- (6 other versions)Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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(6 other versions)Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Is experience transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.details
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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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(1 other version)The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Qualia that it is right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Conscious awareness and representation.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.details
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(6 other versions)Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Ted Warfield (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
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(4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. [REVIEW]Nathaniel Caldwell - 1926 - Philosophical Review 35:189-90.details
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Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.details
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Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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On the Phenomenology of Introspection.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 129.details
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Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world1.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):352-383.details
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Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.details
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Elements of a Phenomenological Theory of Perception.Gianfranco Soldati - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):461-484.details
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(1 other version)Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Transparency of experience and the perceptual model of phenomenal awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.details
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Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory.Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.details
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