Feminist Buddhology is a burgeoning area of study, with many scholar-practitioners examining the interaction between Buddhism and feminist theory. Here I examine the contributions made by Buddhist Feminists and argue that, in general, Feminist Buddhology runs the serious risk of being ‘apologist’. I contrast the discrimination against women evident in Buddhist traditions with the claims of Buddhist Feminists that ‘Buddhism is feminism’ and ‘feminism is Buddhism’. In order to do so I provide a brief history or the position of women (...) in Buddhism, an overview of Feminist Buddhology and lastly the beginnings of an alternate perspective from which we may interweave Buddhism and feminism, without an underlying apologist perspective. (shrink)

A collection of essays, mostly original, on the actual and possible positions on free will available to Buddhist philosophers, by Christopher Gowans, Rick Repetti, Jay Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Charles Goodman, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Martin T. Adam, Christian Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, Mark Siderits, Ben Abelson, B. Alan Wallace, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, and Karin Meyers, and a Foreword by Daniel Cozort.

I argue for a soft compatibilist theory of free will, i.e., such that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, directly opposite hard incompatibilism, which holds free will incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. My intuitions in this book are primarily based on an analysis of meditation, but my arguments are highly syncretic, deriving from many fields, including behaviorism, psychology, conditioning and deconditioning theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, simulation theory, etc. I offer a causal/functional analysis of (...) meta-mental control, or 'metacausality', cashed out in counterfactual terms, to solve what I call the easy problem of free will. (shrink)

A critical overview to the bulk of extant Buddhist theories of free will.

The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of the will, (...) but not the minimal power of free will. It seems that the Buddha’s view shifts from agent causation (independent ownership) to a causal sequence of impersonal processes (psychophysical factors). This paper claims to shed clarity on ‘whether free will is viable in the context of the anattāvāda in Buddhism.’ It mainly studies the secondary sources (even though it has also discussed the primary sources) and their interpretations of freedom of the will and how it further does argue for a compatibility approach of free will in Buddhist thought. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea of "pure experience" within the context of the Buddhist tradition and in connection with the notions of emptiness and dependent origination via a reading of Dale Wright's reading of 'Huangbo' in his 'Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism'. The purpose is to appropriate Wright's text in order to engender a response to Steven Katz's contextualist-constructivist thesis that there are no "pure" (i.e., unmediated) experiences. In light of the Mahayana claim that everything is empty of substance, i.e., (...) originates dependently through conditions, contingencies, and contexts, what does the "purity" of the Enlightenment experience mean for Chan/Zen Buddhism? (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I plan to argue that in light of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics, it would be an inherent contradiction to the Buddhist tradition as whole to defend the cognitivist view that moral knowledge is possible. Quite the contrary, this essay will demonstrate that, in light of Buddhist theories of knowledge and metaphysical philosophies of no-self and emptiness, Buddhist ethics only makes coherent sense from a standpoint of non-cognitivism. Second, from the arguments that support (...) a non-cognitivist reading of Buddhist ethics, I plan to show that such a standpoint does not entail moral nihilism. Rather, what we find in Buddhism is a middle-way ethic of pluralism. Herein I shall argue that the moral life of Buddhism non-cognitively arises within skandha of feelings, yet is conditioned by the cognitive nature of Buddhist wisdom. (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

Recently, some contradictory statements have been made concerning whether or not the Buddha taught free will. Here, a comparative method is used to examine what exactly is meant by free will, and to determine to what extent this meaning is applicable to early Buddhist thought as recorded in the Pāli Nikāyas. The comparative method reveals parallels between contemporary criticisms of Cartesian philosophy and Buddhist criticisms of Brahmanical and Jain doctrines. Although in Cartesian terms Buddhism promotes no recognizable theory of free (...) will, it does promote a primitive theory of compatibilism which shares some keyfeatures with Daniel Dennett's position on this issue. It is argued that the implicit Buddhist stance on freedom of the will allows the existence of choice and responsibility without calling upon an ultimate controlling agency that transcends the causal nexus of mind and body. (shrink)

The paper explores the role of body in Epictetus’s Discourse and Buddhist Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and underscores the importance of embodied practice in Epictetan askēsis (‘training or exercise’). It argues that the important but unrecognized role of the body in Epictetan askēsis can be better understood if we introduce in some perspectives of early Buddhism. From the angle of spiritual exercise, early Buddhism maintains that the meditator ought to experience the body directly and contemplate the body as an impermanent physical object, (...) and not identify oneself with it. And based on the insight into the reality of the body and the cultivation of bodily awareness, the meditator can detach himself from the transient phenomenon and remove the unwholesome states of mind. Similarly, for Epictetus, by training our impression on the body and regarding the body as an indifferent thing but not the true self, one may successfully attain the truth of the body conditioned in various social contexts and then realize detachment and freedom. Therefore, in both early Buddhist meditation and Epictetan askēsis, the embodied practice of contemplating the body as it actually is, is also a spiritual exercise to understand the phenomenal world and detach from external things and to examine and tranquilize the internal world. (shrink)

Buddhists endorse the concept of human actions and their consequences as they uphold the doctrine of karma. However, they deny the existence of a ‘permanent self’. Few questions arise in this regard. If a permanent self does not exist then who guides a person to decide the course of an action? How does a person choose to perform an action of the many alternatives in a situation? Who takes responsibility for the consequences of an action? This paper attempts to answer (...) these questions by reinterpreting the Buddhist’s ‘no-self’ theory from epistemological and logical perspectives. This paper argues that Buddhists while rejecting the existence of a ‘permanent self’ affirm the existence of impermanent psychophysical entities (five skandhas). The mereological sum of these psychophysical entities is known as a ‘person’ who performs actions. A person becomes morally responsible for the consequences of an action justifying the Buddhist doctrine of karma. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the claim that early Buddhism could be interpreted as an empirical philosophy. Made in a time when verifiable foundations were thought to lend credence to a system of belief, the assertion served to differentiate Buddhism from a “mystical” Hinduism and even to give it a leg up over theistic religions. The position of this paper is that the Buddhist Empiricism Thesis is most certainly false. That position is arrived at via a (...) close examination of Buddhist means to knowledge and doctrinal content, which unfortunately entails taking only the most shallow view of a deep subject matter. This superficiality is no reflection on Buddhist belief, but rather is the necessary effect of refuting empirical claims for beliefs which are much more than merely “verifiable”. (shrink)

The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy. Lama Anagarika Govinda, 1991, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, Rs 125The Law of Karma: a philosophical study. Bruce R. Reichenbach, 1990, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, pp. xiv + 238, $38.00Religious Philosophy of Tagore and Radhakrishnan. Harendra Prasad Sinha, 1993, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers 188 pp., Rs. 150Scripture, Canon and Commentary: a comparison of Confucian and Western exegesis. John B. Henderson, 1991, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, xii + 247 pp. $32.50Chan Insights and Oversights: an (...) epistemological critique of the Chan tradition. Bernard Fauré, 1993, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, ix + 322 pp. £45Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: an essay on the nature of Indian philosophical thinking. Jitendra Nath Mohanty, 1992, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 306 pp. £37.50Avicenna. L. E. Goodman London, Routledge, 1992, xii + 240 pp. £12.99Becoming Bamboo: Western and Eastern explorations of the meaning of life. Robert E. Carter, 1992, Montreal, McGill‐Queen's University Press, xvi + 224 pp. £22.95. (shrink)