One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. I argue that methodological rules can be epistemically significant, both with respect to observables and unobservables. Using an example from the history of medicine—Koch’s 1882 discovery of tuberculosis bacteria—I argue that even anti-realists ought to accept that these rules can break the tie between theories that are allegedly underdetermined. I then distinguish two types of underdetermination and argue that anti-realists, in order to (...) maintain the underdetermination argument, need to do more than show that theories are empirically equivalent: they need to show that a certain kind of underdetermination obtains. (shrink)

Multiple determination is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by means of multiple, independent procedures. It is an important strategy praised by both philosophers of science and practicing scientists. Despite the heavy appeal to multiple determination, little analysis has been provided regarding the specific grounds upon which its epistemic virtues rest. This article distinguishes between the various dimensions of multiple determination and shows how they can be used to evaluate the epistemic force of the strategy in particular cases. (...) Distinguishing between the various dimensions helps to resolve the disagreements regarding the relevance and epistemic import of multiple determination for scientific research. It also suggests a fruitful mode of interaction between the philosophy of science and (historical) accounts of scientific practice. (shrink)

This paper seeks to recover the function of universal history, which was to place particulars into relation with universals. By the 20th century universal history was largely discredited because of an idealism that served to lend epistemic coherence to the overwhelming complexity arising from universal history's comprehensive scope. Idealism also attempted to account for history's being "open"--for the human ability to transcend circumstance. The paper attempts to recover these virtues without the idealism by defining universal history not by its scope (...) but rather as a scientific method that provides an understanding of any kind of historical process, be it physical, biological or human. While this method is not new, it is in need of a development that offers a more robust historiography and warrant as a liberating historical consciousness. The first section constructs an ontology of process by defining matter as ontic probabilities rather than as closed entities. This is lent warrant in the next section through an appeal to contemporary physical science. The resulting conceptual frame and method is applied to the physical domain of existents, to the biological domain of social being and finally to the human domain of species being. It is then used to account for the emergence of human history's initial stage--the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation and for history' stadial trajectory--its alternation of evolution and revolution. (shrink)

The act of observing is crucial for constructive empiricism, Bas van Fraassen's celebrated position on the aim of science. As Buekens and Muller noted in 2012, the Dutch philosopher should have characterized observation as an intentional act, because observation in science has a purpose. In the present article, which will also address the distinction between observing and observing that, introduced by Hanson and Dretske, it will be shown that considerations about the intentionality of the act of observing are, on the (...) contrary, unnecessary for drawing the distinction between observable and unobservable entities on which constructive empiricism depends. (shrink)

New perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9467-3 Authors Anastasios Brenner, Department of Philosophy, Paul Valéry University-Montpellier III, Route De Mende, 34199 Montpellier cedex 5, France Paul Needham, Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden David J. Stump, Department of Philosophy, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117, USA Robert Deltete, Department of Philosophy, Seattle University, 901 12th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122-1090, USA Journal Metascience (...) Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1. (shrink)

In a 1993 paper, I argued that empirical treatments of the epistemologyused by scientists in experimental work are too abstract in practice tocounter relativist efforts to explain the outcome of scientificcontroversies by reference to sociological forces. This was because, atthe rarefied level at which the methodology of scientists is treated byphilosophers, multiple mutually inconsistent instantiations of theprinciples described by philosophers are employed by contestingscientists. These multiple construals change within a scientificcommunity over short time frames, and these different versions ofscientific methodology (...) can determine the outcome of a controversy. Iillustrated with a comparatively detailed analysis of the methodologyused by biologists debating the existence of an entity called thebacterial mesosome between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. This 1993piece has drawn several critiques in the philosophical literature. Inthis present piece I respond to these critiques and argue that they failto address the core argument of the original paper, and I reflectfurther on the methodologies of philosophers of science pursuingempirical or `naturalistic' epistemology. (shrink)

The French physicist Jean Baptiste Perrin is widely credited with providing the conclusive argument for atomism. The most well-known part of Perrin’s argument is his description of thirteen different procedures for determining Avogadro’s number (N)–the number of atoms, ions, and molecules contained in a gram-atom, gram-ion, and gram-mole of a substance, respectively. Because of its success in ending the atomism debates Perrin’s argument has been the focus of much philosophical interest. The various philosophers, however, have reached different conclusions, not only (...) about the argument’s general rationale but also the role that the multiple determination of N played in it. This paper emphasizes the historical development of Perrin’s experimental work in order to understand the role that the multiple determination of molecular magnitudes played in his argument for molecular reality. It claims that Perrin used the multiple determination strategy to put forward an exceptionally strong no-coincidence argument to argue for both the correctness of the values for the molecular magnitudes determined and the validity of the auxiliary assumptions upon which the different determinations were based. The historicist approach also allows the identification of the elements responsible for the epistemic strength of Perrin’s no-coincidence argument. (shrink)

This article examines a metaphilosophical issue, namely existing disagreements in philosophy of science about the significance of using multiple means of determination in scientific practice. We argue that this disagreement can, in part, be resolved by separating different questions that can be asked about the use of multiple means of determination, including the following: what can be concluded from the convergence of data or the convergence of claims about phenomena? Are the conclusions drawn from the convergence of data and of (...) statements about phenomena of special importance to the debate about realism and antirealism? Do inferences based on multiple means of determination have stronger epistemic force than inferences that are secured in other ways? Is the epistemic goal of deploying multiple means of determination well entrenched within the scientific community? Most of these questions can be discussed both in a formal and in an empirical perspective. If the differences in perspective are taken into account, some disagreements can be easily resolved. In part, however, the disagreements reflect historiographical challenges that are very difficult, if not impossible to meet. (shrink)

I develop a concept of observability that pertains to qualities rather than objects: a quality is observable if it can be registered by human sensation (possibly with the aid of instruments) without involving optional interpretations. This concept supports a better description of observations in science and everyday life than the object-based observability concepts presupposing causal information-transfer from the object to the observer. It also allows a rehabilitation of the traditional empiricist distinction between observations and their interpretations, but without a presumption (...) that observations are infallible. Using this concept of observability, I also propose a re-formulation of constructive empiricism that is easier to defend against realist attacks, while open to reasonable realist intuitions. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that the difference between standard measurement and proxy measurement in paleoclimatology should not be understood in terms of ‘directness’. Measurements taken by climatologists to be paradigmatically non-proxy exhibit the kinds of indirectness that are thought to separate them proxy measurement. Rather, proxy measurements and standard measurements differ in how they account for confounding causal factors. Measurements are ‘proxy’ to the extent that the measurements require vicarious controls, while measurements are not proxy, but rather ‘standard’, to (...) the extent that the measurement apparatus provides sufficient physical control on its own. Guided by this account of proxy measurement, we then consider some of the challenges specific to historical proxy measurement and how it is that historical scientists address these challenges. Historical scientists rely on significant causal dependencies and naturally preserved signals to mitigate the influence of destructive processes over time. (shrink)

Der Artikel führt den Begriff der epistemischen Konkurrenz ein. Im Gegensatz zu „wissenschaftliche Kontroverse“ beschreibt er eine Situation, in der sich zwei Forschungsfelder gegenseitig als mit demselben Bereich von Phänomen befasst wahrnehmen, wobei ihre methodischen Ansätze und theoretischen Erklärungen jedoch so unterschiedlich sind, dass ein offener Konflikt über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit bestimmter Aussagen oder die Genauigkeit in der Anwendung einer Methode nicht stattfindet. Nichtsdestotrotz streben beide Parteien danach, die maßgebliche Erklärung der entsprechenden Phänomene anzubieten. Indem die erweiterte Gemeinschaft der (...) Forschenden oder die Öffentlichkeit einen Ansatz als maßgeblich anerkennt, handeln sie als eine dritte, gewissermaßen neutrale Partei, die einen Preis vergibt, um den die anderen Parteien konkurrieren. Der Artikel beschreibt das Verhältnis von Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie um 1900 als epistemische Konkurrenz. Diese Forschungsfelder geben unterschiedliche Erklärungen für die Phänomene der organischen Reproduktion. Die Erklärungen unterscheiden sich bezüglich der Formbegriffe und entsprechend hinsichtlich der Begriffe der Vererbung von Aspekten der Form eines Organismus. Zudem basieren die Erklärungen der beiden Felder auf unterschiedlichen Arten kausalen Schließens, die in unterschiedliche experimentelle Ansätze eingebettet sind. Diese Unterschiede können als Instanzen eines allgemeineren Unterschieds zwischen der Tradition der Naturgeschichte, die sich mit Unterschieden zwischen Organismen auseinandersetzt, und der Tradition der Anatomie, die sich mit den Teilen der Organismen beschäftigt, angesehen werden. Dieses Bild der Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie als Zweige unterschiedlicher fest verankerter Traditionen widerspricht dem Narrativ der Trennung des Begriffs der Vererbung von dem der Entwicklung im Zuge einer Trennung der Disziplinen der Genetik und der Embryologie, das in der Historiographie der Biologie nach wie vor weit verbreitet ist. (shrink)

Three major views of the observation?theory relation are now extant: (1) Observation and theory are mutually independent and observation provides the basis for evaluating theories. (2) Observations are theory?dependent and do not provide objective grounds for evaluating theories. (3) The concept of observation should be extended in a way that includes many so?called ?theoretical?entities? among the observables. Analyses of these views set the stage for a new approach that incorporates lessons learned from discussions of earlier accounts. The central idea of (...) this new approach is that empirical testing requires comparison of results arrived at by derivation from the theory being tested (plus appropriate auxiliary premises) with results derived from an interaction with aspects of nature in the theory's domain. These routes are independent in that each can be pursued without knowledge of the details or results of the alternative route. The approach accounts for the role of empirical results in evaluating theories without requiring that these results be theory?free or more certain than theoretical results. It also provides a basis for understanding the conditions under which a conflict between observation and theory can result in rejection of the observational result. (shrink)

Thinkers from a variety of fields analyze the roles of imaging technologies in science and consider their implications for many issues, from our conception of selfhood to the authority of science. In what follows, I encourage scholars to develop an applied philosophy of imaging, that is, to collect these analyses of scientific imaging and to reflect on how they can be made useful for ongoing scientific work. As an example of this effort, I review concepts developed in Don Ihde’s phenomenology (...) of technology and refigure them for use in the analysis of scientific practice. These concepts are useful for drawing out the details of the interpretive frameworks scientists bring to laboratory images. Next, I apply these ideas to a contemporary debate in neurobiology over the interpretation of images of neurons which have been frozen at the moment of transmitter release. This reveals directions for further thought for the study of neurotransmission. (shrink)

In april 1872, with the caisson at a depth of seventy-odd feet and still no bedrock, two men died. The strain for Roebling was nearly unbearable, as his wife later said. On May 18, a third man died, and that same day Roebling made the most difficult and courageous decision of the project. Staking everything — the success of the bridge, his reputation, his career - he ordered a halt. The New York tower, he had concluded, could stand where it (...) was, at a depth of 78 feet 6 inches, not on bedrock, but on “hardpack” sand. From examinations of the strata he had determined to his own satisfaction that no movement had occured at the level since the time of deposit millions of years in the geologic past; so, he said, it was “good enough to found upon”. (shrink)

In response to a recent argument by David Bloor, I argue that denying absolutes does not necessarily lead to relativism, that one can be a fallibilist without being a relativist. At issue are the empirical natural sciences and what might be called “framework relativism”, that is, the idea that there is always a conceptual scheme or set of practices in use, and all observations are theory-laden relative to the framework. My strategy is to look at the elements that define a (...) relativist stance and show where the pragmatic fallibilist disagrees. Defending the pragmatic notion of experience will be central, given that relativists reject the idea that experience can play a role in objectively justifying belief. We can reject all absolutes and start from the premise that everything is historical, contingent, and situated. One of the lessons of pragmatism is that universal and fixed principles are not necessary for objective knowledge. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Artikel führt den Begriff der epistemischen Konkurrenz ein. Im Gegensatz zu „wissenschaftliche Kontroverse“ beschreibt er eine Situation, in der sich zwei Forschungsfelder gegenseitig als mit demselben Bereich von Phänomen befasst wahrnehmen, wobei ihre methodischen Ansätze und theoretischen Erklärungen jedoch so unterschiedlich sind, dass ein offener Konflikt über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit bestimmter Aussagen oder die Genauigkeit in der Anwendung einer Methode nicht stattfindet. Nichtsdestotrotz streben beide Parteien danach, die maßgebliche Erklärung der entsprechenden Phänomene anzubieten. Indem die erweiterte Gemeinschaft der (...) Forschenden oder die Öffentlichkeit einen Ansatz als maßgeblich anerkennt, handeln sie als eine dritte, gewissermaßen neutrale Partei, die einen Preis vergibt, um den die anderen Parteien konkurrieren. Der Artikel beschreibt das Verhältnis von Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie um 1900 als epistemische Konkurrenz. Diese Forschungsfelder geben unterschiedliche Erklärungen für die Phänomene der organischen Reproduktion. Die Erklärungen unterscheiden sich bezüglich der Formbegriffe und entsprechend hinsichtlich der Begriffe der Vererbung von Aspekten der Form eines Organismus. Zudem basieren die Erklärungen der beiden Felder auf unterschiedlichen Arten kausalen Schließens, die in unterschiedliche experimentelle Ansätze eingebettet sind. Diese Unterschiede können als Instanzen eines allgemeineren Unterschieds zwischen der Tradition der Naturgeschichte, die sich mit Unterschieden zwischen Organismen auseinandersetzt, und der Tradition der Anatomie, die sich mit den Teilen der Organismen beschäftigt, angesehen werden. Dieses Bild der Genetik und Entwicklungsbiologie als Zweige unterschiedlicher fest verankerter Traditionen widerspricht dem Narrativ der Trennung des Begriffs der Vererbung von dem der Entwicklung im Zuge einer Trennung der Disziplinen der Genetik und der Embryologie, das in der Historiographie der Biologie nach wie vor weit verbreitet ist. (shrink)

I develop the idea of what I call an interpretive praxis as a generalized procedure for analyzing how experimenters can formulate observable predictions, discern real effects from experimental artifacts, and compare predictions with data. An interpretive praxis requires theories – theories not only about instruments and the interpretation of phenomena, but also theories that connect the use of instruments and interpretation of phenomena to high‐level theory. I will call all such theories that enable experimentation to work intermediate theories. I offer (...) an account of theory‐networks that embrace these intermediate theories and explain their functions. (shrink)