In this paper I articulate the question of whether machines can have emotions. I then reject a common argument against why they cannot have emotions based on the lack of a capacity for feelings. The goal of this paper is not to decisively show that machines can have emotions, but to decisively show that the naïve argument for the conclusion that they cannot needs to be critically examined. I argue that machines that have artificial general intelligence can have emotions based (...) on having the capacity to make judgments that are essential and constitutive of certain emotions, such as anger. I argue against the view that phenomenological or physiological profiles are essential to anger on the basis of emotion regulation. I consider a long list of objections to the position that machines can have emotions. (shrink)

Due to the potent role of teachers’ emotion regulation in effective teaching, it seems essential to see how emotion regulation can contribute to other relevant teaching constructs. In this regard, the present study is intended to probe into the causal relationship among teacher emotion regulation, self-efficacy beliefs, engagement, and anger. In so doing, the Language Teacher Emotion Regulation Inventory, The Teacher Sense of Efficacy Scale, The Engaged Teacher Scale, and The Teacher Anger Scale were administered to 581 English as a (...) Foreign Language teachers in Iran. To gauge the causal relationships among the variables, confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling using LISREL 8.80 were conducted. The results indicated that language teacher emotion regulation could positively and significantly predict teachers’ self-efficacy beliefs and engagement at work. Moreover, the influence of language teacher emotion regulation on the teacher’s anger is significantly negative. That is, the stronger emotion regulation is implemented the better teachers can manage their anger. The implications of this study may uncover new prospects for effective teaching, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

The literature describes religious coping as an important predictor of mental well-being. Present study is aimed at extending this knowledge by assessing whether specific religious coping regulates specific cognitive emotional responses to improve well-being during Covid pandemic, an extreme international event with significant impacts on individuals and communities. A sample of young adults responded to self-report measures of negative and positive religious coping, positive reappraisal, self-blaming, and mental well-being. Results revealed that positive religious coping was a positive predictor of mental (...) well-being and positive reappraisal mediated this positive link. Also, gender and physical health status significantly interacted with positive reappraisal to predict mental well-being in these mediational associations. More specifically, indirect effects of positive reappraisal were positive and significant for men and for participants with better physical health compared with women and those with poor physical health. However, negative religious coping was not a significant correlate of mental well-being but a positive correlate of self-blame. Results suggest that positive religious coping facilitates positive regulation of emotions for improved mental well-being in young adults and particularly young men. (shrink)

Previous studies have suggested that the Zhongyong thinking style is associated with psychological features. However, little is known about the direct association between Zhongyong thinking and resilience and the underlying mechanisms of this relationship in Chinese culture. The present study aimed to investigate the association between Zhongyong thinking and undergraduates’ resilience and to assess whether cognitive reappraisal and positive effects mediated this association. A sample of undergraduates was recruited for this study and the participants completed the Zhongyong Thinking Style Scale, (...) the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale, and the Resilience-11. Results indicated that the Zhongyong thinking style was positively and significantly associated with resilience. Undergraduates’ resilience was affected by Zhongyong thinking partly through 3 different pathways: the mediating role of cognitive reappraisal, the mediating role of positive effect, and the mediating chain role of both cognitive reappraisal and positive effect. These findings might provide a deeper understanding of the protective factors for resilience among Chinese undergraduates. (shrink)

Improving emotion regulation is central to borderline personality disorder (BPD) treatment, but little research indicates which emotion regulation strategies are optimally effective and when. Basic emotion science suggests that engagement emotion regulation strategies that process emotional content become less effective as emotional intensity increases, whereas disengagement strategies that disengage from it do not. This study examined whether emotional reactivity to emotional stimuli predicts the effectiveness of engagement and disengagement emotion regulation across self-report, general physiologic (heart rate), sympathetic (skin conductance responses), (...) and parasympathetic (respiratory sinus arrythmia) emotion in BPD, healthy, and clinical control (i.e. generalized anxiety disorder; GAD) groups. 120 participants (40 per group) were exposed to emotion inductions and then instructed to implement engagement (mindful awareness) and disengagement (distraction) strategies while self-report and physiological emotion measurements were taken. In the BPD and GAD groups, higher heart rate or respiratory sinus arrythmia reactivity, respectively, predicted improved mindful awareness effectiveness. Higher skin conductance reactivity predicted worsened distraction effectiveness in BPD. Higher reactivity may potentiate engagement emotion regulation, and exacerbate disengagement from emotional content, in BPD. Future research should examine other domains of emotion regulation that may be influenced by emotional intensity, and other forms of emotional intensity that may influence them. (shrink)

The paradox of fiction tackles how we can be considered as rational while having emotions towards fictional and thus non-existing events. I aim to show that the different philosophical positions on this issue can be reconciled within the emotion regulation framework. This approach refines the concept of emotion, defining it as a sequence of distinct regulated processes. I argue that the philosophical solutions that have been proposed to solve the paradox can be framed as different regulation mechanisms occuring at each (...) stage of the emotion sequence. Based on these results, I propose an original and unifying solution to the paradox of fiction which relies on the notion of quasi-belief. On one hand, this solution solves the paradox of fiction through rejecting each proposition of the paradox at different stages of the emotion process. On the other hand, it explains through the notion of rational appraisal why the question of the existence of emotions towards fictional events is bound to the question of their rationality. The functional roles of emotion towards fictional events are thus discussed, showing how rationality shapes emotions towards fictional events. (shrink)

This paper summarizes the seminar AI in Medicine in Context: Hopes? Nightmares? that was held at the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto on October 17, 2017, with special guest assistant professor and neurosurgeon Dr. Sunit Das. The paper discusses the key points from Dr. Das' talk. Specifically, it discusses about Dr. Das' perspective on the ethical and moral issues that was experienced from applying artificial intelligence (AI) in law and how such issues can also arise when applying (...) AI to medicine, and concludes with a brief discussion on how such issues can be prevented. (shrink)

The field of emotion regulation has developed rapidly, and a number of emotion regulatory strategies have been identified. To date, empirical attention has focused on contrasting specific regulatio...

We contribute to the growing literature on white fragility by examining how the distinctively emotional manifestations of white fragility (which we dub ‘emotional white fragility’) make it more difficult for white people to have constructive, meaningful thoughts and conversations about race. We claim that emotional white fragility typically involves a failure of emotion regulation, or the ability to manage one’s emotions in real time. We suggest that this lack of emotion regulation can contribute to an unjust distribution of burdens that (...) can further entrench moral damage in the context of relationships as well as help support large-scale patterns of white supremacy. Given the serious implications of emotional white fragility, we suggest a number of emotion regulation techniques that one can deploy to mitigate the potential harms wrought by emotional white fragility. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmotion regulation comprises attempts to influence when and how emotions are experienced and expressed. It has mostly been conceived of as proactive or reactive, but it may also be retroactive and involve memory. I term such past-oriented activity mnemonic emotion regulation and propose that it involves increasing or decreasing access to or altering the characteristics of a memory. People may increase access to a memory and make it more likely that it will be retrieved in the future, for example by (...) rehearsing a pleasant memory. They may decrease access to a memory and make it less likely that intrusions will be experienced in the future, for example by repeatedly trying to stop an unpleasant memory from being retrieved. Finally, people may alter the characteristics of a memory and change its content or context, for example by replacing a negative impression with a productive interpretation. I discuss how mnemonic emotion regulation may be i... (shrink)

Experience and expression are orthogonal emotion dimensions: we do not always show what we feel, nor do we always feel what we show. However, the experience and expression dimensions of emotion are rarely considered simultaneously. We propose a model outlining the intersection of goals for emotion experience and expression. We suggest that these goals may be aligned or misaligned. Our model posits these states can be separated into goals to experience and express, experience but not express, express but not experience, (...) or neither experience nor express positive and negative emotion. We contend that considering intersections between experience and expression goals will advance understanding of emotion regulation choice and success. (shrink)

This essay argues that there are concrete emotion regulation practices described, but not developed, in Kierkegaard’s Christian Discourses. These practices—such as attentiveness to emotion, attentional deployment, and cognitive reappraisal—help the reader to regulate her emotions, to get rid of negative, unwanted emotions such as worry, and to cultivate and nourish positive emotions such as faith, gratitude, and trust. An examination of the Discourses also expose Kierkegaard’s understanding of the emotions; his view is akin to a perceptual theory of the emotions (...) that closely connects emotions and concerns. In particular, this analysis unearths two main regulatory strategies located in the Discourses, strategies that closely resemble present-day psychological accounts of emotion regulation. I conclude that contemporary research reinforces Kierkegaard’s philosophical analysis of emotions and emotion-regulation strategies. Drawing on this research provides the most persuasive interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the emotions and emotion-regulation strategies. Additionally, present-day research clarifies the otherwise elusive, opaque strategies he describes. Finally, my analysis demonstrates that Kierkegaard’s work can uniquely contribute to the present-day psychological research by emphasizing the need for diachronic regulation strategies, while the contemporary literature overwhelmingly focuses on synchronic strategies. (shrink)

Putting feelings into words, or “affect labeling,” can attenuate our emotional experiences. However, unlike explicit emotion regulation techniques, affect labeling may not even feel like a regulatory process as it occurs. Nevertheless, research investigating affect labeling has found it produces a pattern of effects like those seen during explicit emotion regulation, suggesting affect labeling is a form of implicit emotion regulation. In this review, we will outline research on affect labeling, comparing it to reappraisal, a form of explicit emotion regulation, (...) along four major domains of effects—experiential, autonomic, neural, and behavioral—that establish it as a form of implicit emotion regulation. This review will then speculate on possible mechanisms driving affect labeling effects and other remaining unanswered questions. (shrink)

This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and the aforementioned (...) argument for a libertarian conception of free will. In defending each of these arguments, the book both defends and relies upon the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In articulating the latter transcendental argument – for freedom – heavy reliance is made on the earlier, epistemic, work: especially on the deontological conception of rational justification (on epistemic internalism). (shrink)

The article presents the results of research on relationships between types of social participation and emotion regulation. In the study, Gratz’ and Roemer’s perspective on emotion regulation and Reinders’ and Butz’s concept of types of social participation were applied. Participants were 1151 students from three types of vocational schools: basic vocational school, technical upper secondary school, and specialized upper secondary school. The results of studies conducted with the use of Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale and Social Participation Questionnaire indicate that (...) there are small, however, significant, differences in the levels of social participation dimensions and the frequency of particular types of social participation between students from the three investigated types of vocational schools. The level of transitive orientation turned out to be higher among students from the basic vocational schools than among students from the specialized upper secondary schools and the technical upper secondary schools. In each educational group, the level of transitive orientation was significantly higher than the level of moratorium orientation. The hypothesis about the relationship between dimensions of emotion regulation and types of social participation, particularly with respect to the dimension of “lack of emotional awareness”, was confirmed. The most effective style in terms of emotion regulation turned out to be the assimilation type. The highest level of emotion dysregulation proved to be connected with the segregation type. (shrink)

The article presents the results of a study investigating the links between emotion regulation and identity. The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between the two variables. On the basis of neo-eriksonian theories, an attempt to specify the role of emotion regulation in the process of identity formation was made. The study involved 849 people aged 14-25. The participants attended six types of schools: lower secondary school, basic vocational school, technical upper secondary school, general upper secondary school, (...) post-secondary school, and university. The research was conducted with the use of two questionnaires: Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale and Dimensions of Identity Development Scale. The analysis of the results points to a partial confirmation of the assumed hypotheses about the differences between people with different identity statuses in respect of the six investigated dimensions of emotion regulation. Also, the hypotheses about the links between the dimensions of emotion regulation and dimensions of identity in the subgroups with different identity statuses were partially confirmed. (shrink)

Researchers have recognized that interpersonal trust consists of different dimensions. These dimensions suggest that trust can be rational, cognitive, or affective. Affect, which includes moods and emotions, is likely to have a direct impact on the affective dimension. On the other hand, there are also studies showing that affect indirectly influence cognitive judgments. Nonetheless, in this chapter we argue that the impact of affect on judgment will not be the same on all individuals. In effect, the impact varies, depending on (...) the individual's attention to affect, motivation to use or guard against affect, or regulation of affect. All this may suggest that an individual's abilities or tendencies to manage affect will have implication on his or her trust relationships with others. (shrink)

Many philosophies of engagement build upon pedagogical, metaphysical, epistemological and ethical frameworks, particularly Virtue Ethics frameworks. However, a glance at the literature suggests that there are many debates about the nature, meaning, value and application of such things. In this paper, I will look at some recent empirical work (particularly in neuroscience) on virtues. I will argue that not only do such (empirical) studies enrich and deepen our understanding of virtues and indeed of virtue ethics; when combined with a reinterpretation (...) of some key parts of virtue ethics, drawn from Aristotle, it may be possible to respond coherently to some well-­‐known “misgivings” about virtue ethics (and indeed its range of possible applications in education), namely that 1) ‘the previous history of virtue-­‐educational initiatives does not augur well for the prospects of future ones’; 2) ‘the study of virtue and character lacks a clear empirical methodology’; 3) ‘we know very little about the impact of previous interventions in this field.’(Kristjánsson, 2013) It may also make possible a more cogent explanation of the place of eudaimonia, if any, in modern (higher) education. (shrink)

It is often acknowledged that mindfulness facilitates emotion regulation on a long-term scale. Only few empirical studies support the hypothesis that even a brief mindfulness induction among subjects without previous experience of meditation allows an effective reduction of both positive and negative emotions. To the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis has never been tested when comparing mindfulness to other regulation strategies known to be effective. The current study investigates the effects of mindfulness, reappraisal and expressive suppression during the regulation (...) of positive emotions. Forty-five participants without previous meditation experience watched four positive video clips while applying a specific regulation strategy: mindful attention, reappraisal, expressive suppression or no strategy. Video clips were matched for intensity and positive emotions index. Each of them was evaluated on two dimensions, valence and arousal. Moreover, participants’ facial expressions were recorded during the presentation of the video clips. Results showed that participants report less positive affect in reappraisal and mindful attention conditions compared to expression suppression and a control condition; and the facialexpression – activation of AU12 and AU6 – varies with the regulation strategy applied. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of mindfulness in decreasing both the evaluative judgment of positive video clips and the related facial expression, among participants without previous mindfulness experience. (shrink)

Moral judgment has typically been characterized as a conflict between emotion and reason. In recent years, a central concern has been determining which process is the chief contributor to moral behavior. While classic moral theorists claimed that moral evaluations stem from consciously controlled cognitive processes, recent research indicates that affective processes may be driving moral behavior. Here, we propose a new way of thinking about emotion within the context of moral judgment, one in which affect is generated and transformed by (...) both automatic and controlled processes, and moral evaluations are shifted accordingly. We begin with a review of how existing theories in psychology and neuroscience address the interaction between emotion and cognition, and how these theories may inform the study of moral judgment. We then describe how brain regions involved in both affective processing and moral judgment overlap and may make distinct contributions to the moral evaluation process. Finally, we discuss how this way of thinking about emotion can be reconciled with current theories in moral psychology before mapping out future directions in the study of moral behavior. (shrink)

Construal-level theory emphasizes that representing events at greater spatial, temporal, social, or hypothetical distance results in processing information at high construal levels (more conceptual, abstract). We posit that psychological distance and construal level are somewhat separable constructs, and can have different effects on emotion, and therefore, emotion regulation. We argue that psychological distance influences emotional appraisal, such that increasing distance results in lower emotion intensity, which can be leveraged to down-regulate emotions. However, we consider construal level a mindset, which can (...) occur with either high or low psychological distance. Furthermore, we argue that compared with psychological distance, construal level has a more nuanced relationship with emotion, and changing construal level for the purpose of changing emotion also requires considering the construal level of one's emotion-regulation goals. (shrink)

Although there is evidence parent–child attachment security is associated with trait-like emotion indices, trait perspectives do not fully capture children's responses to context, an important emotion regulation component. This paper evaluates whether attachment is associated with two dynamic emotion indicators: emotion reactivity and emotion recovery. We review conceptual and empirical connections, describe the dynamic emotion perspective, discuss hypotheses, and review evidence. Our review (15 studies) shows that secure attachment was more consistently related to recovery than reactivity, avoidant attachment was related (...) to low emotion reactivity and recovery, ambivalent attachment was associated with greater emotion reactivity, and disorganized attachment was related to high reactivity and recovery difficulties. We close by comparing trait-like and dynamic emotion conclusions then propose future research directions. (shrink)

This study investigates the relationship between moral stress reactions and resulting coping efforts in severely morally challenging situations. Long-term positive reactions and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) indicators following morally challenging situations are also studied. The sample consisted of cadets and officers (n = 332) from Norway and Sweden. Long-term positive reactions were found to be associated with limited moral stress reactions during the challenging episode and frequent use of acceptance and positive reappraisal coping strategies. Long-term high scores on a PTSD (...) indicator scale covaried with high scores on Openness, a strong moral stress reaction, and frequent use of instrumental coping strategies. The main conclusion is that the immediate moral stress reaction and coping strategies following morally challenging situations appear to be related to both positive long-term reactions and to indicators of PTSD. (shrink)

People experience various negative emotions in their everyday lives. They feel anger toward aggressive drivers, shame for making a mistake at work, and guilt for hurting another person. When these...

This study explored attention and interpretation biases in processing facial expressions as correlates of theoretically distinct self-reported anger experience, expression, and control. Non-selected undergraduate students completed cognitive tasks measuring attention bias, interpretation bias, and Spielberger’s State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Attention bias toward angry faces was associated with higher trait anger and anger expression and with lower anger control-in and anger control-out. The propensity to quickly interpret ambiguous faces as angry was associated with greater anger expression and its subcomponent of anger (...) expression-out and with lower anger control-out. Interactions between attention and interpretation biases did not contribute to the prediction of any anger component suggesting that attention and interpretation biases may function as distinct mechanisms. Theoretical and possible clinical implications are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmotion differentiation refers to the precision with which people can identify and distinguish their emotions and has been associated with well-being in adults. This study investigated ED and its relation with emotional well-being in adolescents. We used an experience sampling method with 72 participants to assess adolescents’ positive and negative emotions at different time points over the course of two weekends and a baseline questionnaire to assess emotional well-being. Differentiating negative emotions was related to less negativity intensity and propensity, and (...) to the belief that emotions are malleable. Differentiating positive emotions was not related to any of the assessed well-being variables. Together, these results suggest that a detailed awareness of one’s negative emotional states is an important dimension of well-being, also in adolescence. (shrink)

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...) moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in the use of meditation to improve cognitive performance, emotional balance, and well-being. As a consequence, research into the psychological effects and neural mechanisms of meditation has been accumulating. Whether and how meditation affects decision making is not yet clear. Here, we review evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging studies and summarize the effects of meditation on social and non-social economic decision making. Research suggests that meditation modulates brain activities associated (...) with cognitive control, emotion regulation and empathy, and leads to improved non-social and social decision making. Accordingly, we propose an integrative model in which cognitive control, emotional regulation, and empathic concern mediate the effects of meditation on decision making. This model provides insights into the mechanisms by which meditation affects the decision making process. More evidence is needed to test our explanatory model and to explore the function of specific brain areas and their interactive effects on decision making during meditation training. (shrink)

Cognitive theories of emotion propose that the interpretation of emotion-eliciting situations crucially shapes affective responses. Implicit or automatic biases in these interpretations may hinder emotion regulation and thereby increase risk for the onset and maintenance of psychological disorders. In this study, participants were randomly assigned to a positive or negative interpretation bias training using ambiguous social scenarios. After the completion of the training, a stress task was administered and changes in positive and negative affect and self-esteem were assessed. The results (...) demonstrate that the interpretation bias training was successful in that participants exhibited a tendency to interpret novel scenarios in accordance with their training condition. Importantly, the positive training condition also had a protective effect on self-esteem. Participants in this condition did not exhibit a decrease in self-esteem after the stress task, whereas participants in the negative condition did. These results demonstrate that implicit cognitive biases can be trained and that this training affects self-esteem. Implications of these findings for research on psychopathology and emotion regulation are discussed. (shrink)

Do people share their feelings of guilt with others and, if so, what are the reasons for doing this or not doing this? Even though the social sharing of negative emotional experiences, such as regret, has been extensively studied, not much is known about whether people share feelings of guilt and why. We report three studies exploring these questions. In Study 1, we re-analysed data about sharing guilt experiences posted on a social website called “Yahoo Answers”, and found that people (...) share intrapersonal as well as interpersonal guilt experiences with others online. Study 2 found that the main motivations of sharing guilt (compared with the sharing of regret) were “venting”, “clarification and meaning”, and “gaining advice”. Study 3 found that people were more likely to share experiences of interpersonal guilt and more likely to keep experiences of intrapersonal guilt to themselves. Together, these studies contribute to a further understanding of the social sharing of the emotion guilt. (shrink)

The present cross-sectional study explored whether childhood maltreatment might lead to moral disengagement through emotion regulation strategies, i.e. expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal. We examined these links in a convenience sample of 178 adults aged 18 to 56 (M = 22.50, SD = 4.89) who completed an online survey. Results suggested that expressive suppression was positively linked to emotioal and sexual abuse and moral disengagement. At the same time, cognitive reappraisal was negatively correlated with emotional abuse. Also, moral disengagement was (...) significantly associated with physical and sexual abuse. Finally, mediation analysis results suggested a significant indirect effect of expressive suppression on the link between emotional and sexual abuse and moral disengagement (but not physical abuse) and moral disengagement. We discuss these findings through the lenses of moral psychology, focusing on moral disengagement as a potential reaction to childhood trauma through expressive suppression. (shrink)

Previous studies have found differences in the cognitive and neural mechanisms between cognitive reappraisal and expression suppression in the regulation of various negative emotions and the recognition of regulated stimuli. However, whether these differences are valid for sadness remains unclear. As such, we investigated the effect of cognitive reappraisal and expression suppression on sadness regulation and the recognition of sad scenes adopting event-related potentials. Twenty-eight healthy undergraduate and graduate students took part in this study. In the regulation phase, the participants (...) were asked to down-regulation, expressive suppression, or maintain their sad emotion evoked by the sad images, and then to perform an immediately unexpected recognition task involving the regulated images. The behavioral results show that down-regulation reappraisal significantly diminished subjective feelings of sadness, but expressive suppression did not; both strategies impaired the participants’ recognition of sad images, and expressive suppression had a greater damaging effect on the recognition of sad images than down-regulation reappraisal. The ERP results indicate that reappraisal and expressive suppression significantly reduced the late positive potential induced by sadness. These findings suggest that down-regulation reappraisal and expression suppression can effectively decrease sadness, and that down-regulation reappraisal is a more effective regulation strategy for sadness. Both strategies impair the recognition of sad scenes, and expression suppression leads to relatively greater impairment in the recognition of sad scenes. (shrink)

Emotion regulation (ER) strategies may reduce the negative relationship between math anxiety and mathematics accuracy, but different strategies may differ in their effectiveness. We recorded electrodermal activity (EDA) to examine the effect of physiological arousal on performance during different applied ER strategies. We explored how ER strategies might affect the decreases in accuracy attributed to physiological arousal in high math anxious (HMA) individuals. Participants were instructed to use cognitive reappraisal (CR), expressive suppression (ES), or a “business as usual” strategy. During (...) the ES condition, HMA individuals showed decreases in math accuracy associated with increased EDA, compared to low math anxious (LMA) individuals. For both HMA and LMA groups, CR reduced the association between physiological arousal and math accuracy, such that even elevated physiological arousal levels no longer had a negative association with math accuracy. These results show that CR provides a promising technique for ameliorating the negative relationship between math anxiety and math accuracy. (shrink)

The present narrative review addresses issues concerning the defining criteria and conceptual underpinnings of pain catastrophizing. To date, the concept of pain catastrophizing has been extensively used in many clinical and experimental contexts and it is considered as one of the most important psychological correlate of pain chronicity and disability. Although its extensive use, we are still facing important problems related to its defining criteria and conceptual understanding. At present, there is no general theoretical agreement of what catastrophizing really is. (...) The lack of a consensus on its definition and conceptual issues has important consequences on the choice of the pain management approaches, defining and identifying problems, and promoting novel research. Clinical and research work in absence of a common theoretical ground is often trivial. It is very surprising that clinical and experimental work has grown extensively in the past years, without a common ground in the form of a clear definition of pain catastrophizing and overview of its conceptual basis. Improving the efficacy and efficiency of pan catastrophizing related treatments requires an understanding of the theoretical construct. So far, most interventions have only demonstrated modest effects in reducing pain catastrophizing. Therefore, clarifying the construct may be an important precursor for developing more targeted and effective interventions, thereby easing some of the burden related to this aspect of pain. In our review, we have extracted and de-constructed common elements that emerge from different theoretical models with the aim to understand the concept of catastrophizing, which components can be modulated by psychological interventions, and the general role in pain processing. The analysis of the literature has indicated essential key elements to explain pain catastrophizing: emotional regulation, catastrophic worry, rumination, behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation systems, and interoceptive sensitivity. The present paper attempts to integrate these key elements with the aim to re-compose and unify the concept within a modern biopsychosocial interpretation of catastrophizing. (shrink)

Reappraisal is a widely investigated emotion regulation strategy, often impaired in those with acquired brain injury (ABI). Little is known, however, about the tools to measure this capacity in patients, who may find traditional reappraisal tasks difficult. Fifty-five participants with ABI, and thirty-five healthy controls (HCs), completed reappraisal tasks with personal and impersonal emotion elicitation components, questionnaires measuring reappraisal (the ERQ-CA), and neuropsychological assessment. The main findings demonstrated that both groups produced more reappraisals, and rated their reappraisal ideas as more (...) effective for personal stimuli. The ABI group were significantly faster to generate reappraisals for personal, compared to impersonal, stimuli. Yet, participants with ABI performed worse than HCs on the majority of reappraisal components, across both reappraisal tasks. Results of regression analyses revealed significant relationships between certain measures of cognitive control and certain reappraisal components, which varied for the personal and impersonal reappraisal task. Notably, while inhibition predicted aspects of reappraisal in both the ABI and HC group, working memory was only related to reappraisal in participants with ABI. The study suggests that personal context plays a key role in reappraisal, and proposes a model to better understand the role of cognitive control across the reappraisal process. (shrink)