The essay theorizes the responsibilities moral agents may be said to have in relation to global structural social processes that have unjust consequences. How ought moral agents, whether individual or institutional, conceptualize their responsibilities in relation to global injustice? I propose a model of responsibility from social connection as an interpretation of obligations of justice arising from structural social processes. I use the example of justice in transnational processes of production, distribution and marketing of clothing to illustrate operations of structural (...) social processes that extend widely across regions of the world. The social connection model of responsibility says that all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices. I distinguish this model from a more standard model of responsibility, which I call a liability model. I specify five features of the social connection model of responsibility that distinguish it from the liability model: it does not isolate perpetrators; it judges background conditions of action; it is more forward looking than backward looking; its responsibility is essentially shared; and it can be discharged only through collective action. The final section of the essay begins to articulate parameters of reasoning that agents can use for thinking about their own action in relation to structural injustice. a Footnotesa Thanks to David Alexander, Daniel Drezner, David Owen, and Ellen Frankel Paul for comments on an earlier version of this essay. Thanks to David Newstone for research assistance. (shrink)

“Applied ethics” has been the major growth area in North American philosophy in the last decade, yet a robust confidence and enthusiasm over its promise is far from universal in academic philosophy. It is considered nonphilosophical in West Germany, and has largely failed to penetrate British departments of philosophy. Whether it has any intellectually or pedagogically redeeming value is still widely debated in North America, where many who have tried to teach some area of applied ethics for the first time (...) have seen their courses grind to a halt in unresolvable quandaries, practical exigencies, or unavailable technical information. Consequently, some departments are at war over whether to hire or confer tenure on those who teach these subjects. Many also remain unconvinced that philosophical generalizations or theories can play any significant role in applied contexts. They may even doubt both that applied ethics is really ethics and that philosophy should accomodate this creature in its curriculum. (shrink)

‘Applied ethics’, as that expression is now used, is a single rubric for a large range of different theoretical and practical activities. Such rubrics function partly as a protective device both within the academic community and outside it; a name of this kind suggests not just a discipline, but a particular type of discipline. In the case of ‘applied ethics’ the suggestive power of the name derives from a particular conception of the relationship of ethics to what goes on under (...) the rubric of ‘applied ethics’. Not everyone who conducts activities under that rubric owes allegiance to this conception and there are doubtless some who would repudiate it as strongly as I do. But it is that dominant conception from which most work in this area derives or aspires to derive its philosophical legitimacy. What is that conception? (shrink)

What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...) morally responsible for things that we cause. (shrink)

The Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World wishes to devote this special issue of Philosophy in the Contemporary World to themes in the philosophy of Michael Krausz. This is only fitting. For years now, Michael Krausz has been at the heart of our society’s liveliest exchanges. At many of our conferences, our group meetings, and in the pages of this journal, Krausz’s keen insights, probing challenges, supportive suggestions, and inspiring theses have helped us to shape our own views. More (...) so, his patient, elegant, and clear-minded presentations to us of his views have proved for many of us to be invaluable additions to our philosophical educations. (shrink)

In this article, I defend luck at the expense of risk. Or, more precisely, I try to make a distinction that gives both concepts fair treatment. I start by making it clear that luck stands in opposition to control and not to causation. Both luck and risk are related to causal uncertainty. But it is warranted to talk about risk only when the uncertainty involved is brought under control, as it is in some familiar forms of fair gambling such as (...) dicing and roulette. Life is however not a fair gamble. We rarely have the kind of control over the preconditions of life that we have over the preconditions of say dicing. Luck therefore has profound influence on our lives and our health. This means that the standard conception of responsibility - that is, that we stand responsible only for consequences that we control - breaks down far more often than what is usually acknowledged. I therefore end the article by arguing that the standard conception of responsibility ought to be supplemented with a different conception that I have called "responsibility because of social involvement.". (shrink)