- The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Panentheism and Theistic Cosmopsychism: God and the Cosmos in the Bhavagad Gītā.Ricardo Sousa Silvestre - 2024 - Sophia 63 (3):1-23.details
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On the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts.Torin Alter - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):235 - 253.details
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Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Explanation and the hard problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.details
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Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Verlag. pp. 231-251.details
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An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (2):doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010.details
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Semantic gaps and protosemantics.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In J. Acacio de Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Quanta and Mind: Essays on the Connection Between Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness. Springer Verlag.details
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Physicalism and the burden of parsimony.Giacomo Zanotti - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11109-11132.details
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Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction.Giacomo Zanotti - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):283-297.details
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Dissolving type‐b physicalism.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):469-498.details
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Does the Folk Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness Exist?Michał Wyrwa - 2022 - Diametros 19 (71):46-66.details
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How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.details
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The zombie's cogito: Meditations on type-Q materialism.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585-605.details
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Analytic Panpsychism and the Metaphysics of Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2022 - The Monist 105 (1):110-130.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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A Pāli Buddhist Philosophy of Sentience: Reflections on Bhavaṅga Citta.Sean M. Smith - 2020 - Sophia 59 (3):457-488.details
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Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. [REVIEW]Itay Shani - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):413-434.details
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Befuddling the mind: radical Enactivism (Hutto-Myin style) and the metaphysics of experience.Itay Shani - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):39-56.details
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Metaphysical Foundations of Causation: Powers or Laws of Nature?Dmytro Sepetyi - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (2):295-309.details
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What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.details
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Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):73-89.details
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Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism.Susan Schneider - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.details
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Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 10 (1):113-136.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?Robert Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.details
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Mills Can't Think: Leibniz's Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.Marleen Rozemond - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (1):1-28.details
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The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):44-52.details
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Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?Adam J. Rock & Stanley Krippner - 2007 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 26 (1):33-40.details
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The Zombie Attack, Perry’s Parry, and a Riposte: A Slight Softening of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness.J. Brendan Ritchie - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):55-65.details
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Temporal naturalism: reconciling the “4Ms” and points of view within a robust liberal naturalism.Jack Reynolds - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1):1-21.details
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Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2107-2134.details
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Fundamentality physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (1):77-116.details
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Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.details
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É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?Tárik de Athayde Prata - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):255-276.details
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The philosophical issue in machine consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2021 - Husserl Studies 37 (3):209-228.details
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Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties.Brendan O’Sullivan - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.details
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Computational models of the emotions: from models of the emotions of the individual to modelling the emerging irrational behaviour of crowds. [REVIEW]Ephraim Nissan - 2009 - AI and Society 24 (4):403-414.details
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The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3361-3387.details
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Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085.details
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The evolutionary argument for phenomenal powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):293-316.details
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The obscurity of the physical: an objection to Chalmers’ conceivability argument.Felipe G. A. Moreira - 2020 - Filosofia Unisinos 21 (3):296-302.details
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The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity.Kevin Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):103-120.details
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If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails.Mousa Mohammadian - 2021 - Synthese 199:1599–1615.details
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Experiências, Conhecimento Fenomenal e Materialismo.Wilson Mendonça & Julia Telles Menezes - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):415-438.details
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