One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70, Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations. In itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in Early Modern philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea of balancing between available options which Marcelo Dascal (...) has discussed in his important 2005 article “The Balance of Reason”. -/- Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66, he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods. -/- I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of akratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais. (shrink)

The author characterizes the model of rationality devised by critical rationalism in opposition to the classic model of rationality and as an alternative to this. He illustrates and criticizes the trichotomous theory of knowledge which, going back to Max Scheler, is received in a secularized version by Habermas and Apel, also under the influence of the hermeneutic tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer and of the so-called “critical theory” of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. The author criticizes historicism as it expects (...) to be an alternative to naturalism and not to make use of the method based on scientific laws. The author proposes as an example of technological social science the model developed in economics starting from Adam Smith. With regard to legal theories, natural law is rejected because of its sociomorphic cosmology. It is proposed that legal science as social technology has two parts. One part aims at efficient interpretations of valid law (for the space-time region concerned) and a second part aims at the construction of efficient norms for the modification of valid law by legislation. (shrink)

Technical thinking predominates in industrial society. It also predominates ethics. Virtually everything is viewed in terms of the technical model or—more broadly—the reductionistic machine model. Neither of these models has any room for life as a fundamental and decisive factor. Huge problems have been the result. Our appreciation of technology will change completely if the will to power and mastery will be exchanged for respect for all that lives, in all its multi-coloured variety and multiplicity. The aim of technology should (...) become, not to break down and to reduce reality in order to master and control, but to unfold and cause to flourish. We should nurture the perspective of the living and vibrant garden-city, of a culture that takes care of nature and the environment. An ethics of responsibility involves a large agenda. It calls for its own, distinct development, and a spiritual and philosophical struggle with the dominant traditions of ethics in our culture. (shrink)

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions (...) on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence. (shrink)

Im Schatten der „offiziellen‟ Technikphilosophie sind in der jüngeren Vergangenheit Arbeiten entstanden, welche sich verschiedenen Techniken zuwenden und deren konkrete geschichtliche Entwicklung philosophisch aufarbeiten. Nach einem kurzen Abriß der Technikphilosophie in Deutschland seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, wird auf eine kleine Auswahl solcher Arbeiten naher eingegangen. Hierbei stellt man eine überraschende Nahe zu den Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaften fest.

The author draws attention to gnoseologically not enough investigated phenomenon of automorphism thinking. In the widely known works of F. Varela, and U. Maturana automorphism is associated mainly with the study of the adaptation of biological organisms. It appears, however, that the possibilities of this approach are more significant. The author believes that the driving force of thinking activity is the constructive combination. Cognitive morphogenesis processes as a free combination of symbolic forms, managed by rules of mental experimentation over one’s (...) own resources, resulting in the development of the spiritual world of a person. The ‘generation of meanings through distinction of meanings‘ logic is a lever that starts independent-functioning automatic processes. Such a spiritual auto-modelling generates symbolic morphisms – what is referred to as drawing ‘castles in the air‘, creating constructions without basement. The author comes to the conclusion that in scientific knowledge, as in poetry, all abilities of associative consciousness on the basis of auto-modelling mechanism are involved and they serve as indicators for creation of form. In this process tools of internal semantic transformations aimed at paramorph exposure of reality are applied. (shrink)

Tracing the interplay between theory and practice in the dynamics of philosophical argument, This paper represents philosophy as an open, Critical discipline, Which keeps asking the same fundamental questions about knowledge, Reality, Justice, Freedom, Harmony and truth under changing historical conditions. In the light of this, The present impasse of human thought which manifests itself in the confrontation between totalitarian functionalism in the west on the one hand and totalitarian ideologism in the east on the other, The need for a (...) reversal of thinking becomes evident. The present deadlock of human thought and the confrontation between west and east resulting from it can be broken only if one-Sided functional practice is replaced by fully-Fledged human practice. This requires moving beyond popper's one-Dimensional 'critical' rationalism and marxism-Leninism's 'scientific' dialectical materialism to a critical humanism, Based on man's contingent experience of reality. (shrink)

The truth potential of art is realized not only by great art (of educated elites) but also by the cultural industry that has become the art of the masses. Great art and cultural industry do not only contradict one another but often interpenetrate and overlap subversively. Especially in critical periods of crisis (and revolution) great art and cultural industry go together with political action. However, in more counterrevolutionary periods as nowadays post-truth democracy, Adorno's gloomiest interpretation of the cultural industry becomes (...) topical again. (shrink)

In this article I propose a theological reflection on the philosophical assumptions behind the idea that intelligent machine can be governed through ethical protocols, which may apply either to the people who develop the machines or to the machines themselves, or both. This idea is particularly relevant in the case of machines’ extreme wrongdoing, a wrongdoing that becomes an existential risk for humankind. I call this extreme wrong-doing, ‘evil.’ Thus, this article is a theological account on the philosophical assumptions behind (...) the possibility of evil machines, machines that can create an existential risk for humankind, and the ethical remedies that limit that risk. After discussing these assumptions, I argue for the ineffectiveness of these ethical remedies to prevent the possibility of evil machines. The article is an application of Romano Guardini’s thought on technology to evil machines. (shrink)

The label ‘Frankfurt School’ became popular in the ‘positivism dispute’ in the mid-1960s, but this article shows that it is wrong to describe Jürgen Habermas as representing a ‘second generation’ of exponents of critical theory. His communication theory of society is intended not as a transformation of, but as an alternative to, the older tradition of thought represented by Adorno and Horkheimer. The novel and innovative character of Habermas’s approach is demonstrated in relation to three thematic complexes: (1) the public (...) sphere and language; (2) democracy and the constitutional state; and (3) system and lifeworld as categories for a theory of modernity. (shrink)

Three philosophical perspectives on the relation between technology and society are distinguished and discussed: 1) technology as an autonomous force that determines society; 2) technology as a human construct that can be shaped by human values, and 3) a co-evolutionary perspective on technology and society where neither of them determines the other. The historical evolution of the three perspectives is discussed and it is argued that all three are still present in current debates about technological change and how it may (...) affect society. This is illustrated for the case of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is argued that each of the three perspectives contributes to the debate of AI but that the third has the strongest potential to uncover blind spots in the current debate. (shrink)

This article investigates the status assigned to Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as a case study on the development of the concept of theory in twentieth century sociology. I trace this development in the interplay between scholars in the United States and Germany and distinguish three waves of meaning given to the text. The transitions between these phases were brought about by an initial process of mystification of the text in the 1930s and a dynamic (...) of de- and re-mystification beginning in the 1980s. Following this process of (re)interpretation over time, I show that at the beginning of the century the work was perceived as an empirical inquiry, while at the end of the century it was treated as pure theory. Based on the example of the peculiarities of the Weberian expert communities in the United States and Germany, I analyze how the invention of a concept of theory as independent from empirical evidence helped to stabilize the value of scholarly expertise on Weber in the face of otherwise declining resonance of the text. The analysis of this paradigmatic case adds to our understanding of the development, uses, and meaning of theory in contemporary sociology. (shrink)

The 'critical turn' in tourism studies is defined as a research perspective that explores social transfor- mation in and through tourism by facing the negative impact of strategic-instrumental rationality on this activity. This work explores the features of discourse ethics that may normatively support tourism transformation, a gap that has not been thoroughly discussed in tourism research. For this purpose, the study combines the use of critical and ethical theory with an analysis of discourse ethics in tourism literature to demonstrate (...) that the use of Habermasian discourse ethics needs to be complemented with the Apelian approach. Through these steps the work reveals the theoretical bases of discourse ethics to discuss whether understandings between stakeholders guided by strategic-instrumental rationality can be reached not only in the political sphere —Habermas—, but also in the ethical field —Apel. (shrink)

El presente estudio tiene por fin contribuir al debate contemporáneo en torno al rol que desempeña la religión en la cultura y sociedad nacidas de la modernidad. Se intenta analizar la estructura misma de la cultura y su relación con la vivencia religiosa. A continuación, se advierte de los peligros que la exclusión de la sociedad de esta última podría suponer; finalmente, intentamos diseñar algunas propuestas para restablecer una convivencia armónica de la religión con la sociedad actual cuya estructura invita (...) al pensamiento religioso a asumir una nueva condición acorde a los tiempos. This study aims to contribute to the contemporary debate about the role that religion in the culture and society born of modernity. We try to analyze the structure of culture and its relationship to religious experience. Then we warn of the dangers that the exclusion of the religion involves; finally, we try to design some proposals to restore harmonious coexistence of religion in the contemporary society whose structure invites the religious thinking to assume a new status according to times. -/- . (shrink)

The concept of free will has been heavily debated in philosophy and the social sciences. Its alleged importance lies in its association with phenomena fundamental to our understandings of self, such as autonomy, freedom, self-control, agency, and moral responsibility. Consequently, when neuroscience research is interpreted as challenging or even invalidating this concept, a number of heated social and ethical debates surface. We undertook a content analysis of media coverage of Libet’s et al.’s :623–642, 1983) landmark study, which is frequently interpreted (...) as posing a serious challenge to the existence of free will. Media descriptions of Libet et al.’s experiment provided limited details about the original study. Overall, many media articles reported that Libet et al.’s experiments undermined the existence of free will, despite acknowledging that several methodological limitations had been identified in the literature. A propensity to attribute greater credibility than warranted to neurobiological explanations could be at stake. (shrink)

This essay explores how the experience of National Socialism provoked German intellectuals to rethink elitist conventions in politics. It focuses on three figures in the town of Heidelberg—Alexander Mitscherlich, Dolf Sternberger, and Alfred Weber—as well as on a journal and a discussion forum that they established after 1945. Breaking with both mandarin and vanguardist traditions, they conceived a politics that neither transpired over the masses’ heads nor sought to organize them from above but rested on the people's participation from below. (...) Moreover, a correspondence existed between their thinking on democracy and the grassroots, extra-institutional activities they pursued in an attempt to realize what they called “publicness”. Finally, the essay relates such immediate postwar ideas and practices to these intellectuals’ stances toward West Germany after 1949 as well as to the discussion on “publicness” that unfolded there, as exemplified in Jürgen Habermas's early work. (shrink)

The paper addresses the question of how the unity of science can adequately be characterized. A mere classification of scientific fields and disciplines does not express the unity of science unless it is supplemented with a perspective that establishes a systematic coherence among the different branches of science. Four ideas of this kind are discussed. Namely, the unity of scientific language, of scientific laws, of scientific method and of science as a practical‐operational enterprise. Whereas reference to the unity of scientific (...) language and of scientific laws does not provide a viable basis for the unity of science, the methodological and practical unity might. The unity of science can be characterized by the way in which methodological criteria enter into the assessment or evaluation of theories, and, moreover, by a transdisciplin‐ary approach to problems. Accordingly, the unity of science is not expressed by theoretical uniformity but by the unity of scientific practice. (shrink)

Science is considered as an open system that constitutes a sub-entity of the total system "society" and whose functions include the production, systematization, communication and application of knowledge. Since this system is made up of individuals and groups, its functions are dependent on psychological factors. This fact serves as a starting point for a psychology of science, which can contribute to optimizing scientific practice by treating the heuristic, organizational, technological, and normative aspects of scientific activity.

Der Wissenschaftskonzeption der "kritischen Theorie" der zu verändernden Gesellschaft wird im wesentlichen zugestimmt. Sie wird verteidigt insbesondere gegen ein Selbstverständnis der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften, das sich im Namen der "Freiheit von Forschung und Lehre" auf einen Begriff "der" interesse- bzw. wertfreien Wissenschaft zurückzieht. Andererseits will der Autor die genannte Konzeption ergänzen bzw. präzisieren: Zwar stellt die Einheit von Theorie und Praxis ein Postulat philosophischer Reflexion dar, letztere erweist aber auf ihrer höchsten Stufe das politisch interessierte Engagement und das wissenschaftliche Interesse (...) an entdogmatisierender Reflexion jedes Engagements unter den Bedingungen menschlicher Endlichkeit als polar-entgegengesetzte, auseinandertretende Momente. (shrink)

The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, (...) we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality. (shrink)

Der erkenntnistheoretische Realismus ist die systematische Basis dessen, was im Positivismusstreit als positivistisch attackiert worden war; darum knüpft der Beitrag an jene Kontroverse an. An die Analyse der argumentativen Funktion des Realismus innerhalb der Popperschen Wissenschaftslehre schließt sich eine sinnkritische Rekonstruktion der realistischen Unabhängigkeitsthese aus den Kontexten technischen, experimentellen und kommunikativen Handelns an mit dem Ziel, die Bedeutungsabhängigkeit eines jeden Redens von "unabhängiger Realität" von solchen Handlungskontexten zu erweisen. Die Darlegungen schließen mit der These, daß der Poppersche Realismus nur eine (...) Konsistenzbedingung experimentellen Handelns formuliert und philosophisch als ein bloßes Mittel der Legitimation und Stabilisierung dieses Handlungstypus zu verstehen ist. (shrink)

The Habermasian concept of ‘interest’ has had a profound effect on the characterization of scientific disciplines. Going beyond issues unrelated to the theory itself, intra‐theoretical interest characterizes the specific ways of approaching any science‐related discipline, defining research topics and methodologies. This approach was developed by Jürgen Habermas in relation to empirical–analytical sciences, historical–hermeneutics sciences, and critical sciences; however, he did not make any specific references to health sciences. This article aims to contribute to shaping a general epistemological framework for health (...) sciences, as well as its specific implications for the medical and nursing areas, via an analysis of the basic knowledge interests developed by Habermas. (shrink)

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions (...) on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that conventional reasoning on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is based on the assumption of a liberal market economy in the context of a nation state. I build on the study of Scherer and Palazzo (Acad Manage Rev 32(4):1096-1120, 2007), developing a number of criteria to identify elements of liberal philosophy in the ongoing CSR debate. I discuss their occurrence in the CSR literature in detail and reflect on the implications, taking into account the emerging political (...) reading of the firm. I conclude that the apolitical framework in the mainstream CSR literature has to be overcome since it does not reflect recent changes in the socio-economic conditions for economic actors in a globalizing world. (shrink)

In modern continental thought, natural science is widely portrayed as an exclusively instrumental mode of reason. The breadth of this consensus has partly preempted the question of how it came to persuade. The process of persuasion, as it played out in Germany, can be explored by reconstructing the intellectual exchanges among three twentieth-century theorists of science, Heidegger, Habermas, and Werner Heisenberg. Taking an iconic Heisenberg as a kind of limiting case of “the scientist,” Heidegger and Habermas each found themselves driven (...) to place new constraints on their previously more capacious assessments of science, especially its capacity to reflect on its method. Tracing how that happened, through archival and historical contextualization and close readings of their texts, lets us make visible Heidegger and Habermas’s intellectual affinities and argumentative parallels, which derived not only from their shared grounding in earlier reactions against positivism, but also from confrontation with contemporary events. The latter included, for Heidegger, the rise of a technically powerful science exemplified by nuclear physics, and for Habermas, post-World War II controversies over science, technology, and their socially critical possibilities. (shrink)

As a relational concept, responsible innovation can be made more tangible by asking innovation of what and responsibility of whom for what? Arranging the scattered field of responsible innovation comprehensively, starting from an anthropological point of view, into five fields of tension and five categories of spearheads, may be theoretically and practically helpful while offering suggestions for both research and management.

The authors discuss Popper's and Kuhn's theories of science and consider whether these can explain the real course taken by the history of science, that is the real behaviour of scientists seen in an historical light. It has mainly to do with the problem of what criteria influence scientists in deciding on the acceptance of one of several possible theories. The authors postulate the necessity of introducing the category of "objective technological Erkenntnisinteresse" to help solve the problem. They illustrate this (...) by analysing the various models of the structure of Benzol, proposed by Kekulé, Claus and Ladenburg. According to the authors, Popper and Kuhn cannot explain the fact that the model of Kekulé was readily accepted. It can however be explained with the category of Erkenntnisinteresse. (shrink)

Organizations routinely make choices when addressing conflicting stakes of their stakeholders. As stakeholder theory continues to mature, scholars continue to seek ways to make it more usable, yet proponents continue to debate its legitimacy. Various scholarly attempts to ground stakeholder theory have not narrowed down this debate. We draw from the work of Juergen Habermas to theoretically advance stakeholder theory, and to provide practical examples to illustrate our approach. Specifically, we apply Habermas’ language-pragmatic approach to extend stakeholder theory by advancing (...) seven sets of normative axioms. We conclude that a deliberative approach, with its focus on the conditions of legitimation and deliberative democracy, has the potential to become a cornerstone of stakeholder theory. The need for global stakeholder discourse and its internalization in corporate structures and institutions is exemplified by a multitude of CSR and stakeholder initiatives that have mushroomed in response to global risk scenarios such as climate change, nuclear warfare, or terrorism. Further research may help to build a functioning global governance system in order to provide guidance for management in the 21st century. (shrink)

Der Essay behandelt Aspekte des philosophisch seit Jahren breit diskutierten Problems der Anerkennung aus psychoanalytischer Perspektive. Im Zentrum stehen dabei zwei »asymmetrische« Anerkennungsprozesse, die beide mit extremen, Anfang und Ende eines Lebenszyklus bezeichnenden biographischen Konstellationen zusammenhängen, nämlich, mit Rückgriff auf Fichtes Theorie der »Aufforderung«, die Kommunikation zwischen dem Erwachsenen und dem Kind sowie die Anerkennungsprozesse, die sich im Feld zwischen Leben und Tod vollziehen. Ausgehend von Freuds »Trauer und Melancholie« und im Anschluss an Konzepte Winnicotts wird Trauer als paradoxer Anerkennungsprozess (...) verstanden: als Konstitution einer inneren »Objektverwendung« durch Zerstörung einer inneren »Objektbeziehung«. (shrink)

The contemporary proliferation of “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” seems to render obsolete the notion of a public sphere in the singular. In my article, I would like to argue against this view: Following Jürgen Habermas, “the public sphere” can be understood as the concomitant horizon of communicative action, while the latter permeates society as a whole. On the basis of this socio-philosophical approach, the omnipresent tendencies toward fragmentation appear as reactive attempts to ward off this socially established and context-transcending (...) context of discussion. Habermas himself, however, has never adopted this perspective. Instead, he interprets the various symptoms of the decline of the public sphere—including its fragmentation—as the result of a “colonization of the lifeworld” by economic, bureaucratic, and technological system logics. However, on the basis of the concept of “systematically distorted communication,” which was still crucial for Habermas’s early work, it is possible to reconstruct how the lifeworld context of communicative action, out of which the public sphere emerges, is not only corroded and cut through from the outside by system logics but also exhibits its own dialectic of the refusal of discourse and the overcoming of this refusal. The fragmentation of the public sphere that we are confronted with today can be theoretically interpreted and politically addressed as a precarious standstill of this dialectic. (shrink)

Evidence-based policy-making (EBP) is widely seen as a key instrument for good policy-making. Yet in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the debate on the relation of science and policy-making gained new momentum. The premises of EBP, its narrow understanding of what kind of knowledge counts and how to make decisions, appeared inapt to provide a sound foundation for policy-making under conditions of high complexity and uncertainty. This paper addresses the major shortcomings of EBP and argues for revising its evidentialist (...) framework. First, the idea of evidence itself has to be extended and pluralized by including alternative forms of knowledge. Second, uncertainty has to be taken seriously as a fundamental epistemic condition. To arrive at a more apt model of policy-making, this paper suggests to adopt a pragmatist perspective on the relation of politics, science and the public. This leads to an experimentalist account in the meliorist spirit. Such an account highlights the role of experience, participatory processes and collective learning. Furthermore, and in contrast to scientistic models, it underlines political responsibility and demands to cultivate sensitivity for possible failures and tragic constellations. Finally, a non-evidentialist model of policy advice is outlined. (shrink)

ABSTRACT “Complexity” is ubiquitous in contemporary political commentary, where it is invoked to justify innovative governance programs. However, the term lacks analytic clarity. One way to make sense of it is to construct a genealogy of the notion of “wicked problems,” a concept that highlights the intractability of complex problems and problematizes the technocratic management of complexity. The term wicked problems originated in science planning in postwar Germany and urban planning in the United States. In both cases, planners rejected a (...) naïve optimism about the potential of technical expertise in favor of recognizing that many problems transcend the knowledge possessed by experts. This appreciation of complexity led to attempts, still ongoing, to accommodate both participatory and expert-based decision making in the face of wicked problems, producing a form of technical democracy in which problem solving requires the orchestration of conflict. (shrink)

Digital communication now pervades all spheres of life, creating new possibilities for commodification: personal data and communication are the new resources of surplus value. This in turn brings about a totally new category of threats to privacy. With recourse to the culture industry critique of early critical theory, this article seeks to challenge basic theoretical assumptions held within a liberal account of privacy. It draws the attention to the entanglement of technical and socio-economic transformations and aims at elaborating an alternative (...) framing which takes into account that privacy is not in the first place a pre-political space for individual freedom but a constituted sphere in which social power relations are reproduced in a particularly deceitful way. With recourse to positions of critical theory, this article revisits the conceptual ambiguity of liberation and oppression and looks to draft prospects for a socio-theoretical justification and critique of privacy, updated for the digital age. Following the tradition of critical theory, the argument focuses on (new) forms of domination in and by privacy. It aims to prepare the ground for a critique of the social’s increasing commodification as well as an idea of privacy understood as reflexive participation in social practices. (shrink)

There is a continuing irresolution on the levels, both of theory and political praxis, vis-à-vis a coming to terms with the problem of 'historical greatness'. This results from the pre-history of a concept which is, when seen in the context of a systematic theory of science, in two respects methodologically unsatisfactory. 1. The pre-idealist understanding of "greatness", in the sense of canonical exemplariness, is based on a timeless concept of morality, itself determined through a heteronomous concept of norm-giving transcendence and/or (...) nature. 2. The philosophy of history ignores the Kantian reference to the autonomy of the genesis of human orientation; instead it sees this genesis not as the expression of a potentially autonomous normativity but as a source of normative existential orientation. In this orientation the goal and the steps towards the goal are pre-reflexively implied. In the philosophy of history the 'historically great' function as genial mediators between telos and epoché. Their actions are not explicable by the categories of normal rationality. The lack of a sufficient methodology of socially practicable communication continues to lessen the chances of overcoming the practical and theoretical dependency on the idea of the mediating genius. Yet the shift to a critical social hermeneutic remains impossible as long as hermeneutic theory is willing to deny itself in the face of a purely scientistic analytic philosophy. (shrink)