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  1. Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.
    Consider the sentence 'This sentence is not true'. It seems that the sentence can be neither true nor not true, on pain of contradiction. Certain notorious paradoxes like this have bedevilled philosophical theories of truth. Tim Maudlin presents an original account of logic and semantics which deals with these paradoxes, and allows him to set out a new theory of truth-values and the norms governing claims about truth. All philosophers interested in logic and language will find Truth and Paradox a (...)
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  • The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1221-1242.
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar paradox. (...)
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  • Pursuing Meaning.Emma Borg - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Emma Borg examines the relation between semantics and pragmatics, and assesses recent answers to fundamental questions of how and where to draw the divide between the two. She argues for a minimal account of the interrelation between them--a 'minimal semantics'--which holds that only rule-governed appeals to context can influence semantic content.
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  • The Revision Theory of Truth.Anil Gupta & Nuel D. Belnap - 1993 - MIT Press.
    In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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  • The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics.Peter Ludlow - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Peter Ludlow presents the first book on the philosophy of generative linguistics, including both Chomsky's government and binding theory and his minimalist ...
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  • Expressibility and the Liar's Revenge.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):297-314.
    There is a standard objection against purported explanations of how a language L can express the notion of being a true sentence of L. According to this objection, such explanations avoid one paradox (the Liar) only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if L can contain its own truth predicate, we can identify another notion it cannot express, on pain of contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. This paper seeks to undermine such ‘revenge’ by arguing that it presupposes a (...)
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  • Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1981 - In David Zaret (ed.), Review of Thomas S. Kuhn The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Duke University Press. pp. 320--39.
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  • Saving truth from paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    A selective background -- Broadly classical approaches -- Paracompleteness -- More on paracomplete solutions -- Paraconsistent dialetheism.
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  • New horizons in the study of language and mind.Noam Chomsky - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is an outstanding contribution to the philosophical study of language and mind, by one of the most influential thinkers of our time. In a series of penetrating essays, Chomsky cuts through the confusion and prejudice which has infected the study of language and mind, bringing new solutions to traditional philosophical puzzles and fresh perspectives on issues of general interest, ranging from the mind-body problem to the unification of science. Using a range of imaginative and deceptively simple linguistic analyses, (...)
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  • The liar speaks the truth: a defense of the revision theory of truth.Aladdin Mahmūd Yaqūb - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed (...)
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  • What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
    Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude that knowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason to trust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide range of cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have a greater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliable intuitions. Whats distinctive about the faulty intuitions, I argue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a (...)
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  • Still counterintuitive: A reply to Kremer.Roy T. Cook - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):257–261.
    In (2002) I argued that Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth (1993) has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the pair of sentences: (S1) At least one of S1 and S2 is false. (S2) Both of S1 and S2 are false.1 is pathological on the Revision account. There is one, and only one, assignment of truth values to {(S1), (S2)} that make the corresponding Tarski..
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  • Counterintuitive consequences of the revision theory of truth.Roy Cook - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):16–22.
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  • Eligibility and inscrutability.J. Robert G. Williams - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):361-399.
    Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘ eligibility ’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but (...)
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  • On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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  • Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
    Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. (...)
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  • Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
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  • What theories of truth should be like (but cannot be).Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.
    This article outlines what a formal theory of truth should be like, at least at first glance. As not all of the stated constraints can be satisfied at the same time, in view of notorious semantic paradoxes such as the Liar paradox, we consider the maximal consistent combinations of these desiderata and compare their relative advantages and disadvantages.
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  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • (1 other version)Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
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  • (1 other version)New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
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  • (1 other version)New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Language as a Natural Object.Noam Chomsky - 2000 - In New horizons in the study of language and mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 106--133.
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  • (1 other version)Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):735-736.
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  • Radical Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Dialectica 27 (1):313-328.
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  • Intuitive consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth.Michael Kremer - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):330-336.
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  • (1 other version)Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Preface. De Gruyter. pp. 207-230.
    According to Emma Borg, minimalism is (roughly) the view that natural language sentences have truth conditions, and that these truth conditions are fully determined by syntactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for her brand of minimalism is that it coheres well with the popular view that semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. In this paper, I argue that the liar paradox presents a serious problem for this principal motivation. Two lines of response (...)
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  • Minimal semantics.Emma Borg - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Minimal Semantics asks what a theory of literal linguistic meaning is for - if you were to be given a working theory of meaning for a language right now, what would you be able to do with it? Emma Borg sets out to defend a formal approach to semantic theorising from a relatively new type of opponent - advocates of what she call 'dual pragmatics'. According to dual pragmatists, rich pragmatic processes play two distinct roles in linguistic comprehension: as well (...)
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  • Mathematics is megethology.David K. Lewis - 1993 - Philosophia Mathematica 1 (1):3-23.
    is the second-order theory of the part-whole relation. It can express such hypotheses about the size of Reality as that there are inaccessibly many atoms. Take a non-empty class to have exactly its non-empty subclasses as parts; hence, its singleton subclasses as atomic parts. Then standard set theory becomes the theory of the member-singleton function—better, the theory of all singleton functions—within the framework of megethology. Given inaccessibly many atoms and a specification of which atoms are urelements, a singleton function exists, (...)
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  • Naive semantics and the liar paradox.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
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  • Naturalness, Representation and the Metaphysics of Truth.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):384-401.
    This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch (2009).
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  • Inconsistent Languages.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
    The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox.
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  • Language and Intepretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry.Noam Chomsky - 2000 - In New horizons in the study of language and mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 46--74.
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  • (1 other version)Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Preface. De Gruyter. pp. 207-230.
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  • The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Vann McGee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
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  • Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can (...)
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  • Prolegomenon to future revenge.J. C. Beall - 2007 - In The Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1–30.
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  • The liar in context.Michael Glanzberg - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (3):217 - 251.
    About twenty-five years ago, Charles Parsons published a paper that began by asking why we still discuss the Liar Paradox. Today, the question seems all the more apt. In the ensuing years we have seen not only Parsons’ work (1974), but seminal work of Saul Kripke (1975), and a huge number of other important papers. Too many to list. Surely, one of them must have solved it! In a way, most of them have. Most papers on the Liar Paradox offer (...)
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  • A contextual–hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad (...)
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  • What Truth Depends on.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
    What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of (...)
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  • Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.
    Magnetism in meta-semantics is the view that the meaning of our words is determined in part by their use and in part by the objective naturalness of candidate meanings. This hypothesis is commonly attributed to David Lewis, and has been put to philosophical work by Brian Weatherson, Ted Sider and others. I argue that there is no evidence that Lewis ever endorsed the view, and that his actual account of language reveals good reasons against it.
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  • Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
    It is argued that a certain form of the view that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are "inconsistent" provides the best response to the semantic paradoxes. After extended discussions of the views of Kirk Ludwig and Matti Eklund, it is argued that in its strongest formulation the view maintains that understanding a natural language is sharing cognition of an inconsistent semantic theory for that language with other speakers. A number of aspects of this approach are discussed and a (...)
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  • Semantical paradox.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.
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  • The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  • On representing ‘true-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.
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  • Radical Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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