- (2 other versions)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.details
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(1 other version)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.details
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The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 307-319.details
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(1 other version)A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.details
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When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.details
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(1 other version)The individual strikes back.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):281-302.details
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(1 other version)Rules and powers.John Heil & C. B. Martin - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312.details
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Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
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The taming of the true.Michael Glanzberg - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290-293.details
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(1 other version)Rules and Powers.C. B. Martin & John Heil - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):283-312.details
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How (not) to think about idealisation and ceteris paribus -laws.Robert Kowalenko - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):183-201.details
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How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction.John D. Norton - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):185-207.details
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On Kripke’s and Goodman’s Uses of ”Grue’.Ian Hacking - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (265):269-295.details
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Simple Tasks, Abstractions, and Semantic Dispositionalism.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):453-470.details
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Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation.Paul Coates - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.details
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Idealizing, Abstracting, and Semantic Dispositionalism.Adam C. Podlaskowski & Nicholaos J. Jones - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):166-178.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays. [REVIEW]Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):898-901.details
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Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies.Barry Allen - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (2):257-264.details
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The formal equivalence of grue and green and how it undoes the new Riddle of induction.John D. Norton - unknowndetails
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