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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate.Brie Gertler - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Epistemic agency: Some doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.details
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The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.Neil McDonnell - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Practical Knowledge without Luminosity.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):917-934.details
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Does the free will debate rest on a mistake?Saul Smilansky - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (3):173-88.details
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An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains.Shane Ward - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):374-395.details
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Part one: Are mental events outlaws?Mark Leon - 1980 - Philosophical Papers 9 (2):1-13.details
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The impossibility of psycho-physical laws.David Brooks - 1980 - Philosophical Papers 9 (October):21-45.details
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The Free Will Problem [Hobbes, Bramhall and Free Will].Paul Russell - 2011 - In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy in early modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 424-444.details
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Hume on free will.Paul Russell - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2020 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Springer. pp. 171-184.details
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Manifestations of Virtue.Arden Ali - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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Reasons and First-Person Authority.Severin Schroeder - 2017 - In Jesús Padilla Gálvez & Margit Gaffal (eds.), Intentionality and Action. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 123-138.details
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Agency and Alienation.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism In Question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 173-87.details
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Agential Settling Requires a Conscious Intention.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (01):139-155.details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Passive action and causalism.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):295-314.details
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Agency: Let's Mind What's Fundamental.Robert H. Wallace - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):285–298.details
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A Dilemma for Reductive Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2763–2785.details
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Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism.Steven J. Wagner - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):81-110.details
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Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility.Tillmann Vierkant - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507-534.details
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Is recursion language-specific? Evidence of recursive mechanisms in the structure of intentional action.Giuseppe Vicari & Mauro Adenzato - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 26:169-188.details
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Causality, determination and free will: towards an anscombean account of free action.Niels van Miltenburg - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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Expressive Embodiment: Hegel, Habitual Agency and the Shortcomings of Normative Expressivism.Italo Testa - 2021 - Hegel Bulletin 42 (1):114-132.details
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Deviant Causal Chains, Knowledge of Reasons, and Akrasia.Gregory Strom - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):67-76.details
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Joint action without robust theory of mind.Daniel Story - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5009-5026.details
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The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.details
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Reasons with rationalism after all.Michael Smith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):521-530.details
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Actions, cognition and the self.Peter Slezak - 1986 - Synthese 66 (3):405 - 435.details
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No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
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Agency.A. P. Simester - 1996 - Law and Philosophy 15 (2):159 - 181.details
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Free will and the structure of motivation.David Shatz - 1985 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-82.details
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Free Will and the Structure of Motivation.David Shatz - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-482.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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The intentionality of intention and action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.details
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The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):47-70.details
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The intentionality of intention and action.John R. Searle - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):47-70.details
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The Metaphysics of Rule-Following.Markus E. Schlosser - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369.details
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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There is no escape from philosophy: Collective intentionality and empirical social science.Antti Saaristo - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.details
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Inner Achievement.Guy Rohrbaugh - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1191-1204.details
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An aristotelian approach to cognitive enhancement.Lubomira Radoilska - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375.details
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Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5 (6):153-172.details
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Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.details
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