhist Society," "the newcomer to Buddhism has lacked a simple and reliable introduction to the complexities of the subject. Dr. Rahula's "What the Buddha Taught" fills the need as only could be done by one having a firm grasp of the vast material to be sifted. It is a model of what a book should be that is addressed first of (...) all to 'the educated and intelligent reader.' Authoritative and clear, logical and sober, this study is as comprehensive as it is masterly." This edition contains a selection of illustrative texts from the "Suttas" and the "Dhammapada", sixteen illustrations, and a bibliography, glossary, and index. (shrink)

Chapter 4 MIND AND REBIRTH I The argument of the first three chapters is essentially that the study of early Buddhism is neither methodologically, logically, nor emotively flawed. These chapters argue for the rationality of.

In what follows I argue for two interrelated theses: that early Buddhism is not a form of empiricism, and that consequently there is no basis for an early Buddhist apologetic which contrasts an empirical early Buddhism with either a metaphysical Hinduism on the one hand, or with a baseless Christianity on the other.

I am very much honoured to have been asked to make the closing speech at this Conference. Since this is the first time for over fifty years that a philosophical congress of this scope has been held in England, I hope that you will think it suitable for me to devote my lecture to the revival of the empiricist tradition in British philosophy during this century. I shall begin by examining the contribution of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore. Though (...) he first owed his fame to his book Principia Ethica regarded as a work of genius by the Cambridge Apostles and their associates in Bloomsbury, who did not venture to question Moore's mistaken view of ‘good’ as an unanalysable non-natural quality, his reputation now chiefly rests on his subsequent defence of common sense. (shrink)

Several recent writers, of whom the most important and accessible, for English readers, are probably K. N. Jayatilleke and W. Rahula, have drawn attention to the fact that Buddhism, unlike many other religious philosophies, regards personal experience as the only valid source of knowledge. The Buddha himself is said to have distinguished between those who base their religion, or world-view, on tradition, those who base it on reasoning and speculation, and those who base it on personal experience, as he does (...) himself: I am one of those who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before. (shrink)

And the Bactrian King, a possible convert to Buddhism, responds at this point, " Well said, Nagasena! So it is, and as such I accept it." Conclusion Between the times of these two apparently contradictory texts about nirvana, the Mahavagga and ...

In a recent book on the historical development of Buddhist thought, the author, David J. Kalupahana, has presented the thesis that early Buddhist philosophy, as found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, is radically different from that of later Buddhism, and supports his claim by tracing the historical divergence of the later schools from original Buddhism as he reconstructs it. He then goes on to assert that not only does early Buddhism differ philosophically from the later schools, but also (...) that even the spiritual goal of nirvāna was fundamentally different, i.e., that the experience or condition denoted by the term ‘ nirvāna ’ in early Buddhism is quite different from that state which the same term came to denote later – a theory which is perhaps the most controversial feature ofhis overall interpretation of Buddhism. (shrink)