- Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.details
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(1 other version)The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays.Steven Luper (ed.) - 2003 - Ashgate Publishing.details
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When the unreal is more likely than the real: Post hoc probability judgements and counterfactual closeness.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):147 – 177.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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Knowledge, luck and lotteries.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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What luck is not.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.details
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Easy possibilities.R. M. Sainsbury - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.details
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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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Moral and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.details
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(2 other versions)The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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(1 other version)Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.details
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What, and where, luck is: A response to Jennifer Lackey.Neil Levy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):489 – 497.details
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Knowledge Can Be Lucky.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 164.details
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The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal Justice.Larry Laudan - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):282-294.details
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(1 other version)Safety-Based Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.details
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(1 other version)Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.details
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Philosophical Perspectives on Risk.Sven Ove Hansson - 2004 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 8 (1):10-35.details
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Justification, coherence, and epistemic responsibility in legal fact-finding.Amalia Amaya - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):pp. 306-319.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.details
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The epistemic predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian tracking, and scepticism.Steven Luper-Foy - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):26 – 49.details
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Epistemic Value.Wayne D. Riggs - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Does luck exclude control?E. J. Coffman - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504.details
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Resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.details
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``Understanding, Knowledge, and the M eno Requirement".Wayne D. Riggs - 2009 - In Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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In defence of modest anti-luck epistemology.D. Pritchard - 2012 - In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 173--192.details
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