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Switch to: Citations
References in:
For a History of Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason. First Formulations and Their Historical Background
In Marcelo Dascal (ed.), Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist? Springer. pp. 463--478 (2008)
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As a Franciscan friar, student, teacher, philosopher, theologian, and political theorist, William of Ockham was and remains one of the most stimulating thinkers of the Middle Ages. The one consistent characteristic of his professional output—both as a student and later as an opponent of papal authoritarianism—was the provocative nature of his ideas. In required commentaries on standard theological texts as well as in his later, more independently inspired treatises, Ockham demonstrated a genuine talent for suggesting and sustaining a number of (...) |
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Leibniz entertained the idea that, as a set of “striving possibles” competes for existence, the largest and most perfect world comes into being. The paper proposes 8 criteria for a Leibniz-world. It argues that a) there is no algorithm e.g., one involving pairwise compossibility-testing that can produce even possible Leibniz-worlds; b) individual substances presuppose completed worlds; c) the uniqueness of the actual world is a matter of theological preference, not an outcome of the assembly-process; and d) Goedel’s theorem implies that (...) |
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In his well-known Discourse on Metaphysics , Leibniz puts individual substance at the basis of metaphysical building. In so doing, he connects himself to a venerable tradition. His theory of individual concept, however, breaks with another idea of the same tradition, that no account of the individual as such can be given. Contrary to what has been commonly accepted, Leibniz’s intuitions are not the mere result of the transcription of subject-predicate logic, nor of the uncritical persistence of some old metaphysical (...) |
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The relation between leibniz's logical and his metaphysical views is the subject of much modern scholarship. Some commentators have argued that his metaphysics is based on his logic; others have taken the opposite position. However, Both sides pose the question in terms of 'priority'. On the contrary, I argue that it is likely that leibniz means the psr to play "both" a logical and a metaphysical role. The ambiguity of leibniz's psr indicates that he equates the metaphysical notion of causation (...) |
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Leibniz war gewillt, die Idee der kontingenten Wahrheiten über nur mögliche individuelle Substanzen ernst zu nehmen -unabhängig davon, ob diese Substanzen existieren oder nicht. Einer der Wege, diese Idee zu erklären, ist die berühmte Lehre von der unendlichen Analyse. Eine wichtige und verwirrende Schwierigkeit für diese Lehre ist das von Robert M. Adams erörterte Problem des Beweises mit Glück. Auch wenn der vollständige individuelle Begriff einer möglichen Substanz S sich durch Analyse in unendlich viele einfache Begriffe zerlegen läßt, ist es (...) |
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If we had a balance of reasons, where the arguments presented in favor and against the case were weighed precisely and the verdict could be pronounced in favor of the most inclined scale ... [we would have] a more valuable art than that miraculous science of producing gold. |
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