The story of Jonathan and David stands out as the Bible's lengthiest and most complex narrative reflection on friendship. Far from idealizing the mutuality of their devotion, however, this story invites readers to ponder the human freedom to accept, reject, exploit, or reciprocate the gift of a friend's loyalty.

This article falls into two parts: the first is an analysis, in the light of my earlier discussions of and of the Homeric usage of and the second, an attempt to show that, as in the case of the effects of Homeric usage persist to a considerable degree in the moral philosophy of Aristotle. In the earlier discussions I have argued that the higher value placed upon the competitive in Greek entails that co-operative relationships, even when valued and necessary, take (...) the form dictated by the more valued qualities, the The most general words to denote co-operative relationships in Greek are and its derivatives: my purpose here is to show how the Homeric usage of these words is related to the Homeric standard and to Homeric society, and to sketch in the outline of a wider discussion, which I hope to be able to fill in later. (shrink)

This paper offers a definition of social holism that makes the doctrine non-trivial but possibly true. According to that definition, the social holist maintains that people depend non-causally on interaction with one another for possession of the capacity to think; the thesis is meant to be a contingent truth but one, like physicalism, that is plausible in the light of some a priori argument and some plausible empirical assumptions. The paper also sketches an argument in support of social holism, which (...) connects with themes in a number of traditions, philosophical and sociological. The key idea is that people depend on socially shared dispositions and responses for the ability to identify - identify fallibly - the properties and other entities that they consider in each individual has to the course of thinking. (shrink)

This essay seeks to question a certain imbalance in many existing accounts of Plato's dialogues. This imbalance involves a tendency to place too much emphasis upon a dualism between matter and spirit, soul and body. Although the author by no means denies the presence of such dualistic elements, she wishes to qualify them with reference to those aspects of Plato's dialogues which appear to place a stress upon the importance of multiplicity, myth, ritual, society, history, mimesis and time. Such instances (...) of mediation, it will be argued, are just as central to an understanding of Plato's philosophy as instances where the body and/or instances of multiplicity appear to be deprioritised in favour of the soul and the unity of the intelligible realm. These issues will be explored with particular reference to Plato's examination of the nature of justice in the city and its relationship with the philosopher‐guardians exercise of phronesis. What is the relationship between dikaiosyne and phronesis? In order to answer this question, several further questions will be raised: What, for Plato, is a city? What is philosophy? And why, in the Laws, does the Athenian describe the city as “the true tragedy”? (shrink)