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  1. Beyond Black Dots and Nutritious Things: A Solution to the Indeterminacy Problem.Marc Artiga - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The indeterminacy problem is one of the most prominent objections against naturalistic theories of content. In this essay I present this difficulty and argue that extant accounts are unable to solve it. Then, I develop a particular version of teleosemantics, which I call ’explanation-based teleosemantics’, and show how this outstanding problem can be addressed within the framework of a powerful naturalistic theory.
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  • Understanding Self and Other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  • Are Blind Babies Delayed in Achieving Social Understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
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  • Omitting the Second Person in Social Understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.
    Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.
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  • Intentional Schema Will Not Do the Work of a Theory of Mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.
    Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
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  • Ontogeny, Evolution, and Folk Psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.
    Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.
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  • Social Relations and Understanding the Intentional Self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.
    Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.
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  • Four-Year-Old Humans Are Different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
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  • Understanding That Looking Causes Knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.
    Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.
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  • Understanding Minds and Selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.
    Barresi & Moore provide a welcome focus on children's abilities to integrate first and third person information about intentional relations but they pay insufficient attention to the origins of children's understanding of the nature of subjective orientations vis-à-vis a shared world and the potential significance of such understanding as a source of domain-general information-processing capacities.
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  • Self-Knowledge, Knowledge of Other Minds, and Kinesthetic-Visual Matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.
    The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.
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  • Imagination and Imitation: Input, Acid Test, or Alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131-132.
    Immediate imitation is likely to be a major, direct input to Barresi & Moore's level 2 competence, but deferred imitation is unlikely to play a key role in the transition to level 3, because the attribution of first person knowledge is neither a necessary cause nor an obvious consequence of deferred imitation, and deferred imitation does not correlate phylogenetically with capacities that more plausibly either yield or reflect a concept of intentional agency.
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  • First Person Representations Need a Methodology Based on Simulation or Theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.
    Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
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  • Rhesus Monkeys Are Radical Behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.
    The data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago. When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.
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  • Second Person Intentional Relations and the Evolution of Social Understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.
    Second person intentional relations, involving intentional activities directed at the perceptor, are qualitatively different from first and third person relations. They generate a peculiar, bidirectional kind of intentionality, especially in the realm of visual perception. Systems specialized in dealing with this have been selected by evolution. These systems can be considered to be the evolutionary precursors to the human theory of mind.
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  • Moral Competence is Cognitive but (Perhaps) Nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.
    Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
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  • On the Dangers of Oversimulation.Gergely Csibra & György Gergely - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):127-128.
    Barresi & Moore fail to provide a satisfactory account for the development of social understanding because of their ambiguous characterization of the relationship between the intentional schema and shared intentional activities, their underestimation of the representational capacities of infants, and their overreliance on the simulationist assumption that understanding others is tantamount to sharing their experience.
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  • An Ambiguity.Jennifer Church - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):126-127.
    The difference between first and third person information may be thought of as a difference in either informationalcontentor informationalmodality. Each option faces some problems. I try to sort out some of these issues and raise a question about the explanatory force of the notion of a schema.
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  • Language and its Role in Understanding Intentional Relations: Research Tool or Mechanism of Development?Nancy Budwig & Michael Bamberg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):125-126.
    In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.
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  • Development of Social Emotions and Constructive Agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.
    The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore. Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.
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  • Can Children with Autism Integrate First and Third Person Representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.
    Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information, and in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
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  • Comparative Cognitive Studies, Not Folk Phylogeny, Please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.
    Barresi & Moore provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
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  • Intentional Relations and Social Understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations. However, through the integration of these (...)
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  • Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy.Manolo Martínez - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):427-453.
    In the first part of the paper, I present a framework for the description and evaluation of teleosemantic theories of intentionality, and use it to argue that several different objections to these theories (the various indeterminacy and adequacy problems) are, in a certain precise sense, manifestations of the same underlying issue. I then use the framework to show that Millikan's biosemantics, her own recent declarations to the contrary notwithtanding, presents indeterminacy. In the second part, I develop a novel teleosemantic proposal (...)
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  • Es Pot Naturalitzar la Intencionalitat?Marc Artiga - 2016 - Quaderns de Filosofia 3 (2).
    Intentionality is a central feature of our understanding of the world. We daily attribute intentional states (like beliefs, desires or perceptual states) to explain the behavior of other agents, and many theories appeal to them to understand more complex notions. Nonetheless, intentional states are puzzling entities. This article explains what intentionality is and why it is so important and problematic at the same time. Secondly, it examines various naturalistic theories, which seek to show that intentionality is compatible with a scientific (...)
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  • Comment on Ryder's SINBAD Neurosemantics: Is Teleofunction Isomorphism the Way to Understand Representations?Marius Usher - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.
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  • A Naturalistic Account of Content and an Application to Modal Epistemology.Manolo Martínez - 2010 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona
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  • Teleosemantics and Productivity.Manolo Martinez - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):47-68.
    There has been much discussion of so-called teleosemantic approaches to the naturalization of content. Such discussion, though, has been largely confined to simple, innate mental states with contents such as ?There is a fly here.? Even assuming we can solve the issues that crop up at this stage, an account of the content of human mental states will not get too far without an account of productivity: the ability to entertain indefinitely many thoughts. The best-known teleosemantic theory, Millikan's biosemantics, offers (...)
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  • Perceiving the World Outside: How to Solve the Distality Problem for Informational Teleosemantics.Peter Schulte - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):349-369.
    Perceptual representations have distal content: they represent external objects and their properties, not light waves or retinal images. This basic fact presents a fundamental problem for ‘input-oriented’ theories of perceptual content. As I show in the first part of this paper, this even holds for what is arguably the most sophisticated input-oriented theory to date, namely Karen Neander's informational teleosemantics. In the second part of the paper, I develop a new version of informational teleosemantics, drawing partly on empirical psychology, and (...)
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  • Much Ado About Nothing? Why Going Non-Semantic is Not Merely Semantics.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):187-203.
    This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one (...)
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  • Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy.David Papineau - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):1-14.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation.
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  • How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan’s Teleosemantics to the Test.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.
    How do frogs represent their prey? This question has been the focus of many debates among proponents of naturalistic theories of content, especially among proponents of teleosemantics. This is because alternative versions of the teleosemantic approach have different implications for the content of frog representations, and it is still controversial which of these content ascriptions (if any) is the most adequate. Theorists often appeal to intuitions here, but this is a dubious strategy. In this paper, I suggest an alternative, empirical (...)
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  • Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
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  • On Several Misuses of Sober’s Selection for/Selection of Distinction.Marc Artiga - 2011 - Topoi 30 (2):181-193.
    Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accounts of intentionality. However, it is widely known that these theories suffer from a major objection: the Indeterminacy Problem. The most common reply to this problem employs the Target of Selection Argument, which is based on Sober’s distinction between selection for and selection of . Unfortunately, some years ago the Target of Selection Argument came into serious attack in a famous paper by Goode and Griffiths. Since then, the question (...)
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  • The Misuse of Sober's Selection for/Selection of Distinction.R. Goode & P. E. Griffiths - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):99-108.
    Elliott Sober''s selection for/selection of distinction has been widely used to clarify the idea that some properties of organisms are side-effects of selection processes. It has also been used, however, to choose between different descriptions of an evolutionary product when assigning biological functions to that product. We suggest that there is a characteristic error in these uses of the distinction. Complementary descriptions of function are misrepresented as mutually excluding one another. This error arises from a failure to appreciate that selection (...)
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  • Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations.Marc Artiga - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):483-505.
    Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game (...)
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  • Causal Theories of Mental Content.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs (...)
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  • Explaining How to Perceive the New: Causal-Informational Teleosemantics and Productive Response Functions.Fabian Hundertmark - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    According to Karen Neander’s causal-informational teleosemantics, the contents of perceptual states depend on the etiological response functions of sensory-perceptual systems. In this paper, I argue that this theory is, despite its virtues, unable to explain how humans and other animals are capable of perceiving properties with which no sensory-perceptual system has ever been confronted. After rejecting Neander’s own proposal in terms of second-order similarity and a proposal inspired by Ruth Millikan in terms of simplicity, I offer a solution which equates (...)
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  • But What is the Intentional Schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.
    The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
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  • Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-141.
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  • Teleological Theories of Mental Content.Karen Neander - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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