The acknowledgement that something is complex, it is argued, implies that our knowledge of it will always be limited. We cannot make complete, absolute or final claims about complex systems. Post-structuralism, and specifically deconstruction, make similar claims about knowledge in general. Arguments against deconstruction can, therefore, also be held against a critical form of complexity thinking and a defence of the view from complexity (as presented here) should take account of them. Three of these arguments are investigated: that deconstruction and (...) complexity-thinking lead to relativism, that they are subject to the performative contradiction and that their claims are vague. It is shown that these critiques are not really effective and it is suggested that a responsible approach to complexity has to be provisional, i.e. modest, without being vague or relativistic. (shrink)

The contemporary use of the term ‘complexity’ frequently indicates that it is considered a unified concept. This may lead to a neglect of the range of different theories that deal with the implications related to the notion of complexity. This paper, integrating both the English and the Latin traditions of research associated with this notion, suggests a more nuanced use of the term, thereby avoiding simplification of the concept to some of its dominant expressions only. The paper further explores the (...) etymology of ‘complexity’ and offers a chronological presentation of three generations of theories that have shaped its uses; the epistemic and socio‐cultural roots of these theories are also introduced. From an epistemological point of view, this reflection sheds light on the competing interpretations underlying the definition of what is considered as complex. Also, from an anthropological perspective it considers both the emancipatory as well as the alienating dimensions of complexity. Based on the highlighted ambiguities, the paper suggests in conclusion that contributions grounded in contemporary theories related to complexity, as well as critical appraisals of their epistemological and ethical legitimacy, need to follow the recursive feedback loops and dynamics that they constitute. In doing so, researchers and practitioners in education should consider their own practice as a learning process that does not require the reduction of the antagonisms and the complementarities that shape its own complexity. (shrink)

This is a review article of Paul Cillier's 1999 book _Complexity and Postmodernism_. The review article is generally encouraging and constructive, although isolates a number of areas in need of clarification or development in Cillier's work. The volume of the _South African Journal of Philosophy_ in which the review article appeared also printed a response by Cilliers.

The position adopted in this paper is inspired by Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity and his critique of scientific and philosophical forms of reductionism. This paper is based on research focusing on the diversity of conceptions of critique developed in academic discourses. It aims to challenge the fragmentation and the reduction framing the understanding of this notion in educational sciences. The reflection begins with the introduction of some of Morin’s assumptions concerning the paradigm of complexity. The next section provides a (...) definition of the idea of critique and explores some limits associated with contemporary references framing this notion. Theories of critique are at the core of several educational theories. Based on the literature identified in French-speaking and English-speaking critical traditions in education, several factors determining the way the idea of critique is reduced in education are highlighted. Stressing the tacit character of those variables challenges the limits of traditional conceptions of critique in contemporary education. The position adopted denounces therefore the fact that the current development of theories of critique in education does not provide a framework considering more systematically their conditions of emergence, their own limitations, as well as the antagonistic, complementary and contradictory relationships, which connect them to one another. Based on this position, this paper finally suggests that a distinction be made between “hypocritique” and “hypercritique” as a semantic artifact, stressing the importance of challenging existing theories of critique in education according to the level of complexity that one may attribute to them. (shrink)

Among “continental” philosophers there is general agreement that reason has to be understood as culturally mediated and embodied in social practice, and thus that the critique of reason should be carried out through some form of sociocultural analysis. At the same time, there is very sharp disagreement among them as to just what form the critique should take. In its most general terms, that disagreement has come to be known as the “modernity/postmodernity debate” in philosophy. Stylizing a bit, we might (...) characterize one side as attacking Enlightenment—especially Kantian—conceptions of reason and the rational subject at their very roots, and the other side as wanting to preserve such conceptions by transforming them. It is the merit of Richard Bernstein’s recent book to have reconstructed these abstruse metaphilosophical debates in generally comprehensible prose and to have indicated in the process the relevance of the pragmatist tradition to the issues they raise. (shrink)

Over the past two centuries, criticism has assumed an indispensable role in the production of truth in many academic contexts. Furthermore, a dominant conception of critique emerged out of disciplinary truth regimes – evident as much in right wing think tanks as in critical theories. This ‘grammar of critique’ requires critics to judge specific contexts against founded criteria. However, in an epistemological ethos beset by obdurate uncertainty, where disciplinarity is increasingly under attack, a judgmental grammar faces intractable challenges. For one (...) thing, intransigent ambiguities defy the silencing required to achieve certainty, or universal agreement, on ‘founded criteria’. This predicament creates a distinctive semantic disquiet and a unique opportunity to prize critique loose from its previously privileged grammar. Allegorically referring to Derrida’s images of hospitality, this paper offers a different grammar of critique as an experience of imagined prospects, a promise that rallies against ossified thought systems of the now. This experience is structured through the impossible to the extent that it defies absolute definition, finitely encounters infinite possibilities, involves preconceptions, and opens critics up to promises that never fully arrive. As such, critical experiences invite existential anticipations whose contours, paradoxically, are imagined from within, and yet promise an escape from, local historical circumstances. (shrink)