By a close examination of changes in analytical chemistry between the years 1920 and 1950, I document the case that natural science has undergone and continues to undergo a major revolution. The central feature of this transformation is the rise in importance of scientific instrumentation. Prior to 1920, analytical chemists determined the chemical constitution of some unknown by treating it with a series of known compounds and observing the kind of reactions it underwent. After 1950, analytical chemists determined the chemical (...) constitution of an unknown by using a variety of instruments which allow one to discriminate chemicals in terms of their physical properties. This transformation involved changes in the practice of analytical chemistry. It involved the development of a new family of scientific instrument-making companies, and a new level of capital expenditure necessary to do analytical chemistry. It involved the development of new means to disseminate information about scientific instruments. While I do not document the broader case, these changes have been widespread throughout the natural sciences. It is the rise in the importance of instrumentation which is the key conceptual change in what has been identified as the fourth big scientific revolution. (shrink)

The concept of observability of entities in physical science is typically analysed in terms of the nature and significance of a dichotomy between observables and unobservables. In the present work, however, this categorization is resisted and observability is analysed in a descriptive way in terms of the information which one can receive through interaction with objects in the world. The account of interaction and the transfer of information is done using applicable scientific theories. In this way, the question of observability (...) of scientific entities is put to science itself. The result is a demonstration that observability has many dimensions, some more epistemically significant than others. (shrink)

The ArgumentBehind the dispute over the relative priority of theory and experiment lie conflicting philosophical images of the nature of scientific inquiry. One crucial image arose in the 1920s, when the logical positivists agitated for a “unity of science” that would ground all meaningful scientific activity on an observational foundation. Their goals and rhetoric dovetailed with the larger movements of architectural, literary, and philosophical modernism. Historians of science followed the positivists by tracking experimental science as the basis for scientific progress. (...) After World War II, historians and philosophers of science created an antipositivist movement, inverting the positivist idea that observation had epistemic priority. But this counter-movement retained the modernist aspiration to unity, now chaining observation to theory. Once again historians of science, following their philosophical colleagues, illustrated the new modernism with historical instances of observation dominated by theory.Either reductionist scheme, by privileging one activity over the other, dictates an overly constrictive periodization. We need a wider class of periodization models that will allow instrumentation, experimentation, and theory a partial autonomy without granting any one the sole legitimate narrative standpoint. Such a heterogeneous representation of historical traditions may, surprisingly, make better sense of the perceived coherence of activity across theoretical transitions than the monolithic modernist representation of science it displaces. (shrink)

Between the 1930s and 1950s, life science had evolved into a sophisticated and expensive scientific enterprise. Under the influence of the Rockefeller Foundation's program of molecular biology, vital processes, especially the properties of proteins, were increasingly probed through systematic applications of tools from the physical sciences. This trend altered the nature of biological knowledge, the organization of research, and patterns of funding for the life sciences, transforming laboratory research into 'big science' — a team activity centered around massive apparatus. The (...) development of the Tiselius apparatus during the 1930s and 1940s serves as an example par excellence of these nascent intellectual and institutional trends. The paper shows that the Tiselius apparatus and the research it spawned represented one of the early collaborative projectes organized around a major laboratory technology. From its inception, design, construction, and early uses the new electrophoresis technology was a joint-effort between Svedberg's group at the University of Uppsala, the Rockefeller Institute, and a few other elite institutions. These collaborations reflected access to resources, and a commitment to a scientific agenda which stressed the physico-chemical approach to biological phenomena. The collaborations were based on the 'protein paradigm' — the view that proteins were the primary determinants of biological specificity. By examining the intellectual programs and the institutional network around the Tiselius apparatus, this paper also underscores the fruitfulness of studying the history of laboratory technology of the life sciences. (shrink)