Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the (...) social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons. "Each person," writes Rawls, "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." Advancing the ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, and Lincoln, Rawls's theory is as powerful today as it was when first published. (shrink)

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is a pertinent example of a framework that has been stretched over many conceptual contexts and that has been applied to a wide variety of empirical phenomena. A pressing issue involves the scope of application of stakeholder theory, however, because it is not a comprehensive ethical scheme or problem-solving algorithm. We begin our search for the boundaries of stakeholder management by identifying a presently under-acknowledged yet major underlying assumption, notably that the approach is rooted in voluntary action and (...) association. Building on this presumption, we argue that firm - stakeholder relationships are best to be understood in contractualist terms; i.e. as voluntary arrangements between two or more parties seeking mutual benefit. This assertion subsequently allows us to identify three boundary conditions applying to stakeholder theory: (1) the parties should be sufficiently autonomous; (2) their interests need to be alignable; and (3) they should be capable of living up to their commitments. We substantiate these criteria with evidence from a collective case study of buyer - supplier relationships in the Dutch manufacturing sector, demonstrating that the stakeholder management model fails when these boundary criteria are violated. (shrink)

Our research has found that companies which have diverged from traditional management in order to adopt strategies which include ethics, cooperation and a joint vision of management obtain a greater added value. The new challenges of competitiveness require a position of active cooperation between firms and their suppliers, which should be considered as collaborators rather than adversaries. An active cooperation management may well allow the company to improve the quality of its products and its image, speed up delivery to its (...) clients and make its production and trading more agile, thus enhancing the perception the client has of the product. An improved ethical quality in our dealings, generating trust, improving communication and establishing long-term relationships with joint added value, results in higher competitiveness and greater creation of wealth. (shrink)

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

Is morality rational? In this book Gauthier argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. He proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of cooperation, rather than according to what would give an individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice (...) did not have that end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, the author establishes morals on the firm foundation of reason. Gauthier's argument includes an account of value, linking it to preference and utility; a discussion of the curcumstances in which morality is unnecessary; and an application of morals by agreement to relations between peoples at different levels of development and different generations. Finally, he reflects on the assumptions about individuality and community made by his account of rationality and morality. (shrink)

By the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Presenting a sustained critique of moral theory from Kant onwards, Williams reorients ethical theory towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy (...) and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a new commentary on the text by A.W.Moore and a foreword by Jonathan Lear. (shrink)

T. M. Scanlon's magisterial book What We Owe to Each Other is surely one of the most sophisticated and important works of moral philosophy to have appeared for many years. It raises fundamental questions about all the main aspects of the subject, and I hope and expect that it will have a decisive influence on the shape and direction of moral philosophy in the years to come. In this essay I shall focus on four sets of issues raised by Scanlon's (...) systematic argument, with the aim of clarifying some of Scanlon's central assumptions and presenting alternatives at several key points. The perspective from which I offer these comments is that of a reader who is sympathetic to Scanlon's general approach but not yet convinced on various points of detail. (shrink)

One of the reasons why Kantian contractualism has been seen as an appealing alternative to utilitarianism is that it seems to be able to avoid utilitarianism's extreme demandingness, while retaining a fully impartial moral point of view. I argue that in the current state of the world, contractualist obligations to help those in need are not significantly less demanding than utilitarian obligations. I also argue that while a plausible version of utilitarianism would be considerably less demanding if the state of (...) the world were different, a central aspect of contractualism means that it would remain exceedingly demanding in any practically realizable state of the world. (shrink)

The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...) This unexpected victory proved that cooperation - one might even say altruism - is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. (shrink)

Sufficiently frequent interaction between partners has been identified by, a.o., Axelrod as a more-or-less sufficient condition for stable cooperation. The underlying argument is that rational cooperation is ensured if short-term benefits from opportunistic behavior are offset by the long-term costs of sanctions imposed on the culprit. In this paper, we develop a model for ‘embedded trust’ in which a trustee interacts with a number of trustors who may communicate via a social network with each other about the behavior of the (...) trustor. The analysis reconfirms the standard predictions about how the level of trust depends on the payoffs and shadow of the future. We provide new predictions both on between-network effects (“which network is more favorable for cooperation?”) and on within-network effects (“in what network position can you trust more?”). (shrink)

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

Our research has found that companies which have diverged from traditional management in order to adopt strategies which include ethics, cooperation and a joint vision of management obtain a greater added value. The new challenges of competitiveness require a position of active cooperation between firms and their suppliers, which should be considered as collaborators rather than adversaries. An active cooperation management may well allow the company to improve the quality of its products and its image, speed up delivery to its (...) clients and make its production and trading more agile, thus enhancing the perception the client has of the product. An improved ethical quality in our dealings, generating trust, improving communication and establishing long-term relationships with joint added value, results in higher competitiveness and greater creation of wealth. (shrink)