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  1. Proof complexity of propositional default logic.Olaf Beyersdorff, Arne Meier, Sebastian Müller, Michael Thomas & Heribert Vollmer - 2011 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 50 (7-8):727-742.
    Default logic is one of the most popular and successful formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning. In 2002, Bonatti and Olivetti introduced several sequent calculi for credulous and skeptical reasoning in propositional default logic. In this paper we examine these calculi from a proof-complexity perspective. In particular, we show that the calculus for credulous reasoning obeys almost the same bounds on the proof size as Gentzen’s system LK. Hence proving lower bounds for credulous reasoning will be as hard as proving lower bounds (...)
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  • Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
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  • Two Adaptive Logics of Norm-Propositions.Mathieu Beirlaen & Christian Straßer - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (2):147-168.
    We present two defeasible logics of norm-propositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict- and gap-tolerant logic of norm-propositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for non-monotonic reasoning in order to meet (...)
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  • Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.
    “Since today is Saturday, the grocery store is open today and will be closed tomorrow; so let’s go today”. That is an example of everyday practical reasoning—reasoning directly with the propositions that one believes but may not be fully certain of. Everyday practical reasoning is one of our most familiar kinds of decisions but, unfortunately, some foundational questions about it are largely ignored in the standard decision theory: (Q1) What are the decision rules in everyday practical reasoning that connect qualitative (...)
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  • Logic in general philosophy of science: old things and new things.Hannes Leitgeb - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):339 - 350.
    This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments.
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  • Completeness and Correspondence in Chellas–Segerberg Semantics.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):891-911.
    We investigate a lattice of conditional logics described by a Kripke type semantics, which was suggested by Chellas and Segerberg – Chellas–Segerberg (CS) semantics – plus 30 further principles. We (i) present a non-trivial frame-based completeness result, (ii) a translation procedure which gives one corresponding trivial frame conditions for arbitrary formula schemata, and (iii) non-trivial frame conditions in CS semantics which correspond to the 30 principles.
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  • Compact Representations of Extended Causal Models.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):986-1010.
    Judea Pearl (2000) was the first to propose a definition of actual causation using causal models. A number of authors have suggested that an adequate account of actual causation must appeal not only to causal structure but also to considerations of normality. In Halpern and Hitchcock (2011), we offer a definition of actual causation using extended causal models, which include information about both causal structure and normality. Extended causal models are potentially very complex. In this study, we show how it (...)
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  • Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.
    Recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy has shown that judgments of actual causation are often influenced by consideration of defaults, typicality, and normality. A number of philosophers and computer scientists have also suggested that an appeal to such factors can help deal with problems facing existing accounts of actual causation. This article develops a flexible formal framework for incorporating defaults, typicality, and normality into an account of actual causation. The resulting account takes actual causation to be both graded and (...)
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  • Entitlement and Evidence.Martin Smith - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.
    Entitlement is conceived as a kind of positive epistemic status, attaching to certain propositions, that involves no cognitive or intellectual accomplishment on the part of the beneficiary — a status that is in place by default. In this paper I will argue that the notion of entitlement — or something very like it — falls out of an idea that may at first blush seem rather disparate: that the evidential support relation can be understood as a kind of variably strict (...)
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  • Indicative conditionals, conditional probabilities, and the “defective truth-table”: A request for more experiments.Peter Milne - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196-224.
    While there is now considerable experimental evidence that, on the one hand, participants assign to the indicative conditional as probability the conditional probability of consequent given antecedent and, on the other, they assign to the indicative conditional the “defective truth-table” in which a conditional with false antecedent is deemed neither true nor false, these findings do not in themselves establish which multi-premise inferences involving conditionals participants endorse. A natural extension of the truth-table semantics pronounces as valid numerous inference patterns that (...)
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  • Two Problems of Direct Inference.Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):299-318.
    The article begins by describing two longstanding problems associated with direct inference. One problem concerns the role of uninformative frequency statements in inferring probabilities by direct inference. A second problem concerns the role of frequency statements with gerrymandered reference classes. I show that past approaches to the problem associated with uninformative frequency statements yield the wrong conclusions in some cases. I propose a modification of Kyburg’s approach to the problem that yields the right conclusions. Past theories of direct inference have (...)
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  • (1 other version)A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):531-575.
    We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over probabilistic credal states that we call probalogic. To motivate probalogic, we first expand classical logic to geo-logic, which fills the entire unit cube, and then we (...)
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  • Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference.David Makinson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):511-529.
    We reflect on lessons that the lottery and preface paradoxes provide for the logic of uncertain inference. One of these lessons is the unreliability of the rule of conjunction of conclusions in such contexts, whether the inferences are probabilistic or qualitative; this leads us to an examination of consequence relations without that rule, the study of other rules that may nevertheless be satisfied in its absence, and a partial rehabilitation of conjunction as a ‘lossy’ rule. A second lesson is the (...)
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  • Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks.Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Synthese Library. Edited by Gregory Wheeler, Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn & and Jon Williamson.
    Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.
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  • Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity.Niki Pfeifer - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):263-264.
    Normative theories like probability logic provide roadmaps for psychological investigations. They make theorizing precise. Therefore, normative considerations should not be subtracted from psychological research. I explain why conditional elimination inferences involve at least two norm paradigms; why reporting agreement with rationality norms is informative; why alleged asymmetric relations between formal and psychological theories are symmetric; and I discuss the arbitration problem.
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  • Framing human inference by coherence based probability logic.Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (2):206--217.
    We take coherence based probability logic as the basic reference theory to model human deductive reasoning. The conditional and probabilistic argument forms are explored. We give a brief overview of recent developments of combining logic and probability in psychology. A study on conditional inferences illustrates our approach. First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences conclude the paper.
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  • Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Belief is thus central to epistemology. It comes in a qualitative form, as when Sophia believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria, and a quantitative form, as when Sophia's degree of belief that Vienna is the capital of Austria is at least twice her degree of belief that tomorrow it will be sunny in Vienna. Formal epistemology, as opposed to mainstream epistemology (Hendricks 2006), is epistemology done in a formal way, (...)
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  • Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Wayne Wobcke - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):55-103.
    We consider the connections between belief revision, conditional logic and nonmonotonic reasoning, using as a foundation the approach to theory change developed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (the AGM approach). This is first generalized to allow the iteration of theory change operations to capture the dynamics of epistemic states according to a principle of minimal change of entrenchment. The iterative operations of expansion, contraction and revision are characterized both by a set of postulates and by Grove's construction based on total (...)
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  • Human Rationality Challenges Universal Logic.Brian R. Gaines - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (2):163-205.
    Tarski’s conceptual analysis of the notion of logical consequence is one of the pinnacles of the process of defining the metamathematical foundations of mathematics in the tradition of his predecessors Euclid, Frege, Russell and Hilbert, and his contemporaries Carnap, Gödel, Gentzen and Turing. However, he also notes that in defining the concept of consequence “efforts were made to adhere to the common usage of the language of every day life.” This paper addresses the issue of what relationship Tarski’s analysis, and (...)
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  • Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.
    Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...
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  • Reactive preferential structures and nonmonotonic consequence.Dov M. Gabbay & Karl Schlechta - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):414-450.
    We introduce Information Bearing Relation Systems (IBRS) as an abstraction of many logical systems. These are networks with arrows recursively leading to other arrows etc. We then define a general semantics for IBRS, and show that a special case of IBRS generalizes in a very natural way preferential semantics and solves open representation problems for weak logical systems. This is possible, as we can the strong coherence properties of preferential structures by higher arrows, that is, arrows, which do not go (...)
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  • Mental probability logic.Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):98-99.
    We discuss O&C's probabilistic approach from a probability logical point of view. Specifically, we comment on subjective probability, the indispensability of logic, the Ramsey test, the consequence relation, human nonmonotonic reasoning, intervals, generalized quantifiers, and rational analysis.
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  • Cumulativity without closure of the domain under finite unions.Dov M. Gabbay & Karl Schlechta - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):372-392.
    For nonmonotonic logics, Cumulativity is an important logical rule. We show here that Cumulativity fans out into an infinity of different conditions, if the domain is not closed under finite unions.
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  • (1 other version)Deontic logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • (1 other version)Non-monotonic logic.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term "non-monotonic logic" covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference , i.e., that kind of inference of everyday life in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Such inferences are called "non-monotonic" because the set of conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base does not increase (in fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. This is (...)
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  • Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of belief for a particular (...)
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  • Valuation structure.Zhaohui Zhu, Zhenghua Pan, Shifu Chen & Wujia Zhu - 2002 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 67 (1):1-23.
    This paper introduces valuation structures associated with preferential models. Based on KLM valuation structures, we present a canonical approach to obtain injective preferential models for any preferential relation satisfying the property INJ, and give uniform proofs of representation theorems for injective preferential relations appeared in the literature. In particular, we show that, in any propositional language (finite or infinite), a preferential inference relation satisfies INJ if and only if it can be represented by a standard preferential model. This conclusion generalizes (...)
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  • Rational acceptance and conjunctive/disjunctive absorption.Gregory Wheeler - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):49-63.
    A bounded formula is a pair consisting of a propositional formula φ in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate, interpreted to express the lower-bound probability of φ. Converting conjunctive/disjunctive combinations of bounded formulas to a single bounded formula consisting of the conjunction/disjunction of the propositions occurring in the collection along with a newly calculated lower probability is called absorption. This paper introduces two inference rules for effecting conjunctive and disjunctive absorption and (...)
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  • Reviewing Reduction in a Preferential Model‐Theoretic Context.Emma Ruttkamp & Johannes Heidema - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):123 – 146.
    In this article, we redefine classical notions of theory reduction in such a way that model-theoretic preferential semantics becomes part of a realist depiction of this aspect of science. We offer a model-theoretic reconstruction of science in which theory succession or reduction is often better - or at a finer level of analysis - interpreted as the result of model succession or reduction. This analysis leads to 'defeasible reduction', defined as follows: The conjunction of the assumptions of a reducing theory (...)
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  • Proof systems for probabilistic uncertain reasoning.J. Paris & A. Vencovska - 1998 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (3):1007-1039.
    The paper describes and proves completeness theorems for a series of proof systems formalizing common sense reasoning about uncertain knowledge in the case where this consists of sets of linear constraints on a probability function.
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  • Distance semantics for belief revision.Daniel Lehmann, Menachem Magidor & Karl Schlechta - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):295-317.
    A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. The new postulates (...)
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  • (1 other version)Implication with possible exceptions.Herman Jurjus & Harrie de Swart - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (2):517-535.
    We introduce an implication-with-possible-exceptions and define validity of rules-with-possible-exceptions by means of the topological notion of a full subset. Our implication-with-possible-exceptions characterises the preferential consequence relation as axiomatized by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990]. The resulting inference relation is non-monotonic. On the other hand, modus ponens and the rule of monotony, as well as all other laws of classical propositional logic, are valid-up-to-possible exceptions. As a consequence, the rules of classical propositional logic do not determine the (...)
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  • The Logic of Theory Assessment.Franz Huber - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.
    This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper (...)
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  • Normative autonomy and normative co-ordination: Declarative power, representation, and mandate. [REVIEW]Jonathan Gelati, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor & Guido Governatori - 2004 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (1-2):53-81.
    In this paper we provide a formal analysis of the idea of normative co-ordination. We argue that this idea is based on the assumption that agents can achieve flexible co-ordination by conferring normative positions to other agents. These positions include duties, permissions, and powers. In particular, we explain the idea of declarative power, which consists in the capacity of the power-holder of creating normative positions, involving other agents, simply by proclaiming such positions. In addition, we account also for the concepts (...)
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  • Non-prioritized ranked belief change.Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose & Thomas Meyer - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):417-443.
    Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This (...)
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  • Belief contraction as nonmonotonic inference.Alexander Bochman - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2):605-626.
    A notion of an epistemic state is introduced as a generalization of common representations suggested for belief change. Based on it, a new kind of nonmonotonic inference relation corresponding to belief contractions is defined. A number of representation results is established that cover both traditional AGM contractions and contractions that do not satisfy recovery.
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  • Reduction revisited.Emma Ruttkamp - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):102-112.
    This is a first tentative examination of the possibility of reinstating reduction as a valid candidate for presenting relations between mental and physical properties. Classical Nagelian reduction is undoubtedly contaminated in many ways, but here I investigate the possibility of adapting to problems concerning mental properties an alternative definition for theory reduction in philosophy of science. The definition I offer is formulated with the aid of non-monotonic logic, which I suspect might be a very interesting realm for testing notions concerning (...)
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  • A logical framework for data-driven reasoning.Paolo Baldi, Esther Anna Corsi & Hykel Hosni - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
    We introduce and investigate a family of consequence relations with the goal of capturing certain important patterns of data-driven inference. The inspiring idea for our framework is the fact that data may reject, possibly to some degree, and possibly by mistake, any given scientific hypothesis. There is no general agreement in science about how to do this, which motivates putting forward a logical formulation of the problem. We do so by investigating distinct definitions of ‘rejection degrees’ each yielding a consequence (...)
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  • Belief Revision Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-49.
    We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren’t especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent’s beliefs rule out all and only those possibilities that are either (i) ruled out by their evidence or (ii) sufficiently less normal than some other possibility not ruled out by their evidence. Working within this framework, we argue that the logic (...)
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  • Two semantic interpretations of probabilities in description logics of typicality.Antonio Lieto & Gian Luca Pozzato - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
    We intoduce a novel extension of Description Logics (DLs) of typicality by means of probabilities able to represent and reason about typical properties and defeasible inheritance in DLs.
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  • An Axiomatic System for Concessive Conditionals.Eric Raidl, Andrea Iacona & Vincenzo Crupi - 2023 - Studia Logica 112 (1):343-363.
    According to the analysis of concessive conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona, a concessive conditional $$p{{\,\mathrm{\hookrightarrow }\,}}q$$ p ↪ q is adequately formalized as a conjunction of conditionals. This paper presents a sound and complete axiomatic system for concessive conditionals so understood. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a method that has been employed by Raidl, Iacona, and Crupi to prove the soundness and completeness of an analogous system for evidential conditionals.
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  • Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional.Andrea Iacona & Lorenzo Rossi - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2):559-584.
    This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naïve truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate (...)
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  • Certain and Uncertain Inference with Indicative Conditionals.Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper develops a trivalent semantics for the truth conditions and the probability of the natural language indicative conditional. Our framework rests on trivalent truth conditions first proposed by Cooper (1968) and Belnap (1973) and it yields two logics of conditional reasoning: (i) a logic C of certainty-preserving inference; and (ii) a logic U for uncertain reasoning that preserves the probability of the premises. We show systematic correspondences between trivalent and probabilistic representations of inferences in either framework, and we use (...)
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  • Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?Francesco Berto & Levin Hornischer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2727-2752.
    Sentences \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) are _cognitive synonyms_ for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1 ), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2 ), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1 ). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2 ), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3 ). A cognitively adequate individuation (...)
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  • Morphologic for knowledge dynamics: revision, fusion and abduction.Isabelle Bloch, Jérôme Lang, Ramón Pino Pérez & Carlos Uzcátegui - 2023 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 33 (3):421-466.
    Several tasks in artificial intelligence require the ability to find models about knowledge dynamics. They include belief revision, fusion and belief merging, and abduction. In this paper, we exploit the algebraic framework of mathematical morphology in the context of propositional logic and define operations such as dilation or erosion of a set of formulas. We derive concrete operators, based on a semantic approach, that have an intuitive interpretation and that are formally well behaved, to perform revision, fusion and abduction. Computation (...)
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  • Counterfactuals as modal conditionals, and their probability.Giuliano Rosella, Tommaso Flaminio & Stefano Bonzio - 2023 - Artificial Intelligence 323 (C):103970.
    In this paper we propose a semantic analysis of Lewis' counterfactuals. By exploiting the structural properties of the recently introduced boolean algebras of conditionals, we show that counterfactuals can be expressed as formal combinations of a conditional object and a normal necessity modal operator. Specifically, we introduce a class of algebras that serve as modal expansions of boolean algebras of conditionals, together with their dual relational structures. Moreover, we show that Lewis' semantics based on sphere models can be reconstructed in (...)
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  • The logic of conditionals on outback trails.Johan van Benthem - 2023 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 31 (6):1135-1152.
    Conditional statements are ubiquitous, from promises and threats to reasoning and decision making. By now, logicians have studied them from many different angles, both semantic and proof-theoretic. This paper suggests two more perspectives on the meaning of conditionals, one dynamic and one geometric, that may throw yet more light on a familiar and yet in some ways surprisingly elusive and many-faceted notion.1.
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  • Reasoning about general preference relations.Davide Grossi, Wiebe van der Hoek & Louwe B. Kuijer - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 313 (C):103793.
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  • Le raisonnement par analogie considéré comme un schéma d'inférence.Bernard Walliser, Denis Zwirn & Hervé Zwirn - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):225-248.
    Despite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar one, thanks to an over-hypothesis linking two sets of properties. The belief (...)
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  • Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.
    This paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging (...)
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