Health defined as the psychophysiological capacity to act or respond appropriately in a wide variety of situations, is enhanced by many means other than preventing and treating disease and injury. Therefore no choice of a particular medical intervention is likely to maximize health for all people with (or at risk for) a given disease. As a result, if medical practitioners are to be fully competent in the sense of knowing not only how to perform procedures but when and when not (...) to do so, they must be able to support patients (and those who know and care about them) in weighing all of the many factors which bear upon the decision as to which, if any, medical interventions are likely to improve the person''s health. (shrink)

On the basis of a ten-place comparative value relation, artificially reduced to a binary relation, some human value structures are studied and a concept of value kinematics is proposed. A miniature value logic is outlined, making it possible with precision to handle several explicated value notions and to analyze interrelations between them. Finally, the question is discussed whether health can be said to be an absolute and an intrinsic value.

The programmatic thrust of Thomasma and Pellegrino [5] is clarified and underscored and is interpreted as an attempt to introduce a fixed point into the ethical dimension of medicine by specifying some regulative principles for the medical profession. Two important features of this type of enterprise are noted: on the one hand, it may lead the profession to distinguish between technically identical actions on the basis of the normative principles it produces, thus excluding some morally permissible actions as duties constitutive (...) of the art. It is argued that the formulation of the grounds for this ethic given by Thomasma and Pellegrino is insufficient. In order to speak to the clinical situation, medical ethics must not be based on merely the living human body alone, but on the patientqua person. (shrink)

The article offers an approach to inquiry about, the foundation of medical ethics by addressing three areas of conceptual presupposition basic to medical ethical theory. First, medical ethics must presuppose a view about the nature of medicine. it is argued that the view required by a cogent medical morality entails that medicine be seen both as a healing relationship and as a practical art. Three ways in which medicine inherently involves values and valuation are presented as important, i.e., in being (...) aimed at the good of health, in being a cognitive art evaluating towards that good, and as a manifestation of a virtuous disposition concerning that good. Finally, a value ontology drawn from these considerations is seen as necessarily underlying medical ethics. A set of three such basic values are promoted as crucial: the value of health; the value of the individual patient; and the value of altruism that mediates the class of potential patients. (shrink)

This commentary, while sympathetic to Thomasma and Pellegrino [15], raises three sets of questions concerning the adequacy of their view of medicine as a foundation for medical ethical decision-making. The first set of questions concerns the account of the nature of medicine presented by Thomasma and Pellegrino. It is argued that the account is not clearly univocal and that even the most important description offered requires further clarification. Questioned, secondly, is the reasoning used by Thomasma and Pellegrino to propel their (...) movement from establishing an evaluative component in medicine to asserting an ethical dimension to medical judgment. It is argued that the authors equivocate in their presentation between the medical and moral uses of value terms. Finally, the role of the living body as a foundation for medical ethics is questioned, both in terms of the normative force such a ground can generate, and in terms of the range of duties to which this foundation must commit the profession. (shrink)

Proceedings of the first trans-disciplinary symposium on philosophy and medicin held at Galveston, Texas, May 9-11,1974.

Thomasma and Pellegrino''s [3] focus on the healing relationship as the way to give medical ethics a philosophical foundation contains a number of difficulties. Most importantly, their approach focuses philosophical analysis on an idealized view of the healing relationship in which the ideal of health is seen as an uncontroversial norm in the individual case. medical ethics is then characterized as an intrinsic part of the medical act itself. Philosophical inquiry seems limited to a description of the practice of medicine (...) in which ethical norms are embodied. Insufficient attention to methodology leaves unclear how this vision is to be achieved in philosophical reflection. (shrink)