- Functions.Larry Wright - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):139-168.details
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Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense.Karen Neander - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (2):168-184.details
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The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.details
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On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.details
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Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.details
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(1 other version)How direct is visual perception? Some reflections on Gibson's 'ecological approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.details
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(1 other version)Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-53.details
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Intentionality and teleological error.Paul M. Pietroski - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):267-82.details
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Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-164.details
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In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.details
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Semantics, wisconsin style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.details
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Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.details
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The Language of Thought.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1975 - Noûs 14 (1):120-124.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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(2 other versions)The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.details
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What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain.J. Lettvin - 1959 - Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 49:1940-1951.details
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(1 other version)How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson's “ecological approach”.J. A. Fodor & Z. W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-196.details
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The misuse of Sober's selection for/selection of distinction.R. Goode & P. E. Griffiths - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):99-108.details
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(2 other versions)The unavailability of what we mean: A reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press. pp. 61-101.details
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Holism: A Consumer Update.Georges Rey (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.details
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(1 other version)Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.details
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The continuity of levels of nature.William G. Lycan - 1990 - In Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 77--96.details
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According to Fodor, beliefs (and I shall take these as exemplary) involve relations to internal representations: to believe that p is to be in a certain relation to some internal state s which represents.Colin McGinn - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207.details
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What do frogs really believe?Nicholas Agar - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):1-12.details
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The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Rom Harre - 1985 - Noûs 19 (3):473-474.details
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Reality and Representation.Reinaldo Elugardo - 1987 - Noûs 26 (3):379-389.details
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(1 other version)Teleological Explanations.Andrew Woodfield & Larry Wright - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):86.details
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