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  1. Objections to Ostritsch’s argument in “The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation”.Garry Young - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (3):209-219.
    This paper raises three objections to the argument presented by Ostritsch in The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation, in which the amoralist’s mantra “it’s just a game” is viewed as an illegitimate rebuttal of all moral objections to video games. The first objection focuses on Ostritsch’s ‘strong sense’ of player enjoyment, which I argue is too crude, given the moral work it is meant to be doing. Next, I question the legitimacy of Ostritsch’s claim that certain (...)
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  • Violent video games and morality: a meta-ethical approach.Garry Young - 2015 - Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):311-321.
    This paper considers what it is about violent video games that leads one reasonably minded person to declare “That is immoral” while another denies it. Three interpretations of video game content are discussed: reductionist, narrow, and broad. It is argued that a broad interpretation is required for a moral objection to be justified. It is further argued that understanding the meaning of moral utterances—like “x is immoral”—is important to an understanding of why there is a lack of moral consensus when (...)
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  • Homo ludens: A study of the play‐element in cult.Johan Huizinga - 1949 - Routledge/Thoemms Press.
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  • The incorrigible social meaning of video game imagery.Stephanie Patridge - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 13 (4):303-312.
    In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist (...)
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  • Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
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  • Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Ethik.Sebastian Ostritsch - 2018 - In Daniel Martin Feige, Sebastian Ostritsch & Markus Rautzenberg (eds.), Philosophie des Computerspiels: Theorie – Praxis – Ästhetik. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 77-96.
    Wovon reden wir, wenn wir über die Ethik des Computerspiels sprechen? Unter dem Ausdruck ›Ethik‹ wollen wir im Folgenden die philosophische Ethik verstehen, d. h. die systematische, argumentativ-rationale Reflexion der normativen und evaluativen Dimension menschlicher Praxis. Einer Ethik in diesem Sinne geht es also nicht darum, normative und/oder evaluative Meinungsäußerungen zu tätigen, sondern darum, nach der Berechtigung und den Prinzipien derartiger normativer und/oder evaluativer Urteile zu fragen. Als Ethik des Computerspiels wird der Reflexionsbereich nun entsprechend eingeschränkt, nämlich vom Gesamtbereich menschlicher (...)
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  • Ontologie.Sebastian Ostritsch & Jakob Steinbrenner - 2018 - In Daniel Martin Feige, Sebastian Ostritsch & Markus Rautzenberg (eds.), Philosophie des Computerspiels: Theorie – Praxis – Ästhetik. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 55-74.
    In der Ontologie wird einerseits danach gefragt, was für Arten von Gegebenem es überhaupt gibt und andererseits, worin das Sein eines Gegenstandes bzw. einer Art von Gegenstand besteht. Im Folgenden wollen wir uns mit der Ontologie der Computerspiele beschäftigen. Dass es so etwas wie Computerspiele tatsächlich gibt, ist im Gegensatz zu der Frage, ob es Abstrakta wie allgemeine Eigenschaften oder fiktive Entitäten gibt, evident und unkontrovers. Spannender, weil alles andere als offensichtlich, ist aber die Antwort auf die Frage, was Computerspiele (...)
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  • Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • An Expressivist Account of the Difference between Poor Taste and Immorality.Garry Young - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):465-482.
    This paper considers whether proposition – “x is not immoral but it is in poor taste” – is morally contradictory when considered from the standpoint of constructive ecumenical expressivism. According to CEE, pronouncements about poor taste and immorality have the following in common: they each convey a negative attitude towards x and intimate that x ought not to be done. Given this, P1 is vulnerable to a charge of contradiction, as it intimates that x is both something and not something (...)
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  • The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation.Sebastian Ostritsch - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (2):117-128.
    According to the amoralist, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation because morality applies to reality only, and games are not real but “just games”. This challenges our everyday moralist intuition that some games are to be met with moral criticism. I discuss and reject the two most common answers to the amoralist challenge and argue that the amoralist is right in claiming that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in simply playing a game. I go on to argue for (...)
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  • A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming.Garry Young - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):91-102.
    The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-player gamespace (e.g., murder, rape, paedophilia) continues to be debated and, to date, a consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented (e.g., virtue theory and utilitarianism) to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual (...)
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  • Moral judgments and works of art: The case of narrative literature.Mary Devereaux - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (1):3–11.
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