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Phenomenology of Perception

New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes (1962)

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  1. Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach.Christian Coseru - 2009 - Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.
    In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasaṃvitti ('self-awareness', 'self-cognition') following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, (...)
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  • Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception.Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
    Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...)
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  • Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation.Thomas Fuchs & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
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  • Conscious machines: Memory, melody and muscular imagination. [REVIEW]Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):37-51.
    A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290–311, 1995 , 1998 ), Haikonen ( 2003 ), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7–18, 2003 ), Sloman ( 2004 , 2005 ), Aleksander ( 2005 ), Holland and Knight ( 2006 ), and Chella and Manzotti ( 2007 )), and yet a similar amount of effort has (...)
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  • Sylvia Plath and White Ignorance: Race and Gender in "The Arrival of the Bee Box".Ellen M. Miller - 2007 - Janus Head 10 (1):137-156.
    Sylvia Plath wrote in the midst of growing racial tensions in 1950’s and 1960’s America. Her work demonstrates ambivalence towards her role as a middle-class white woman. In this paper, I examine the racial implications in Plath’s color terms. I disagree with Renée Curry’s reading in White Women Writing White that Plath only considers her whiteness insofar as it affects herself. Through a phenomenological study of how whiteness shifts meaning in this poem, I hope to show that Curry’s negative estimation (...)
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  • Motor intentionality and the case of Schneider.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general (...)
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  • Self and self-consciousness: Aristotelian ontology and cartesian duality.Andrea Christofidou - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):134-162.
    The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively (...)
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  • Nishida, agency, and the 'self-contradictory' body.Joel W. Krueger - 2008 - Asian Philosophy 18 (3):213 – 229.
    In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the 'self-contradictory' body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of 'acting-intuition'. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that Nishida develops a (...)
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  • Phenomenology, Abduction, and Argument: Avoiding an Ostrich Epistemology.Jack Reynolds - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (3):1-18.
    Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the “usual suspects” or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention (...)
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  • Prevention of Disease and the Absent Body: A Phenomenological Approach to Periodontitis.Dylan Rakhra & Māra Grīnfelde - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (3):299-311.
    A large part of the contemporary phenomenology of medicine has been devoted to accounts of health and illness, arguing that they contribute to the improvement of health care. Less focus has been paid to the issue of prevention of disease and the associated difficulty of adhering to health-promoting behaviours, which is arguably of equal importance. This article offers a phenomenological account of this disease prevention, focusing on how we—as embodied beings—engage with health-promoting behaviours. It specifically considers how we engage with (...)
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  • challenging adult-centrism: speaking speech and the possibility of intergenerational dialogue.Georgios Petropoulos - 2023 - Childhood and Philosophy 19:1-22.
    This paper reflects on the role of philosophy in the school environment, paying special attention to the promise of intergenerational dialogue carried forward by philosophy programmes associated with Lipman’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) curriculum and its current transformation into Philosophy with Children (PwC). There are two basic ideas that constitute the guiding thread of my reflections. Firstly, that philosophical interventions of that kind challenge adult-centric views of education and philosophy. Secondly, that such initiatives carry with them the promise of acknowledging (...)
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  • Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):1-20.
    There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...)
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  • Understanding the imitation deficit in autism may lead to a more specific model of autism as an empathy disorder.Tony Charman - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):29-30.
    Preston & de Waal are understandably cautious in applying their model to autism. They emphasise multiple cognitive impairments in autism, including prefrontal-executive, cerebellar-attention, and amygdala-emotion recognition deficits. Further empirical examination of imitation ability in autism may reveal deficits in the neural and cognitive basis of perception-action mapping that have a specific relation to the empathic deficit.
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  • The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects.Richard Heersmink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1829-1849.
    In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of (...)
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  • Embodying emotions: What emotion theorists can learn from simulations of emotions. [REVIEW]Matthew P. Spackman & David Miller - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (3):357-372.
    Cognitively-oriented theories have dominated the recent history of the study of emotion. However, critics of this perspective suggest the role of the body in the experience of emotion is largely ignored by cognitive theorists. As an alternative to the cognitive perspective, critics are increasingly pointing to William James’ theory, which emphasized somatic aspects of emotions. This emerging emphasis on the embodiment of emotions is shared by those in the field of AI attempting to model human emotions. Behavior-based agents in AI (...)
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  • Naturalized phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2009 - In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer.
    It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe 20th century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, i.e., for their criticism of psychologism), the situation has (...)
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  • (1 other version)The role of the lived-body in feeling.Bernhard Waldenfels - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):127-142.
    Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Guest editor’s introduction: The recorporealization of cognition in phenomenology and cognitive science.Brady Thomas Heiner - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):115-126.
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  • Before and beyond representation: Towards an enactive conception of the palaeolithic image.Lambros Malafouris - 2007 - In Malafouris, Lambros (2007) Before and Beyond Representation: Towards an Enactive Conception of the Palaeolithic Image. [Book Chapter].
    For most archaeologists the meaning of prehistoric art appears to be grounded upon, if not synonymous with, the notion of representation and symbolism. This paper explores the possibility that the depictions we see already 30,000 years before present, for instance, at the caves of Chauvet and Lascaux, before and beyond representing the world, they first bring forth a new process of acting within this world and at the same time of thinking about it. It is argued that the unique ability (...)
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  • Cultural DeCoding: A humanities program for gifted and talented high school students seeking university entrance.Laura D’Olimpio, Angela McCarthy & Annette Pedersen - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy in Schools 3 (1):84-103.
    This article details Cultural DeCoding, a humanities based high school extension program for gifted and talented Year 11 and 12 students in Western Australia. The brainchild of Dr Annette Pedersen and Dr Angela McCarthy, the program runs for four days across the summer holidays before the start of the school term. The program fills a gap that exists in the education of gifted and talented secondary students who are interested in the humanities. It is comprised of sessions run by academics (...)
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  • Can synaesthesia be cultivated?: Indications from surveys of meditators.Roger Walsh - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):5-17.
    Synaesthesia is considered a rare perceptual capacity, and one that is not capable of cultivation. However, meditators report the experience quite commonly, and in questionnaire surveys, respondents claimed to experience synaesthesia in 35% of meditation retreatants, in 63% of a group of regular meditators, and in 86% of advanced teachers. These rates were significantly higher than in nonmeditator controls, and displayed significant correlations with measures of amount of meditation experience. A review of ancient texts found reports suggestive of synaesthesia in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Throwing like a girl: A phenomenology of feminine body comportment motility and spatiality.Iris Marion Young - 1980 - Human Studies 3 (1):137 - 156.
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  • The lived experience of disability.S. Kay Toombs - 1995 - Human Studies 18 (1):9-23.
    In this paper I reflect upon my personal experience of chronic progressive multiple sclerosis in order to provide a phenomenological account of the human experience of disability. In particular, I argue that the phenomenological notion of lived body provides important insights into the profound disruptions of space and time that are an integral element of changed physical capacities such as loss of mobility. In addition, phenomenology discloses the emotional dimension of physical disorder. The lived body disruption engendered by loss of (...)
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  • Affective intentionality and the feeling body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that (...)
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  • Shaking the foundations of lifeworld: A phenomenological account of an earthquake experience. [REVIEW]David Allan Rehorick - 1986 - Human Studies 9 (4):379 - 391.
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  • Are our emotional feelings relational? A neurophilosophical investigation of the james–lange theory.Georg Northoff - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):501-527.
    The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct (...)
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  • Moral imagination, disability and embodiment.Catriona Mackenzie & Jackie Leach Scully - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (4):335–351.
    abstract In this paper we question the basis on which judgements are made about the ‘quality’ of the lives of people whose embodied experience is anomalous, specifically in cases of impairments. In moral and political philosophy it is often assumed that, suitably informed, we can overcome epistemic gaps through the exercise of moral imagination: ‘putting ourselves in the place of others’, we can share their points of view. Drawing on phenomenology and theories of embodied cognition, and on empirical studies, we (...)
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  • The cognitive origins of Bourdieu's habitus.Omar Lizardo - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):375–401.
    This paper aims to balance the conceptual reception of Bourdieu's sociology in the United States through a conceptual re-examination of the concept of Habitus. I retrace the intellectual lineage of the Habitus idea, showing it to have roots in Claude Levi-Strauss structural anthropology and in the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget, especially the latter's generalization of the idea of operations from mathematics to the study of practical, bodily-mediated cognition. One important payoff of this exercise is that the common misinterpretation of (...)
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  • Book review: Understanding blindness. [REVIEW]Neil Levy - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):315-324.
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  • Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character (...)
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  • Body connections: Hindu discourses of the body and the study of religion. [REVIEW]Barbara A. Holdrege - 1998 - International Journal of Hindu Studies 2 (3):341-386.
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  • On understanding without words: Communication between a deaf-blind child and her parents. [REVIEW]David A. Goode - 1990 - Human Studies 13 (1):1 - 37.
    This paper is an empirical inquiry into the nature of human communication and understanding. It is organized into three sections. First, there is an overview of the ethnomethodological critique of mainstream social scientific research methodology and the relevance of this critique to clinical behavioral research. Second, the details of an ethnomethodological study of communication practices in a family with an alingual, deaf-blind child are provided. Third, implications of the case study are presented.
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  • Husserl’s appropriation of the psychological concepts of apperception and attention.Daniel J. Dwyer - 2007 - Husserl Studies 23 (2):83-118.
    In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl thematizes the surplus (Überschuß) of the perceptual intention whereby the intending goes beyond the partial givenness of a perceptual object to the object as a whole. This surplus is an apperceptive surplus that transcends the purely perceptual substance (Gehalt) or sensed content (empfundene Inhalt) available to a perceiver at any one time. This surplus can be described on the one hand as a synthetic link to future, possible, active experience; to intend an object is (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Critical thinking as a source of respect for persons: A critique.Christine Doddington - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):449–459.
    Critical thinking has come to be defined as and aligned with ‘good’ thinking. It connects to the value placed on rationality and agency and is woven into conceptions of what it means to become a person and hence deserve respect. Challenges to the supremacy of critical thinking have helped to provoke richer and fuller interpretations and critical thought is prevalent in talk of what it is to become a person and more fundamentally to educate. The capacity for critical thought may (...)
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  • (1 other version)Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency.Ezequiel A. Di Paolo - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):429-452.
    A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given (...)
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  • The politics of the gaze: Between Foucault and Merleau-ponty. [REVIEW]Nick Crossley - 1993 - Human Studies 16 (4):399 - 419.
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  • Ethics and cybernetics: Levinasian reflections. [REVIEW]Richard A. Cohen - 2000 - Ethics and Information Technology 2 (1):27-35.
    Is cybernetics good, bad, or indifferent? SherryTurkle enlists deconstructive theory to celebrate thecomputer age as the embodiment of difference. Nolonger just a theory, one can now live a virtual life. Within a differential but ontologically detachedfield of signifiers, one can construct and reconstructegos and environments from the bottom up andendlessly. Lucas Introna, in contrast, enlists theethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to condemn thesame computer age for increasing the distance betweenflesh and blood people. Mediating the face-to-facerelation between real people, allowing and (...)
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  • Cultivating ethos through the body.Seamus Carey - 2000 - Human Studies 23 (1):23-42.
    The paper lays the groundwork for understanding Heidegger's original ethics in the context of embodiment. I draw upon Merleau-Ponty's account of the flesh to develop a new ontology of embodiment as the basis for ethics. This ontology is formulated by integrating three unique accounts of the embodiment, namely, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Yuasa Yasuo's Eastern-based phenomenology of the body, and the emerging science of Psychoneuroimmunology (PNI). In each of these accounts of embodiment, the flesh is revealed as simultaneously consisting of presence and (...)
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  • Can I be ill and happy?Havi Carel - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):95-110.
    Can one be ill and happy? I use a phenomenological approach to provide an answer to this question, using Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the biological and the lived body. I begin by discussing the rift between the biological body and the ill person’s lived experience, which occurs in illness. The transparent and taken for granted biological body is problematised by illness, which exposes it as different from the lived experience of this body. I argue that because of this rift, the experience (...)
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  • Discourse as care: A phenomenological consideration of spatiality and temporality. [REVIEW]Corey Anton - 2002 - Human Studies 25 (2):185-205.
    Scholars increasingly recognize that discourse is not a standing collection of representations for pre-existing thoughts and/or things in a pre-existing world. Still, many obstacles remain, and these seem to be inseparable from contemporary common-sense. When we ask about the nature of discourse, we are, ultimately, asking about the nature of world, the nature of the body, and also, there must be, if only tacitly, an account of space and time. Discourse, I would suggest, is a mode of evaluative praxis, a (...)
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  • The fixation of (visual) evidence.K. Amann & K. Knorr Cetina - 1988 - Human Studies 11 (2-3):133 - 169.
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  • (4 other versions)Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  • Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
    Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...)
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  • Sub-phenomenology.David A. Jopling - 1996 - Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.
    This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind is related (...)
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  • (1 other version)Is there a phenomenological research program?Steven Crowell - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):419-444.
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  • Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed Sleight-of-hand. [REVIEW]Hubert Dreyfus & Sean D. Kelly - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):45-55.
    We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena.
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  • (1 other version)The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach.Murat Aydede & Donald D. Price - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 243--273.
    Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the (...)
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  • The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience.Jonathan Cole - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):309-325.
    Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It (...)
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  • How is consciousness expressed in the cerebral activation manifold?Marcel Kinsbourne - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (2):265-74.
    I dispute that consciousness is generated by core circuitry in the forebrain, with predominance of motor areas, as Cotterillproposes in Enchanted Looms and other theorists do also. Ipropose instead that conscious contents are the momentary modeof action of the integrated cortical field, expressed as a point vector ( dominant focus ), to which, in varying degree, allsectors of the network contribute. Consciousness is the brain''saccess to its own activity space, and is identical with the moment''sdominant mode of activity. The dominant (...)
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  • Interpreting delusions.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
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