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Switch to: Citations
References in:
Completeness of Åqvist’s Systems _E_ and _F_
Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):164-177 (2015)
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This paper develops an informal semantics for 'ought to be' and 'ought to be given...' and argues for its plausibility. A feature of the semantics is that it invalidates 'if a entails b, And o(a), Then o(b)' and 'if o(a) & o(b), Then o(a&b)', While validating detachment for conditional obligation. |
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Cliff Landesman provides a vivid description of a case where we have no best outcome available to us. He poses this as a problem for utilitarians who advise us to do the best we can. This does indeed make such advice impractical. I begin by contrasting older versions of utilitarianism with newer ones that have appeared in deontic logic and that were designed precisely to accommodate Landesman's sort of scenario. (I cast matters in terms of the Limit Assumption and world-theoretic (...) |
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We discuss similarities and residual differences, within the general semantic framework of minimality, between defeasible inference, belief revision, counterfactual conditionals, updating — and also conditional obligation in deontic logic. Our purpose is not to establish new results, but to bring together existing material to form a clear overall picture. |
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The main contribution of this paper is a completeness result for an axiomatization of Hansson [13]'s deontic system DSDL2, whose semantics involves a non-necessarily transitive betterness relation. Reference is made to a deductive system put forth by Åqvist [2, 3]. |
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Recently, Bengt Hansson presented a paper about dyadic deontic logic,2 criticizing some purely axiomatic systems of dyadic deontic logic and proposing three purely semantical systems of dyadic deontic logic which he confidently called dyadic standard systems of deontic logic (DSDL1–3). Here I shall discuss the third by far most interesting system DSDL3 which is operating with preference relations. First, I shall describe this semantical system (Sections 1.1–1.3). Then I shall give an axiomatic system (Section 1.4) which is proved to be (...) |
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This paper reports completeness results for dyadic deontic logics in the tradition of Hansson’s systems. There are two ways to understand the core notion of best antecedent-worlds, which underpins such systems. One is in terms of maximality, and the other in terms of optimality. Depending on the choice being made, one gets different evaluation rules for the deontic modalities, but also different versions of the so-called limit assumption. Four of them are disentangled, and compared. The main observation of this paper (...) |
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