The second volume in an unprecedented publishing event: the complete College de France lectures of one of the most influential thinkers of the last century Michel Foucault remains among the towering intellectual figures of postmodern philosophy. His works on sexuality, madness, the prison, and medicine are classics his example continues to challenge and inspire. From 1971 until his death in 1984, Foucault gave public lectures at the world-famous College de France. These lectures were seminal events. Attended by thousands, they created (...) benchmarks for contemporary critical inquiry. The lectures comprising Abnormal begin by examining the role of psychiatry in modern criminal justice, and its method of categorizing individuals who "resemble their crime before they commit it." Building on the themes of societal self-defense in the first volume of this series, Foucault shows how and why defining "abnormality" and "normality" were prerogatives of power in the nineteenth century, shaping the institutions--from the prison system to the family--meant to deal in particular with “monstrosity,” whether sexual, phsyical, or spiritual. The College de France lectures add immeasurably to our appreciation of Foucault's thought, and offer a unique window on his singular worldview. (shrink)

The normal and the pathological are terms used for structures, activities, individual or collective situations proper to living beings and especially to man. The relation of a fact and a norm is its positive or negative value. Can the assessment of behaviours be reduced to noting a necessity? Is a living being's disease a fact similar to universal attraction? The author maintains that diseases are not merely predetermined effects, but are revealing of a normative regulation proper to living beings and (...) man. (shrink)

This book attempts to isolate the question of ethics in the work of Foucault and Lacan and explores its ramifications and implications for the present day.

Advance patient directives are various forms of anticipatory medical directives made by competent individuals for the eventuality of future incompetence. They are therefore appropriate instruments for competent patients in the early stage of Alzheimer's disease to document their self-determined will in the advanced stages of dementia. Theoretical objections have been expressed against the concept of advance patient directives (problems of authenticity and identity) which, however, cannot negate the fundamental moral authority of advance patient directives. Therefore, patients, family members, and physicians (...) should make use of the appropriate form of advance directive as part of common treatment and care planning. Advance directives, when utilized intelligently, represent appropriate instruments for shared decision-making by patient, family members and physician. They should be utilized to a greater extent, particularly for the treatment planning of demented patients. (shrink)

It may seem paradoxical to speak of the ‘goodlife’ for demented elderly. Many people consider dementia to be a life-wrecking disease and nursing homes to be terrible places. Still, it is relevant to ask how we can make life as good as possible for demented nursing home residents. This paper explores what three standard philosophical accounts of well-being — subjective preference theory, objectivist theories, and hedonism — have to say about the good life for demented people. It is concluded that (...) the relevant differences between the various philosophical theories manifest themselves not so much in their general account of the substantial content of ‘the good life’ but in a number of specific controversies. These concern the nature of well-being, the necessity of endorsement by the patient, the value of experience and the need for experiences to be rooted in reality. Moreover, it is argued that further research should pay detailed attention to the process of dementia and to the effects of this process on patients' identities, self-conceptions, capacities, preferences, values and the like, and that a narrative approach which incorporates the factor time may offer a more comprehensive account of the good life for demented elderly. (shrink)

I wish to take up the subject ... in relation to a set of practices in late antiquity. Among the Greeks, these practices took the form of a precept: epimeleisthai sautou, "to take care of yourself," to take "care of the self," "to be concerned, to take care of yourself."The precept of the "care of the self" [souci de soi] was, for the Greeks, one of the main principles of cities, one of the main rules for social and personal conduct (...) and for the art of life. For us now, this notion is rather obscure and faded. (Foucault, TS, 19). (shrink)

The question of when we have justification for overriding ordinary, everyday decisions of persons with dementia is considered. It is argued that no single criterion for competent decision-making is able to distinguish reliably between decisions we can legitimately override and decisions we cannot legitimately override.

In this paper we analyse some ethical and philosophical questions related to the development of memory enhancing drugs (MEDs) and anti-dementia drugs. The world of memory enhancement is coloured by utopian thinking and by the desire for quicker, sharper, and more reliable memories. Dementia is characterized by decline, fragility, vulnerability, a loss of the most important cognitive functions and even a loss of self. While MEDs are being developed for self-improvement, in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) the self is being lost. Despite (...) this it is precisely those patients with AD and other forms of dementia that provide the subjects for scientific research on memory improvement. Biomedical research in the field of MEDs and anti-dementia drugs appears to provide a strong impetus for rethinking what we mean by ‘memory’, ‘enhancement’, ‘therapy’, and ‘self’. We conclude (1) that the enhancement of memory is still in its infancy, (2) that current MEDs and anti-dementia drugs are at best partially and minimally effective under specific conditions, (3) that ‘memory᾿and ‘enhancement᾿are ambiguous terms, (4) that there is no clear-cut distinction between enhancement and therapy, and (5) that the research into MEDs and anti-dementia drugs encourages a reductionistic view of the human mind and of the self. (shrink)