- (2 other versions)The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.details
|
|
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Erin Kelly & Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):90.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs.Christopher Hitchcock - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (6):273.details
|
|
(1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
|
|
It’s OK if ‘my brain made me do it’: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction.Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2014 - Cognition 133 (2):502-516.details
|
|
(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (8):1320-1347.details
|
|
Counterfactuals, conditionals and causality: A social psychological perspective.D. J. Hilton, J. McClure & B. Slugoski - 2005 - In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The psychology of counterfactual thinking. New York: Routledge. pp. 44--60.details
|
|
Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals.David A. Lagnado, Tobias Gerstenberg & Ro'I. Zultan - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1036-1073.details
|
|
Causal-explanatory pluralism: how intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions.Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognitive Psychology 61 (4):303-332.details
|
|
What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.details
|
|
Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2011 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.details
|
|
(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
|
|
Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Sara Konrath - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.details
|
|
Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect.Kevin Uttich & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):87–100.details
|
|
(1 other version)Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.details
|
|
Sensitive and insensitive causation.James Woodward - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):1-50.details
|
|
(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
|
|
Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments.Liane Young, Joan Camprodon, Marc Hauser, Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Rebecca Saxe - 2010 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (15):6753–8.details
|
|
Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free Will.Shaun Nichols - 2011 - Science 331 (6023):1401-1403.details
|
|
Walden Two. [REVIEW]H. A. L. & B. F. Skinner - 1949 - Journal of Philosophy 46 (20):654.details
|
|
Moral judgment.Michael R. Waldmann, Jonas Nagel & Alex Wiegmann - 2012 - The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
|
|
From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will.Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):211-224.details
|
|
(1 other version)Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
|
|
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
|
|
The Paradox of Moral Focus.Liane Young & Jonathan Phillips - 2011 - Cognition 119 (2):166-178.details
|
|
Causation in biology: Stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation.James Woodward - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318.details
|
|
Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
|
|
(1 other version)An interventionist approach to causation in psychology.John Campbell - 2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal learning: psychology, philosophy, and computation. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 58--66.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Living without Free Will.A. R. Mele - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):375-378.details
|
|
(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1320-1347.details
|
|
Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability.David A. Lagnado & Shelley Channon - 2008 - Cognition 108 (3):754-770.details
|
|
(1 other version)Causation in the Law.F. S. McNeilly - 1962 - Philosophical Quarterly 12 (46):92-94.details
|
|