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The metaphysics & phenomenology of perceptual experience: A reply to Conduct

Michelle Montague

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):737-739 (2012)

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The obscure object of hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.details Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination is thus (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 266 citations
On being alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.details Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 183 citations
Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.details I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented. I will defend a view according to which in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations

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