Metacognitions, which are beliefs about our own thinking processes, can modulate worry and rumination and thereby influence emotional distress. This study aimed to develop a self-report measure of unhelpful pain-related metacognitions which might serve as a clinical and research tool to better understand pain catastrophizing, a significant risk factor for adverse pain outcomes. Two phases of validation are presented. Phase 1 reports on how the Pain Metacognitions Questionnaire (PMQ) was empirically developed through a qualitative study of 20 people with chronic (...) back ( n = 15) or knee ( n = 5) pain in secondary or tertiary care and then validated in a large internet sample of people experiencing pain ( N = 864). Rasch analysis yielded a 21-item scale with two dimensions (positive and negative metacognition) assessing how useful and problematic people believe rumination about pain to be, respectively. In Phase 2, further validation using a new sample ( N = 510) replicated initial findings. Both PMQ subscales have good retest reliability ( r = 0.76, r = 0.72) and internal consistency (0.86, 0.87). They correlate negatively with mindfulness and positively with pain intensity, disability, anxiety, depression, catastrophizing, rumination, and metacognition. The PMQ also predicts unique variance in catastrophizing when other variables are controlled and predicts ‘patient’ status for pain catastrophizing. Sensitivity analysis yielded preliminary suggestions for clinically meaningful cut-offs. Unhelpful pain metacognitions can be validly and reliably measured using a self-report instrument. Future studies using the PMQ might shed new light on pain-related thinking processes to develop better interventions for people prone to worry and rumination about their pain. (shrink)

The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed “outer psychophysics”: the relationship between characteristics (...) of an external stimulus and the magnitude and nature of pain experience. In contrast, Fechner originally envisioned that “inner psychophysics” should investigate the relationship between physiological states and subjective experience. Despite the lack of established research tradition, inner psychophysics has a potential utility in elucidating underlying mechanisms for the production of phenomenal self-report. We illustrate this, using causal modeling analyses of the accuracy of self-reported pain ratings from our laboratory. We submit that the results are inconsistent with representationalist assumptions. Converging trends from several domains of consciousness studies seem to suggest that we need to abandon the unquestioned doctrine of representationalism and search for a more viable framework for understanding the generation of subjective self-report. (shrink)

We discuss some research that has examined approach motivational urges and how this research clarifies the definition of approach motivation. Our research and that of others have raised doubts about the commonly accepted definition of approach motivation, which views it as a positive affective state triggered by positive stimuli. We review evidence that suggests: (a) that approach motivation is occasionally evoked by negative stimuli; (b) that approach motivation may be experienced as a negative state; and (c) that stimuli are unnecessary (...) to evoke approach motivation. (shrink)