- States of affairs.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience.Farid Masrour - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1813-1832.details
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Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.details
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Can disjunctivists explain our access to the sensible world?Adam Pautz - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.details
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Disjunctivism Unmotivated.Gordon Knight - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-18.details
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Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.details
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In Defense of Relational Direct Realism.Kenneth Hobson - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.details
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Why explain visual experience in terms of content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.details
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Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
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Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Facts, properties, and the nature of the proposition.Jeff Speaks - manuscriptdetails
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Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 221-254.details
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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Recent work in perception: Naïve realism and its opponents.Matthew Nudds - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):334-346.details
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The experience of left and right.Geoffrey Lee - 2006 - In Tama Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Experience of Left and Right. Oxford University Press.details
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Primitive knowledge disjunctivism.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73.details
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States of affairs.Thomas Wetzel - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge by acquaintance vs. description.Richard Fumerton - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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O disjuntivismo ecológico e o argumento causal.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação (46):147-174.details
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Visual awareness of properties.Matthew J. Kennedy - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.details
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Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.details
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Color Eliminativism (2006 Manuscript).Adam Pautz - manuscriptdetails
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Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.details
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Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
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The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.details
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The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intentionalism and perceptual presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.details
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That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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Sense-data.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The internal and external components of cognition.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 307-325.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Experiences as complex events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.details
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Possibility and imagination.Alex Byrne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.details
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Perceptual experience and perceptual justification.Nicholas Silins - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist?Daniel Whiting - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):321-341.details
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Of the perfect and the ordinary: Indistinguishability and hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Vehicle-representationalism and hallucination.Roberto de sá Pereira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177:1727–1749.details
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Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument.Alex Moran - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):269-289.details
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Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View.Laura Gow - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):569-589.details
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Intuitions as evidence : an introduction.Marc A. Moffett - 2022 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):234-253.details
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Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists.Giulia Martina - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):138.details
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