In these pages, we expose the main traits of the doctrine of providence of Saint Albert the Great, according to his systematic works, mainly his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced by theological tradition over the centuries. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius or Saint John of Damascus and he gives his personal solution to the complex (...) questions of providence, destiny and contingency of the world. (shrink)

In these pages, we expose the main traits of St. Albert the Great’s doctrine of providence and fate, considered by Palazzo the keystone of his philosophical system. To describe it we examine his systematic works, primarily his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced over the centuries by theological tradition. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius or Saint (...) John of Damascus but, in his Summa he incorporates to his reflections also the noteworthy book of Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, which includes some pages on providence. Albert gives his personal solution to the complex questions of providence, destiny and contingency of the world. His conception of providence is developed in the frame of the creative power of the almighty God. God’s knowledge is necessary and inerrant and his providential purposes are infallible, but that does not mean that every event is necessary. He does not communicate His own proprieties to the creatures. In order to understand this problem, Albert recalls the notion of hypothetical necessity coined by Boethius in an Aristotelian framework and the difference between 'necessitas consequentis' and 'necessitas consequentiae' proposed by Alexander of Hales. He also develops his account of providence, closely linked to the topic of fate. However, it would be exaggerated to deem his position deterministic. (shrink)

Lex necessitatis vel contingentiae Cet article se propose de reconsidérer de manière critique deux présupposés spécifiques à l’interprétation gilsonienne de Thomas d’Aquin : (i) le fait que, dans l’univers thomasien, tous les étants différents de Dieu soient marqués par une « contingence radicale » ; (ii) l’idée qu’en dernière analyse cette contingence est fondée sur la distinction entre être et essence – et, plus généralement, (iii) la conviction que la conception thomiste de la providence se présente comme une alternative radicale (...) au déterminisme et au nécessitarisme de la tradition gréco-arabe. À cette fin, nous examinerons successivement les points suivants : les significations les plus communes que Thomas confère aux notions de nécessité et de contingence ; le rapport entre fortune, sort et providence ; la réfutation conditionnée du déterminisme astral ; le mode sur lequel la providence dispose les événements nécessaires aussi bien que les événements contingents ; les réactions opposées de Siger de Brabant et de Jean Duns Scot au modèle par lequel Thomas tente de sauver la contingence au sein de l’ordre providentiel ; l’affirmation par Thomas de l’existence de créatures formellement nécessaires. En conclusion, on suggère que Thomas affaiblit certains présupposés fondamentaux de la stratégie anti-déterministe mise en œuvre par Aristote dans le livre VI de la Métaphysique, que l’alternative entre nécessité et contingence ne représente pas chez Thomas le véritable départ entre le créateur et la créature, et que, pour cette raison, la distinction entre être et essence n’a pas pour premier et principal objectif de rendre compte de la contingence de tous les étants créés. (shrink)

This book explores the changing perspective of astrology from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Era. It introduces a framework for understanding both its former centrality and its later removal from legitimate knowledge and practice. The discussion reconstructs the changing roles of astrology in Western science, theology, and culture from 1250 to 1500. The author considers both the how and the why. He analyzes and integrates a broad range of sources. This analysis shows that the history of astrology—in particular, (...) the story of the protracted criticism and ultimate removal of astrology from the realm of legitimate knowledge and practice—is crucial for fully understanding the transition from premodern Aristotelian-Ptolemaic natural philosophy to modern Newtonian science. This removal, the author argues, was neither obvious nor unproblematic. Astrology was not some sort of magical nebulous hodge-podge of beliefs. Rather, astrology emerged in the 13th century as a richly mathematical system that served to integrate astronomy and natural philosophy, precisely the aim of the “New Science” of the 17th century. As such, it becomes a fundamentally important historical question to determine why this promising astrological synthesis was rejected in favor of a rather different mathematical natural philosophy—and one with a very different causal structure than Aristotle's. (shrink)