Reprinted 1999 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. LCCN 98-32334. ISBN 1-886363-74-9. Cloth. $95. * Reprint of the first edition.

The Concept of Law is the most important and original work of legal philosophy written this century. First published in 1961, it is considered the masterpiece of H.L.A. Hart's enormous contribution to the study of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. Its elegant language and balanced arguments have sparked wide debate and unprecedented growth in the quantity and quality of scholarship in this area--much of it devoted to attacking or defending Hart's theories. Principal among Hart's critics is renowned lawyer and political philosopher (...) Ronald Dworkin who in the 1970s and 80s mounted a series of challenges to Hart's Concept of Law. It seemed that Hart let these challenges go unanswered until, after his death in 1992, his answer to Dworkin's criticism was discovered among his papers. In this valuable and long-awaited new edition Hart presents an Epilogue in which he answers Dworkin and some of his other most influential critics including Fuller and Finnis. Written with the same clarity and candor for which the first edition is famous, the Epilogue offers a sharper interpretation of Hart's own views, rebuffs the arguments of critics like Dworkin, and powerfully asserts that they have based their criticisms on a faulty understanding of Hart's work. Hart demonstrates that Dworkin's views are in fact strikingly similar to his own. In a final analysis, Hart's response leaves Dworkin's criticisms considerably weakened and his positions largely in question. Containing Hart's final and powerful response to Dworkin in addition to the revised text of the original Concept of Law, this thought-provoking and persuasively argued volume is essential reading for lawyers and philosophers throughout the world. (shrink)

One of the leading legal philosophers of this century, Kelsen published this short treatise in 1934, when the neo-Kantian influence on his work was at its zenith. An earlier, "constructivist" phase had been displaced by his effort to provide something approximating a neo-Kantian foundation for his theory. If this second phase represents the Pure Theory of Law in its most characteristic form, then the present treatise may well be its central text. And of Kelsen's many statements of the Pure Theory, (...) this one is surely the most accessible. Topics covered include the legal norm and Kelsen's normativity thesis, law and morality, the role of ideology, the concept of the legal person, legal interpretation, the identity of law and state, and the theory of international law. Among the appendices is an annotated bibliography of secondary literature on Kelsen. (shrink)

In this paper, I make an attempt to look for a thin and general concept of law that, as far as possible, should be neutral to the more substantial views of legal moralism and legal positivism, so that it is acceptable from both points of view. With this aim in view, I shall begin with a few remarks on concept formation and name a list of necessary requirements on an appropriate concept of law. On this basis, I intend to discuss (...) a number of contemporary legal theories in view to their respective interpretations of the concept of law. Finally, I want to propose a definition of law that not only satisfies the requirements of the concept of law, but is also general enough to be compatible with both camps of legal thinking. (shrink)

The argument of this article is that the dual-nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision-making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation (...) to both authoritative and non-authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law. (shrink)

Kelsen's 'Pure theory of law' was first presented in his fundamental work Hauptprobleme des Staatsrechtlehre (1911) and continued in both editions of Reine Rechtslehre (1934, 1958). Historically, it has a certain relation to John Austin's 'analytical jurisprudence', although Kelsen became acquainted with Austin's work for the first time in 1940. The 'pure theory of law' is a formal-logical analysis of law, considered as a system of norms, based philosophically on the strict distinction between 'is' and 'ought'. It is a normative (...) and positive doctrine, opposed both to positivism, showing the limitations of the positivistic approach, the whole legal order. His positivism is a formal analysis of the legal norm, of its elements and of the architecture of the legal order. Kelsen's concentration on the form of law recognizes the legitimacy of sociological investigations and the study of values in reference both to the contents and the making of law. Equally, his philosophical relativism of values is entirely compatible with his strong stand for democracy and the ideals of western culture. German text. (shrink)

Seite dualität: Anarchismus 121. Konsequenzen der individualitätszerstörenden Gleichheitstheorie: Stellung der Frau 123; unhistorische Denkweise 123; ...

The letter of Leonid Pitamic to Hans Kelsen in 1957 discusses the basic legal norm both thinkers were dealing with. It is to Pitamic’s credit that he was the first to methodologically unravel the problem by basing it on Mach’s cognitive economy. Everything that followed was “merely” a further development and justification in accordance with the normative purity of Kelsen’s theory of law. It was “merely” about suitably standardizing cognitive economy as the basic problem of legal cognition. - Pitamic’s further (...) research led him to look for a common denominator of positive and natural law. In the letter he explicitly emphasizes that the legal order should correspond to the “essence of man” and continues: “Yet I should say that favouring the principle of order has its limits and violations of the norm or decisions comprising gross inhumanity cannot be considered legally binding. Both elements, i. e. ‘order’ and ‘humanity’, are already comprised in the nature, idea, and concept of law and need not be looked for in a special ‘natural law’”. Pitamic’s basic norm is “like a magnetic needle that, in spite of all its oscillations, tends to keep pointing in the same direction.” This direction is needed by anybody interested in law as a phenomenon of life. (shrink)

"Von Natur aus ist der Mensch ein politisches Wesen". Diese Einsicht sprach Aristoteles als erster aus. Die begriffliche Fassung der unterschiedlichen Formen staatlicher Organisation und seine Untersuchungen darüber, welche von ihnen der Bestimmung des Menschen am besten entspräche, begründen die Wissenschaft von der Politik und bilden noch heute ihr Fundament.