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  1. (2 other versions)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims.
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  • A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.
    Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction PART I Intentionality Chapter 1 Fodor’ Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum Chapter 2 Semantics, Wisconsin Style Chapter 3 A Theory of Content, I: The Problem Chapter 4 A Theory of Content, II: The Theory Chapter 5 Making Mind Matter More Chapter 6 Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs Chapter 7 Stephen Schiffer’s Dark Night of The Soul: A Review of Remnants of Meaning PART II Modularity Chapter 8 Précis of The Modularity of (...)
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  • Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
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  • Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
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  • (1 other version)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
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  • The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The Taming of the True poses a broad challenge to realist views of meaning and truth that have been prominent in recent philosophy. Neil Tennant argues compellingly that every truth is knowable, and that an effective logical system can be based on this principle. He lays the foundations for global semantic anti-realism and extends its consequences from the philosophy of mathematics and logic to the theory of meaning, metaphysics, and epistemology.
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  • (1 other version)A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 307-319.
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  • (1 other version)A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.
    Here I defend dispositionalism about meaning and rule-following from Kripkenstein's infamous anti-dispositionalist arguments. The problems of finitude, error, and normativity are all addressed. The general lesson I draw is that Kripkenstein's arguments trade on an overly simplistic version of dispositionalism.
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  • When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
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  • (1 other version)The individual strikes back.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):281-302.
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  • (1 other version)Rules and powers.John Heil & C. B. Martin - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312.
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  • Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.
    Semantic dispositionalism is roughly the view that meaning a certain thing by a word, or possessing a certain concept, consists in being disposed to do something, e.g., infer a certain way. Its main problem is that it seems to have so many and disparate exceptions. People can fail to infer as required due to lack of logical acumen, intoxication, confusion, deviant theories, neural malfunctioning, and so on. I present a theory stating possession conditions of concepts that are counterfactuals, rather than (...)
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  • The taming of the true.Michael Glanzberg - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290-293.
    The Taming of the True continues the project Neil Tennant began in Anti-realism and Logic of investigating and defending anti-realism. Tennant’s earlier book anticipated a second volume, in which issues related to empirical discourse would be addressed in greater detail. The Taming of the True provides this sequel. It also attempts a ground-clearing project, by addressing challenges to some of the presuppositions and implications of Tennant’s anti-realist position. Finally, it takes an opportunity to revisit some of the issues examined in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Rules and Powers.C. B. Martin & John Heil - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):283-312.
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  • How (not) to think about idealisation and ceteris paribus -laws.Robert Kowalenko - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):183-201.
    "Semantic dispositionalism" is the theory that a speaker's meaning something by a given linguistic symbol is determined by her dispositions to use the symbol in a certain way. According to an objection by Kripke, further elaborated in Kusch :156–163, 2005), semantic dispositionalism involves ceteris paribus-clauses and idealisations, such as unbounded memory, that deviate from standard scientific methodology. I argue that Kusch misrepresents both ceteris paribus-laws and idealisation, neither of which factually "approximate" the behaviour of agents or the course of events, (...)
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  • How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction.John D. Norton - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):185-207.
    That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence (...)
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  • On Kripke’s and Goodman’s Uses of ”Grue’.Ian Hacking - 1993 - Philosophy 68 (265):269-295.
    Kripke's lectures, published as Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language , posed a sceptical problem about following a rule, which he cautiously attributed to Wittgenstein. He briefly noticed an analogy between his new kind of scepticism and Goodman's riddle of induction. ‘Grue’, he said, could be used to formulate a question not about induction but about meaning: the problem would not be Goodman's about induction—‘Why not predict that grass, which has been grue in the past, will be grue in the (...)
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  • Simple Tasks, Abstractions, and Semantic Dispositionalism.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):453-470.
    According to certain kinds of semantic dispositionalism, what an agent means by her words is grounded by her dispositions to complete simple tasks. This sort of position is often thought to avoid the finitude problem raised by Kripke against simpler forms of dispositionalism. The traditional objection is that, since words possess indefinite (or infinite) extensions, and our dispositions to use words are only finite, those dispositions prove inadequate to serve as ground for what we mean by our words. I argue (...)
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  • Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation.Paul Coates - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
    The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact (...)
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  • Idealizing, Abstracting, and Semantic Dispositionalism.Adam C. Podlaskowski & Nicholaos J. Jones - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):166-178.
    Abstract: According to certain dispositional accounts of meaning, an agent's meaning is determined by the dispositions that an idealized version of this agent has in optimal conditions. We argue that such attempts cannot properly fix meaning. For even if there is a way to determine which features of an agent should be idealized without appealing to what the agent means, there is no non-circular way to determine how those features should be idealized. We sketch an alternative dispositional account that avoids (...)
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  • A Theory of Content and Other Essays. [REVIEW]Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):898-901.
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  • Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies.Barry Allen - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (2):257-264.
    Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has enlivened recent discussion of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Yet it is quite possible to disengage his interpretive thesis from its supporting argumentation. Doing so leaves one with an intriguing sceptical argument which Kripke first powerfully advances, then tries to halt. But contrary to the impression his argument may leave, Kripke's solution and the position it concedes to the Sceptic are deeply allied. Here I shall demonstrate their common assumption, and on that basis argue (...)
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  • The formal equivalence of grue and green and how it undoes the new Riddle of induction.John D. Norton - unknown
    The hidden strength of Goodman's ingenious "new riddle of induction" lies in the perfect symmetry of grue/bleen and green/blue. The very same sentence forms used to define grue/bleen in terms of green/blue can be used to define green/blue in terms of grue/bleen by permutation of terms. Therein lies its undoing. In the artificially restricted case in which there are no additional facts that can break the symmetry, grue/bleen and green/blue are merely notational variants of the same facts; or, if they (...)
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