Measures of theory-Distance are defined for theories formalizable within first-Order predicate logic by using distributive normal forms. The account is applied to give measures of verisimilitude.

Coherent, well organized text familiarizes readers with complete theory of logical inference and its applications to math and the empirical sciences. Part I deals with formal principles of inference and definition; Part II explores elementary intuitive set theory, with separate chapters on sets, relations, and functions. Last section introduces numerous examples of axiomatically formulated theories in both discussion and exercises. Ideal for undergraduates; no background in math or philosophy required.

This is the basis of the first part of the book.

to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zurich, April 1973 Mario Bunge Preface In this book I have investigated the logical and methodological role of the much debated theoretical concepts in scientific theories. The philosophical viewpoint underlying my argumentation is critical scientific realism. My method of exposition has been to express ideas first in general terms and then to develop and elaborate them within a specific (...) formal framework. It is assumed in the book that the reader has a relatively good knowledge of the basic techniques and results of modern symbolic logic, including model theory. Examples from actual science are mostly from the social sciences. I have deliberately omitted a treatment of a number of characteristic features which are particular to theoretical concepts in the more developed sciences, such as modern physics. This book owes very much to Professor Jaakko Hintikka, to whom I wish to express my deep gratitude. Especially at the begin ning of this project in 1968/69 when I was doing research for my doctoral degree at Stanford University I worked with him closely. (shrink)

The present note is intended to draw the reader's attention to the analysis of the relation between Newtonian Mechanics and Special Relativity Mechanics (henceforth to be referred to as NM and SRM), given by Philipp Frank, one of the classics of Logical Empiricism (in Frank [1938]). Frank's analysis of the relation between NM and SRM is interesting in many ways. Firstly, it shows clearly that problems of disruptive changes and of conceptual disparity were known to and discussed by Logical Empiricists (...) and that, therefore, some of them at least were not at all blinded to 'dynamic' problems of changes in actual science by their view of physical theories as interpreted axiomatic systems and did not deal with those theories as 'static, frozen in logical mold'. Secondly, it reveals some of the reasons for the Logical Empiricist rejection of what came to be known later as the incommensurability claim. (shrink)