I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

The article reviews logical and mathematical problems, which were the starting point of what is now known as “analytical philosophy”. The author proves that the moment of birth of analytical philosophy was Frege’s invention of a notation for quantifiers and va-riables in 1879. Another source of analytical philosophy was rather declaration than proof of certain philosophical beliefs by Moore and Russell during the 1990s. Generally, an analysis of these sources serves to clarify what analytical philosophy is and what it is (...) not, as well as why it appeared exactly at the beginning of the 20th century. (shrink)

A survey of Wittgenstein's writings on logic and mathematics; an analytical bibliography of contemporary articles on rule-following, social constructivism, Wittgenstein, Godel, and constructivism is appended. Various historical accounts of the nature of mathematical knowledge glossed over the effects of linguistic expression on our understanding of its status and content. Initially Wittgenstein rejected Frege's and Russell's logicism, aiming to operationalize the notions of logical consequence, necessity and sense. Vienna positivists took this to place analysis of meaning at the heart of philosophy, (...) while Ramey took extensionalism to result. Wittgenstein's interest in rule-following emerged through his reactions to these attempted appropriations. (shrink)

The author analyzes the inner structure of the philosophy of the Tractatus rather than its relation to the views of other philosophers.

Professor Fogelin has provided an authoritative critical evaluation of both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, making these key texts accessible to the general reader.

Abstract This paper discusses some recent work on the notion of possibility in Wittgenstein's Tractatus assessed by means of an interpretation of the notion put forward in Cerezo 2005. It argues that the proper way to understand the notion of possibility in the Tractatus must pay equal attention both to the picture theory and the truth-functions theory. From this perspective, through an examination of Peach's proposal (2007) it shows that the role played by the notion of logical space in the (...) determination of sense needs to be emphasized. In addition, the paper considers some consequences of the Tractarian notion of possibility, namely, the strong contingency of the world that it involves, which is revealed by the thinkability of logical space as empty envisaged by Wittgenstein in T 2.013, and also discusses the recent debate between Reinhardt (2005) and Geach (2006) on this issue. (shrink)

Tries to identify some strands in the birth of analytic philosophy and to identify in consequence some of its distinctive features.

This article is a survey of Wittgenstein’s writings on logic and mathematics; an analytical bibliography of contemporary articles on rule-following, social constructivism, Wittgenstein, Gödel, and constructivism is appended. Various historical accounts of the nature of mathematical knowledge have glossed over the effects of linguistic expression on our understanding of its status and content. Initially Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s and Russell’s logicism, aiming to operationalize the notions of logical consequence, necessity, and sense. Vienna positivists took this to place analysis of meaning at (...) the heart of philosophy, while Ramsey took extensionalism to result. Wittgenstein’s interest in rule-following emerged through his reactions to these attempted appropriations. (shrink)