Switch to: Citations

References in:

Remembering Entails Knowing

Synthese 190 (14):2717-2729 (2013)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1127 citations  
  • Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.
    In this paper, I present counterexamples to the evidence thesis, the thesis that S knows that p at t only if S believes that p on the basis of evidence at t. The outline of my paper is as follows. In section 1, I explain the evidence thesis and make clear what a successful counterexample to the evidence thesis will look like. In section 2, I show that instances of non-occurrent knowledge are counterexamples to the evidence thesis. At the end (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of memory. -/- Bernecker argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic features generated by other epistemic sources but also functions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
    In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   275 citations  
  • Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):109-121.
    This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Husker Du?Fred Adams - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.
    Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  • Memory.Don Locke - 1971 - Macmillan.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures.Norman Malcolm - 1963 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Epistemic Possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   172 citations