God is conceived in the Western theistic tradition to be both the Creator and Conservor of the universe. These two roles were typically classed as different aspects of creation, originating creation and continuing creation. On pain of incoherence, however, conservation needs to be distinguished from creation. Contrary to current analyses (such as Philip Quinn's), creation should be explicated in terms of God's bringing something into being, while conservation should be understood in terms of God's preservation of something over an interval (...) of time. The crucial difference is that while conservation presupposes an object of the divine action, creation does not. Such a construal has significant implications for a tensed theory of time. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 25-49 [Access article in PDF] Descartes's Nomic Concurrentism:Finite Causation and Divine Concurrence Andrew Pessin DESCARTES APPEARS TO HOLD the traditional view that God acts in the world via willing. 1 In recent papers on his successor Malebranche, who also holds that view, I have argued that since volitions are paradigm representational states, close attention to the representational content of God's volitions (...) has substantial exegetical rewards. 2 The same, I will argue, is true regarding Descartes. In particular, due to lack of such attention, scholars have largely failed to realize that Descartes retains [End Page 25] a version of the scholastic doctrine that God ordinarily concurs with the causal activities of both mental and material finite substances ("concurrentism"). 3 Since concurrentism implies the true causal powers of those finite substances, in exposing Descartes's adherence to it I aim to open up new ways of thinking about some old problems in Cartesian exegesis.The plan:(I) I will first sketch a partial "worldview," along with evidence that Descartes held something like it, then(II) argue, both on the basis of this worldview and other evidence, that we should interpret Descartes's account of divine and finite causality as a version of concurrentism, then(III) show how interpreting Descartes this way has significant implications for understanding his views on the causal powers of both mental and material finite substances, and finally(IV) contrast my interpretation with two recent relevant ones: Kenneth Clatterbaugh's and Daniel Garber's. 1. A Partial Worldview If Descartes's God acts on the world via willing, we may inquire into the contents of those volitions. I suggest that Descartes's God has, among others, distinguishable volitions with roughly the following contents. 4 These constitute a partial worldview (W), and will be discussed in turn:(V1) At all times beginning with original Creation matter exists everywhere.(V2) There is at original Creation a particular quantity q and particular distribution d of motion.(V3) At all times, the laws of motion apply.(V4) Mind m exists at time t (appropriately substituted).(V5) At all times, the laws of mind-body union apply.Our first task is to accommodate God's role in the Cartesian system as the continuous conserver of the material world. 5 One divine volition which would accomplish that might have the content, not that each individual body persists, but rather, simply, that [End Page 26](V1) at all times beginning with original Creation matter exists everywhere. 6Now (V1) may require us to rethink the way continuous conservation arguments are typically framed. In the texts of La Forge and Malebranche, for example, what God conserves are individual bodies,and Cartesian texts seem sometimes to suggest the same. 7 Such framing might suggest, contra (V1), that God's conservational volitional contents make explicit reference to each individual body. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that Descartes's God's conserving activity is and ought to be framed as in (V1):(i) God's willing that (V1) provides an easy way to reconcile Cartesian mind —> body causal interaction with continuous conservation. 8 Many think that there is a tension between these two doctrines, since God, in conserving bodies, would seem to be responsible for all their modes including motion, leaving nothing for minds to contribute to them. Now that might be true where God's conserving volition explicitly represents each individual body, particularly given the role that motion plays in distinguishing individual Cartesian bodies. 9 (V1), however, in making no reference to individual bodies, is perfectly consistent with minds affecting either the quantity or distribution of motion in the material world.(ii) Similarly in Physiologia, Des Chene convincingly defends the claim that for Descartes, "since the existence of motion... is not entailed by the existence of matter, the creation of motion [is] independent of the creation of matter" (329). In light, again, of Descartes's conception of individual bodies (n. 9, below), this independence is best modeled by distinguishing God's conserving volition from those volitions... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ontological Status of Malebranchean IdeasMonte CookOnce again... we are brought back to a fundamental problem in Malebranche’s theory of ideas. What is the ontological status or nature of ideas? They are neither substances nor modifications of any substance. Yet in the Cartesian schema these are the only alternatives: something is either a substance or a modification of a substance. And Malebranche, however modified his Cartesianism, is at least (...) explicit in accepting this ontological dualism.(Steven Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 96.)Nadler nicely states a problem for Malebranchean scholarship: What, for Malebranche, is the ontological status of ideas? Despite their importance to his theory of vision in God, Malebranche seems to leave no metaphysical place for them. He seems to hold three jointly inconsistent positions—that everything is either a substance or a modification of a substance, that ideas are not sub-stances, and that ideas are not modifications.1 Since he clearly denies both that ideas are substances and that they are modifications, on the face of it the only way out of this apparent inconsistency is for him to reject the principle that everything is either a substance or a modification of a substance. And indeed, according to one common interpretation Malebranche restricts the dualism of substances and modifications to created things, thus excluding ideas.2I shall argue that Malebranche can and does consistently hold all three [End Page 525] positions. He escapes inconsistency by maintaining that although ideas fit into the category of substance, they are not different substances. Rather than being substances (plural), they are identical with one substance, God.I am of course not alone in seeing this identification of ideas with the substance of God. Nadler, for example, notes it but thinks that it fails to get Malebranche out of the problem of holding three jointly inconsistent positions.3 Nicholas Jolley not only notes it, but also thinks that it provides Malebranche an escape from inconsistency, if only on a surface level. For Jolley, the real problem is that ideas have features incompatible with their being identified with God: in particular, ideas are abstract entities whereas God is not an abstract entity. Though Malebranche admittedly does identify ideas with the substance of God, then, there is a sense in which he cannot really do this.4The problem Jolley raises is part of the larger problem of how ideas can be identical with the substance of God. Though I will not discuss Jolley’s problem directly, I hope that my discussion of the relation between ideas and the substance of God will throw light on what Jolley takes to be the real problem with identifying ideas with God. I will content myself with showing that Malebranche does hold all three positions in question and explaining how he develops his identification of ideas with the substance of God. In what follows, then, I shall first establish that Malebranche holds the three positions in question, and in particular that he does not restrict the principle that everything is either a substance or a modification to created things. I shall then show how he identifies ideas with the substance of God. Finally, I shall discuss a contrary passage in which Malebranche explicitly denies that intelligible extension (i.e., the idea of extension) is either a substance or a modification.11.1.Malebranche states the principle that everything is either a substance or a mode (or equivalently, a being or a mode) throughout his writings.5 Though he occasionally uses the principle only as it applies to the created world (see LO 237), he almost always states it as applying to everything, created or uncreated: “everything which is, whether it actually exists or not, and consequently [End Page 526] everything intelligible, reduces to being and mode” (LO 639).6 He treats it as a conceptual matter, and thus a necessary truth, that everything must be one or the other: everything “is necessarily either a substance or a mode of being. For in the end all that is can either be conceived of alone or it cannot; there is no middle in contradictory propositions” (LO 513).Reflecting on how Malebranche understands the principle makes... (shrink)

In Anselm's Discovery , Professor Hartshorne makes the rather startling and counterintuitive claim that ‘…there is indeed no issue between theism and pantheism. We all exist in the divine being, as St Paul said.’ 1 Classical or orthodox theists, it seems eminently fair to say, can be expected to recoil from any such suggestion with more than a little indignation. First of all, it might well be objected that Hartshorne - as a ‘process theist’ - is not a classical theist, (...) and, consequently, while there may be no issue between pantheism and his brand of theism, such is simply not the case in so far as classical theism is concerned. According to the latter - in contradistinction, of course, to Hartshorne's ‘neoclassical theism’ - immutability is an ‘essential’ property of God; as such, it would be a conceptual error to ascribe any contingent states to God at all. Now as is well known by philosophers of religion, Hartshorne regards this immutability doctrine of classical theism as a serious ‘logical blunder’ , one which - in so far as it reflects the ‘Greek bias’ which has always identified perfection with the absolutely unchangeable - is profoundly distortive of the biblical concept of Deity. (shrink)

'God needs no instruments to act', Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; 'it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will' (450). After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that '[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious ... [H]is power differs not at all from [H]is will' (116). God's causal power, here, clearly traces only to His (...) volitions - not merely to the fact that He wills, but specifically to the content of His volitions ('"what" He wills'). Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope to rectify this situation here. The plan of this paper is this: first, to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is 'incomplete' in a sense to be explained; second, to show that Malebranche clearly allows and uses something like this notion; third, to apply the notion to Malebranche's doctrine of human freedom. In so doing, I believe, we can understand this doctrine in a new way, and one which: (i) is clearly consistent with his texts, and (ii) unlike other interpretations makes coherent sense out of the conflicting streams in his heroic attempt to reconcile his occasionalism - the doctrine that no finite substances have genuine causal powers - with our freedom; fourth, Contrast my interpretation with those of two recent writers: Sleigh et al. (1998) and Schmaltz (1996); and Fifth, Summarize the major results. (shrink)

Malebranche's Theodicy ANDREW G. BLACK LEIBNIZ'S SOLUTION tO the problem of evil, his theodicy, might be regarded as a paradigm of philosophical theology. Its pattern, as with so much of Leibniz's philosophy, is reconciliation of deep metaphysical truth with recalcitrant ap- pearance. Thus, a theodicy is not just any solution to the problem; strictly speaking it is a vindication of divine providence in the face of the challenge posed by apparent imperfections of all kinds in creation.' The preeminence of Leibniz's (...) theodicy as a modern solution to the problem of evil has helped to obscure distinguished contributions from among his contemporaries. Not least among these is that made by Nicolas Malebranche, a philosopher having much in common with Leibniz . ~ Malebranche shows a deep concern for the problem of evil throughout his philosophical writings, though nowhere more so than in his Treatise on Nature and Grace, a a book written in response to the Jansenist4 challenge to orthodox In addition to an entire and substantial book, the Theodicy , a number of Leibniz's essays contain versions of his theodicy. See, for example, articles 1- 7 of the Discourse on Metaphysics; also "A Vindication of God's Justice Reconciled with his.. (shrink)

In "anselm's discovery", professor hartshorne argues that there is 'no issue' between theism and pantheism. classical or orthodox theists, it seems eminently fair to say, can be expected to recoil from such a claim with more than a little indignation. what i attempt to establish, however, is that hartshorne is correct. in short, i argue that the doctrine of 'god's-constant-conservation-of-all-things' (clearly an essential or integral doctrine of classical theism) entails that the 'spatiotemporal' matrix has the property of being included within (...) the being of god "essentially". if this is so, however, classical theism shows itself to be incoherent insofar as god would not then be immutable (an essential property of god, according to classical theism). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Initial Reservations Coming to Be and Being Self‐Sustenance Conservation Principles and Secondary Causes Divine Intervention Works cited.

The causal power of Malebranche's God is a function of the content of His will. Yet despite its significance for Malebranche, little exegetical attention has been paid to his notion of volitional content. In this paper I develop the notion of an 'incomplete' volition, note that Malebranche accepted and used something like it, and then examine Malebranche's natural theodicy in its light. This yields a new interpretation in which, unlike previous interpretations, Malebranche actually succeeds in reconciling his seemingly incompatible beliefs (...) that: (1) God alone is causally responsible for all natural states of affairs; (2) God's power is His will; (3) God wills to produce only goods; and yet (4) genuine evils exist. (shrink)

In what follows I try to show that Spinoza modelled his project of rational psychology, in some of its major respects, upon Descartes's metaphysics of matter. I argue further that, like Descartes, who paid for the rationalization of the science of matter the price of having to leave out of his description non-quantifiable qualities, so Spinoza left out of his psychology the non-rationalizable aspects of emotions, i.e. whatever in them could not be subsumed under common notions. He therefore was left (...) with the cognitive aspects of emotions, keeping outside of his report the inner feeling which accompanies them. Spinoza's psychology, I claim, disregards any non-cognitive aspect of emotions. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Robert A. Oakes argues that a doctrine central to, and partially constitutive of, classical theism implies a certain sort of pantheism. The doctrine in question is a modal form of the claim that God conserves in existence the world of contingent things; alternatively, it is the view that all contingently existing things are necessarily continuously dependent upon God for their existence. And the variety of pantheism at stake is a modal form of the thesis that all (...) contingent things are, in some sense, included within the being of God. (shrink)

The traditional (Leibnizian) reading of Descartes on mind-body interaction is given a more rigorous reformulation, explaining how Descartes could assert that the mind while not affecting the quantity of motion in the world could change its direction. It is shown, contrary to the trend in recent literature, that this reading has a reliable textual base, and it is argued that it attributes to Descartes a philosophical position of more substance and interest. The kind of interpretation favored depends on the status (...) that the reader attributes to the assertion of the causal closer of the material world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 442-443 [Access article in PDF] Steven Nadler, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche. Cambridge Companions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 319. Cloth, $54.95. With his own Cambridge Companion, the seventeenth-century French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche has at last arrived in the English speaking world. As editor Nadler puts it, "Malebranche was widely recognized by his philosophical and theological (...) contemporaries... as an intellectual force to be reckoned with, a bold... synthesizer of... St. Augustine and Descartes and a systematic thinker of the first rank" (1). Yet until the relatively recent arrival of books or translations by scholars such as Nadler, McCracken, Jolley, Schmaltz, and Riley, Malebranche has largely been treated by Anglo-American scholars as merely the solitary proponent of the allegedly rather silly doctrine of occasionalism. The tide is now turning, and we may expect that over the next few years Malebranche's wide-ranging sophistication and significance will be more widely appreciated. Invaluable to that end will be Nadler's volume, which is of great interest both to those new to Malebranche and to seasoned scholars, for it presents accessible yet thorough introductions to Malebranche's many interesting doctrines—concerning self-knowledge, vision in God, continuous creation, occasionalism, theodicy, grace, freedom, morality, etc.—as well as raises important questions for future research. All of the essays Nadler has assembled are by well-known scholars, and all are worthwhile.The first point to make is that occasionalism—the view that God is the only true cause, and that finite substances lack all true causal power—was neither silly, nor was Malebranche its only proponent. As Nadler's own essay makes clear, the doctrine (or variations thereof) has roots in medieval philosophy as well as in Descartes, and was favored by other Cartesians preceding Malebranche, such as Cordemoy, la Forge, Geulincx, and Clauberg; further, Malebranche offered numerous distinct arguments for it, and, as evidenced in essays by Schmaltz, Rutherford, Kremer, and Riley, intended it to fit with his other metaphysical views in a complete and coherent system. Even if, as some of these same authors suggest, Malebranche failed to get everything to fit quite right, it's at least clear that the oft-raised charge that occasionalism was merely an ad hoc solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem is unjustified. There is of course room to disagree with certain details here: I've argued elsewhere, for example against Nadler, that despite evidence to the contrary Malebranche does not invoke continuous creation as an argument for occasionalism, and, in effect, against Kremer, that Malebranche can succeed in reconciling occasionalism and his conception of free will. But then the fact that scholars can disagree on points such as these is precisely evidence that Malebranche is a rich subject of study.Different essays have different virtues. Some are especially strong in philosophical analysis. Schmaltz provides penetrating analyses of Malebranche's doctrine that we see [End Page 442] all things "in God" as well as of related issues (such as the distinction between the intellectual and the sensible), and also traces their roots in or ramifications for thinkers such as Augustine, Descartes, Arnauld, and Regis; Kremer, too, does an impressive job disentangling the many discrete threads in Malebranche's theory of free will. Essays by Moreau and Riley are particularly useful for their overview or synthetic nature: Moreau presents the many points of contention in the decades-long dispute between Malebranche and Arnauld, while Riley makes explicit the implications that many of the doctrines discussed by other contributors have for Malebranche's moral theory (in the process perhaps implicitly supporting the claim that Malebranche's moral theory may be essential for understanding his metaphysics). Brown's and Robinet's contributions, the former detailing Malebranche's positive influence on or critical reception by figures such as Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid, the latter focusing on disputes between Malebranche, Arnauld, and Leibniz, are essential for those interested (as all should be) in working Malebranche into standard undergraduate courses on modern philosophy, and will also be... (shrink)