Luciano Floridi’s informational structural realism takes a constructionist attitude towards the problems of epistemology and metaphysics, but the question of the nature of the semantical component of his view remains vexing. In this paper, I propose to dispense with the semantical component of ISR completely. I outline a Syntactical version of ISR. The unified entropy-based framework of information has been adopted as the groundwork of SISR. To establish its realist component, SISR should be able to dissolve the latching problem. We (...) have to be able to account for the informational structures–reality relationship in the absence of the standard semantical resources. The paper offers a pragmatic solution to the latching problem. I also take pains to account for the naturalistic plausibility of this solution by grounding it in the recent computational neuroscience of the predictive coding and the free energy principle. (shrink)

Michael Dummett, Frege and other philosophers. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1991. xii + 330pp. £35. ISBN W.Balzer and C.U.Moulines (eds,), Structuralist theory of science:focal issues, new results, Berlin; de Gruyter, 1996. xi + 295 pp.DM 210. ISBN 3-11-014075-6 Henry Prakken, Logical tools for modeling legal argument a study of defeasible reasoning in law.Dordrecht, The Netherlands:Kluwer Academic, 1997, xiii + 314pp.£75.00/$125.00 J.Srzednicki and Z.Stachniak (eds.) Lesniewski’s Systems.Protothetic.Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 54, Dordrecht, Boston and London:Kluwer, 1998. xiv + 310 pp, £99 (cloth). ISBN 0-7923-4504-5.

Points of view are a central phenomenon in human cognition. Although the concept of point of view is ambiguous, there exist common elements in different notions. A point of view is a certain way to look at things around us. In conceptual points of view, things are looked at or interpreted through conceptual lenses. Conceptual points of view are important for epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. In this article, a new method to formalize conceptual points of view is (...) introduced. It is based on the conceptual space approach, where concepts are regions of multi-dimensional quality spaces. Points of view, as defined in this article, consist of a selection of relevant dimensions, referred to here as determinables, and of a certain supposition, referred to here as a theory, about the subject content. After considering some early efforts to formalize points of view, the notion of conceptual space is defined and explored. One concept of point of view is defined and developed in the framework of conceptual space, and a new logic for points of view is also outlined. The problem of mind–body correlation is discussed as an example of the application of the notion of points of view. To conclude, the meaning and applications of the new concepts and tools developed in the article are discussed. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a given theory is formulated. Five types of changes are identified: (1) addition or deletion of special laws, (2) change in scale or metric, (3) change in the importance of dimensions, (4) change in the separability of dimensions, and (5) addition or deletion of dimensions. Given this (...) classification, the conceptual development of empirical theories becomes more gradual and rationalizable. Only the most extreme type—replacement of dimensions—comes close to a revolution. The five types are exemplified and applied in a case study on the development within physics from the original Newtonian mechanics to special relativity theory. (shrink)

In this paper, a modest version of the Semantic View is motivated as both tenable and potentially fruitful for philosophy of science. An analysis is proposed in which the Semantic View is characterized by three main claims. For each of these claims, a distinction is made between stronger and more modest interpretations. It is argued that the criticisms recently leveled against the Semantic View hold only under the stronger interpretations of these claims. However, if one only commits to the modest (...) interpretation for all the claims, then the view obtained, the Modest Semantic View, is tenable and fruitful for the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Our aim in this article is to show how the theory of conceptual spaces can be useful in describing diachronic changes to conceptual frameworks, and thus useful in understanding conceptual change in the empirical sciences. We also compare the conceptual space approach to Moulines’s typology of intertheoretical relations in the structuralist tradition. Unlike structuralist reconstructions, those based on conceptual spaces yield a natural way of modeling the changes of a conceptual framework, including noncumulative changes, by tracing the changes to the (...) dimensions that reconstitute a conceptual framework. As a consequence, the incommensurability of empirical theories need not be viewed as a matter of conceptual representation. (shrink)

The relation between logic and philosophy of science, often taken for granted, is in fact problematic. Although current fashionable criticisms of the usefulness of logic are usually mistaken, there are indeed difficulties which should be taken seriously -- having to do, amongst other things, with different "scientific mentalities" in the two disciplines. Nevertheless, logic is, or should be, a vital part of the theory of science. To make this clear, the bulk of this paper is devoted to the key notion (...) of a "scientific theory" in a logical perspective. First, various formal explications of this notion are reviewed, then their further logical theory is discussed. In the absence of grand inspiring programs like those of Klein in mathematics or Hilbert in metamathematics, this preparatory ground-work is the best one can do here. The paper ends on a philosophical note, discussing applicability and merits of the formal approach to the study of science. (shrink)

Suppes proposes an analysis of the structure and identity of empirical theories with his model-theoretical approach and undertakes effective reconstructions of theories in diverse disciplinary fields. Here the authors analyse the results of these examinations under the optics of questions concerning the assumed ontological commitments, and for how they satisfy economic and other criteria.

Arguably, there is no substantial, general answer to the question of what makes for the approximate truth of theories. But in one class of cases, the issue seems simply resolved. A wide class of applied dynamical theories can be treated as two-component theories—one component specifying a certain kind of abstract geometrical structure, the other giving empirical application to this structure by claiming that it replicates, subject to arbitrary scaling for units etc., the geometric structure to be found in some real-world (...) dynamical phenomenon. In such a case, a theory is approximately true just if the one geometric structure approximately replicates the other (and if problems remain here, they are problems in geometry, of specifying suitable metric approximation relations, not conceptual problems). This article amplifies and defends this simple approach to approximate truth for dynamical theories. (shrink)

In his 1982 Presidential Address to the PSA Ernan McMullin proposed that the Kuhnian “revolution” in the philosophy of science amounts, in part, to the growing awareness that theory-appraisal is to be modelled on decisions and value judgments rather than rule-governed inferences (McMullin 1983). This viewpoint has its attractions but needs developing before it can satisfy skeptics, such as Larry Laudan. For Laudan complains that Kuhn has provided no general model to back up his value-geared account, and that the view (...) leads to untenable subjectivism which Kuhn has tried to avoid.I shall try to show that neither complaint stands to criticism, by joining two ideas. The first – that of modelling theory decisions along decision theory – is not a novel one, but even its supporters have failed to see that it makes Kuhn’s subjectivity a live but respectable possibility. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to examine, and in part revive, a time-honoured perspective to inquiry in general and scientific explanation in particular. The perspective is to view inquiry as a search for answers to questions. If there is anything that deserves to be called a working scientist's view of his or her daily work, it surely is that he or she phrases questions and attempts to find satisfactory answers to them.

Doren Recker has criticized the prevailing accounts of Darwin's argument for the theory of natural selection in the Origin of Species. In this note I argue that Recker fails to distinguish between a deductive short argument for the principle of natural selection, and a non-deductive, long argument which aims at establishing that the principle has explanatory power in the various domains of application. I shall try to show that the semantic view of theories, especially in its structuralist form, makes it (...) easy to distinguish between the two arguments and to explain how Darwin's long argument counts as one argument. I also raise a question about Recker's views on Darwin's mid-Victorian background, arguing that Newton's First Rule of Reasoning was not just a constraint on hypotheses involving unobservables, but a general request to keep conjecture and certainty apart. (shrink)

Michael Dummett, Frege and other philosophers. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1991. xii + 330pp. £35. ISBN W.Balzer and C.U.Moulines, Structuralist theory of science:focal issues, new results, Berlin; de Gruyter, 1996. xi + 295 pp.DM 210. ISBN 3-11-014075-6 Henry Prakken, Logical tools for modeling legal argument a study of defeasible reasoning in law.Dordrecht, The Netherlands:Kluwer Academic, 1997, xiii + 314pp.£75.00/$125.00 J.Srzednicki and Z.Stachniak Lesniewski’s Systems.Protothetic.Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 54, Dordrecht, Boston and London:Kluwer, 1998. xiv + 310 pp, £99. ISBN 0-7923-4504-5.

Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.

Patrick Suppes'' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed''s metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms perception and truth are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.

Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.

This article provides a spatial analysis of the conceptual framework of fluid dynamics during the nineteenth century, focusing on the transition from the Euler equation to the Navier–Stokes equation. A dynamic version of Peter Gärdenfors's theory of conceptual spaces is applied which distinguishes changes of five types: addition and deletion of special laws; change of metric; change in importance; change in separability; addition and deletion of dimensions. The case instantiates all types but the deletion of dimensions. We also provide a (...) new view upon limiting case reduction at the conceptual level that clarifies the relation between the predecessor and successor conceptual framework. The nineteenth-century development of fluid dynamics is argued to be an instance of normal science development. (shrink)

I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to (...) make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes (as I named it) are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

In spite of the ‘experimental turn’ now fashionable in the philosophy of science, the question of the structure and identity criteria of scientific theories continues to be a central issue for the philosophical analysis of empirical science. We need a precise metatheory of empirical theories to deal with this issue. Metatheoretical structuralism appears to offer the most adequate approach in this sense so far. First, some basic intuitions about what empirical theories are, and how they are structured, are laid out. (...) Then, the main notions used by metatheoretical structuralism to analyze theories are explained, and they are illustrated by applying them to an example of a simple physical theory. Finally, it is argued that the picture of the structure and identity of empirical theories coming out of structuralistic analysis adequately corresponds to the basic intuitions stated at the beginning. (shrink)

Vor dem Hintergrund einer weitreichenden Neuorientierung, die der praktischen Vernunft in der Methodologie , in der Sprachphilosophie und in der strukturalen Wissenschaftstheorie den Primat einräumt, werden die Aporien rationalistischdezisionistischer Konzeptionen deutlicher sichtbar. In diesem Papier wird der argumentative Ursprung von Feyerabends Kritik an Rationalität und Wissenschaft als auf einer - angesichts der 'praktischen Wende' der neueren Wissenschaftsphilosophie - überholten Wissenschaftsauffassung basierend analysiert. Feyerabends Zurückweisung der Wissenschaft erscheint dann weder als Konsequenz seiner Vernunftkritik noch als Bruch in seiner Argumentation; er vollstreckt (...) vielmehr die Gegenstandsverfehlung der methodologistischen Wissenschaftstheorie unverdeckt. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers of science have construed fundamental theories as descriptions of entities, properties, and/or structures. Call this the “descriptive-ontological” view. I argue that this view is incorrect, at least insofar as physical theories are concerned. I propose a novel construal of theories that I call the “prescriptive-dynamical” view. The central tenet of this view, roughly put, is that the _essential_ content of fundamental physical theories is a _prescription for interfacing with natural systems and translating local data into compact theoretical (...) language_. The descriptive-ontological aspects of theories, if any, are taken as _inessential_ content on this view: they do not contribute to the predictive success of the theory. Rather than describing _what is there_, the essence of a physical theory is to tell us _what to do_ when interfacing with a physical system. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe belief in the existence of eternal mathematical truth has been part of this science throughout history. Bourbaki, however, introduced an interesting, and rather innovative twist to it, beginning in the mid-1930s. This group of mathematicians advanced the view that mathematics is a science dealing with structures, and that it attains its results through a systematic application of the modern axiomatic method. Like many other mathematicians, past and contemporary, Bourbaki understood the historical development of mathematics as a series of (...) necessary stages inexorably leading to its current state — meaning by this, the specific perspective that Bourbaki had adopted and were promoting. But unlike anyone else, Bourbaki actively put forward the view that their conception of mathematics was not only illuminating and useful for dealing with the current concerns of mathematics, but that this was in fact the ultimate stage in the evolution of mathematics, bound to remain unchanged by any future development of this science. In this way, they were extending in an unprecedented way the domain of validity of the belief in the eternal character of mathematical truths, from the body to the images of mathematical knowledge.Bourbaki were fond of presenting their insistence on the centrality of the modern axiomatic method as a way to ensure the eternal character of mathematical truth as an offshoot of Hilbert's mathematical heritage. A detailed examination of Hilbert's actual conception of the axiomatic method, however, brings to the fore interesting differences between it and Bourbaki's conception, thus underscoring the historically conditioned character of certain, fundamental mathematical beliefs. (shrink)

La parution de la monographic de Sneed,The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics a suscité un renouveau d'intérêt en philosophie contemporaine des sciences. Cet ouvrage arrivait à un moment où l'épistémologie des sciences, telle que développée dans les milieux germaniques et anglo-saxons, accusait de graves insuffisances dans la reconstruction rationnelle du développement historique des théories physiques. Mis sur la défensive par les thèses et arguments historiques de Kuhn et de Feyerabend, ces milieux « orthodoxes » devaient reconnaitre l'état embryonnaire de ce (...) qui devait être uneépistémologie diachroniquedes sciences, une épistémologie du changement scientifique où les méthodes d'analyse formelle puissent être aussi mises á contribution. A cela s'ajoutait un certain malaise, une certaine stagnation de la problématique, plus synchronique, de l'approche traditionnelle issue du mouvement empiriste logique. Le probleme de la dichotomielangage théorique—langage observationnel, ainsi que son fidèle compagnon, le problème destermes théoriques, le statut épistémologique desrègies de correspondance, la dèfinition du concept d'analyticitéen science, autant de questions qui avaient été discutées et critiquées, à maintes reprises, pour aboutir à des résultats peu concluants aux yeux des philosophes, comme à ceux des physiciens préoccupés des fondements de leur discipline et à qui la teneur de cette discussion semblait souvent étrangère à la pratique scientifique. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the discussion on the constitutive a priori in science by linking it with the discussion on scientific laws and theories, in such a way to show how the different senses of the notion of constitutive a priori are not incompatible to each other and that they can be precised in a unified, though differentiated, manner.

En esta trabajo se analiza la relación existente entre las propuestas de Mendel, de los "redescubridores" -de Vries, Correns y Tschermak-, de Bateson y colaboradores y de Morgan y discípulos, e.e. la historia de la genética "clásica", en términos de "inconmensurabilidad", de forma tal de capturar y precisar tanto la idea de que entre éstas se dan ciertas discontinuidades y rupturas como de que éstas tienen "algo" que ver de algún modo entre sí. En particular, se introducen, con ayuda del (...) marco conceptual de la metateoría estructuralista, y aplican al presente caso, los conceptos de "inconmensurabilidad teórica" y "comparabilidad empírica". In this paper the existing relationship between the proposals of Mendel, the "rediscoverers" -de Vries, Correns and Tschermak-, Bateson and collaborators and Morgan and disciples, e.g. the history of "classical" genetics is analyzed in terms of "incommensurability", in such a way to capture and to precise so much the idea that among them take place some discontinuities and ruptures as well as that they have "something" to do with each other. In particular, the concepts of "theoretical incommensurability" and "empirical comparability" are introduced with the help of the conceptual framework of the structuralist view of theories and applied to this case. (shrink)

This paper discusses critically the fundamental elements of the Stegmüller/Sneed-reconstruction of Kuhn's normal science concept. It is argued that a) Kuhn himself cannot accept this reconstruction if he wants to describe theory dynamics in the past; b) the reconstruction is not based on a pure non-statement view; c) to have a theory in the sense of Kuhn, should be related to the ordered pair <K,Iₒ> to ensure the desired constancy over time; d) the reconstruction implies, contrary to Kuhn, the ability (...) of rejecting a theory without having an alternative one; e) the rejection of a theory can be the result of a falsifying procedure and, therefore, theories are not immune from falsification; f) the reconstruction still contains rationality gaps; g) the reconstruction shows more precisely than Kuhn's work that Popper is right when he attacks normal scientist's behaviour; h) the positions of the Kuhnians and of the criticists could be reconciled partially. (shrink)

Fundamentismus und Skeptizismus-Anarchismus sind zwei entgegengesetzte Positionen in der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie und in der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie. Zwischen ihnen gibt es einen dritten Standpunkt, den Evolutionismus. Beispiele sind zwei neuere Arbeiten von Putnam und Stegmüller . Im Gegensatz zum logisch-statischen Fundamentismus berücksichtigt der Evolutionismus auch dynamische und naturalistische Ansätze. Stegmüller folgend entlehnen wir in der vorliegenden Untersuchung aus der Sprachphilosophie pragmatische Gesichtspunkte, um die logische Syntax und Semantik, die Werkzeuge des Fundamentismus, zu ersetzen. Wir zeigen die Kraft der Pragmatik bei der (...) Behandlung von Problemen wie Erkenntniswachstum, Begriffswechsel, Theorien- und Bedeutungsdynamik, wissenschaftliche Entdeckung und besonders beim Problem der Inkommensurabilität. Unser nicht-fundamentistischer Vorschlag ist ein heuristisches Modell, das auf der modernen genetischen Theorie basiert. (shrink)