- (1 other version)The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis.David Chalmers - 2016 - In Uzi Awret & U. Awret (eds.), The Singularity: Could Artificial Intelligence Really Out-Think Us ? Imprint Academic. pp. 12-88.details
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(1 other version)Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1997 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Free-energy and the brain.Karl Friston & Klaas Stephan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):417-458.details
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(1 other version)Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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(1 other version)Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind.Andy Clark - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.details
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The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents. [REVIEW]Nick Bostrom - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):71-85.details
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(1 other version)Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.details
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(1 other version)The singularity: A philosophical analysis.David J. Chalmers - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9 - 10.details
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Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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Enactivism and predictive processing: A non-representational view.Michael David Kirchhoff & Ian Robertson - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):264-281.details
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A Natural History of Human Morality.Michael Tomasello (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.details
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Free-Energy Minimization and the Dark-Room Problem.Karl Friston, Christopher Thornton & Andy Clark - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.details
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Free-Energy and the Brain.Karl J. Friston & Klaas E. Stephan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):417 - 458.details
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Beyond Desire? Agency, Choice, and the Predictive Mind.Andy Clark - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):1-15.details
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Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist.Adrian Downey - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5115-5139.details
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Goal-directed decision making as probabilistic inference: A computational framework and potential neural correlates.Alec Solway & Matthew M. Botvinick - 2012 - Psychological Review 119 (1):120-154.details
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Expecting the World: Perception, Prediction, and the Origins of Human Knowledge.Andy Clark - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):469-496.details
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The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.details
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What do predictive coders want?Colin Klein - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2541-2557.details
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Planning as inference.Matthew Botvinick & Marc Toussaint - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (10):485-488.details
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Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.details
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Active inference and free energy.Karl Friston - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):212-213.details
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Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):110-114.details
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