- Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis).J. A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.details
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Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
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Contentless basic minds and perceptual knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).details
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The Dappled World. A Study on the Boundaries of Science.[author unknown] - 1999 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (1):209-209.details
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Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.details
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精神状态的性质.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 1--223.details
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XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):213-226.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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Styles of mental representation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:213-226.details
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Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.David L. Hull - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):435-438.details
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Darwin's Dangerous Idea.Daniel Dennett - 1994 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):169-174.details
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Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking.Felipe De Brigard - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):155-185.details
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Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.details
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Critical Notices.Nancy Cartwright - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):244-249.details
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The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Storrs Mccall - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):99-106.details
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How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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How the Laws of Physics Lie.Malcolm R. Forster - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):478-480.details
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A teleosemantic approach to information in the brain.Rosa Cao - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):49-71.details
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Intelligence without representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.details
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A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction.Randall D. Beer - 1995 - Artificial Intelligence 72 (1-2):173-215.details
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Intention. [REVIEW]Judith Jarvis - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (8):379-383.details
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Intuition pumps and other tools for thinking.Daniel C. Dennett - 2013 - New York: W. W. Norton & Company.details
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The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Nancy Cartwright - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):411-415.details
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The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunuty of Science.[author unknown] - 1995 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (3):84-86.details
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Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-164.details
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Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.details
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Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.details
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Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.details
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Teleosemantics.David Papineau - 2016 - In David Livingstone Smith (ed.), How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for Naturalism. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 95-120.details
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Teleosemantics and indeterminacy.David Papineau - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):1-14.details
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Representation and explanation.David Papineau - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72.details
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Misrepresenting & malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philos Stud 79 (2):109-141.details
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Phenomenology of perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press. Edited by Donald A. Landes.details
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Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Edited by Erik Myin.details
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Action Is Enabled by Systematic Misrepresentations.Wanja Wiese - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1233-1252.details
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The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.Charles K. West & James J. Gibson - 1969 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 3 (1):142.details
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White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):156.details
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An electro‐mechanical »animal«.W. Grey Walter - 1950 - Dialectica 4 (3):206-213.details
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Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace - 1981 - Cognition 9 (3):237-304.details
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The Structure of Science.Raziel Abelson - 1962 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (3):416-417.details
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The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.details
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Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Andrew Woodfield - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):300-303.details
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Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes.Robert Schwartz & David Marr - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):411.details
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Determinate functions.Carolyn Price - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):54-75.details
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Intentionality and teleological error.Paul M. Pietroski - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):267-82.details
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