Results for 'Russ Shafer-Landau'

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Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison
  1. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism. [REVIEW]Jason Kawall - 2005 - Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):204-205.
    A short review of Russ Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism: A Defence.
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  2. Resolving Conflicts of Rights: Russ Shafer-Landau and Judith Jarvis Thomson Revisited.Patricia Louise Soriano - 2018 - In DLSU Philosophy Senior Research Colloquium Proceedings. Manila, Metro Manila, Philippines: pp. 230-248.
    This manuscript examines two accounts that discuss rights disputes. On the one hand, Russ Shafer-Landau argues for specificationism (or what is referred to here as SA), which deems rights as having innate limitations. One the other, Judith Jarvis Thomson defends infringement theory (or what is referred to here as IVA), which views rights to be competing factors. Shafer-Landau in “Specifying Absolute Rights” endeavored to discredit Thomson’s IVA and promote his favored theory. This material responds to (...)
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  3. Book Review: Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau[REVIEW]Andrew Alwood - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):357-360.
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  4. Shafer-Landau, Russ, ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 324. $99.00 ; $40.00. [REVIEW]Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):828-832.
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  5. Shafer-Landau, Russ, ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 8.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 352. $110.00 ; $45.00. [REVIEW]Guy Fletcher - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):282-288.
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  6. Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then (...)
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  7. Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.
    Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9659-0 Authors Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  8. How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.
    In this paper I highlight two noteworthy features of assertions about our desires, and then highlight two ways in which they can mislead us into drawing unwarranted conclusions about desire. Some of our assertions may indicate that we are sometimes motivated independently of desire, and other assertions may suggest that there are vast divergences between our normative judgements and our desires. But I suggest that some such assertions are, in this respect, potentially misleading, and have in fact misled authors such (...)
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  9. The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (1):1-5.
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  10. From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points.Christos Kyriacou - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points (e.g. the factivity condition). To this effect, I show that the two basic reasons Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) offer in support of moral fixed points naturally carry over to epistemic fixed points. (...)
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  11. Should moral intuitionism go social?Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund & Eliot Michaelson - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):973-985.
    In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and ShaferLandau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and ShaferLandau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take (...)
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  12. Practical Reason and Moral Motivation:An Analysis of Arguments Against Internalism.Rafael Martins - 2013 - Itaca 24:184-200.
    In The moral problem (1994), Michael Smith tries to link three conflicting theories that alone are intuitively plausible, nevertheless, they do not seem to work well together. The first proposes that moral judgments are in fact beliefs about objective matters. The second states the concept of “practicality requirement”. The third is a humean belief-desire psychology, i.e. if a moral judgment is sufficient to explain actions, then it must involve a desire. If that is the case, it cannot be simply a (...)
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  13. Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):80-89.
    Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the 'moral fixed points view' developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou's proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive (...)
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  14. Yes to realism! No to nonnaturalism! Ulysses - 2009 - Kritike 3 (1):168-177.
    I evaluate the metaphysical plausibility of the non-naturalist view of moral properties. I will mainly concentrate my evaluation on the views of Shafer-Landau (henceforth just S-L) whose defence of moral non-naturalism is the most lucid and vigorous so far. I shall try to show its metaphysical problems and defend Jackson’s Occamist naturalism about moral properties which I consider to be more consistent with the supervenience platitude.
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  15. Cooperative Intuitionism.Stephen Ingram - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):780-799.
    According to pluralistic intuitionist theories, some of our moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified, and these beliefs come in both an a priori and an a posteriori variety. In this paper I present new support for this pluralistic form of intuitionism by examining the deeply social nature of moral inquiry. This is something that intuitionists have tended to neglect. It does play an important role in an intuitionist theory offered by Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (forth), but whilst they invoke (...)
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  16. Moral realism, face-values and presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each (...)
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  17. Absurd Angst and Metaethical Pain: The Externalist Moral Paradigm and its Production of Angst Over the Normative Force of Ultimate Reasons.Pierce Marks - 2020 - Dissertation, Oklahoma State University
    The purpose of this essay will be to set out an analysis of a certain philosophical, metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to the extent it can be), and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this angst. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that there are no normative, non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only come about under a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will (...)
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  18. The Bit (and Three Other Abstractions) Define the Borderline Between Hardware and Software.Russ Abbott - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):239-285.
    Modern computing is generally taken to consist primarily of symbol manipulation. But symbols are abstract, and computers are physical. How can a physical device manipulate abstract symbols? Neither Church nor Turing considered this question. My answer is that the bit, as a hardware-implemented abstract data type, serves as a bridge between materiality and abstraction. Computing also relies on three other primitive—but more straightforward—abstractions: Sequentiality, State, and Transition. These physically-implemented abstractions define the borderline between hardware and software and between physicality and (...)
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  19.  41
    Sexual Harassment and the “Repetition Requirement”.Landau Iddo - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):79-83.
    In his “Reply to Iddo Landau,” Edmund Wall responds to the author’s critique of some of the views expressed in his “Sexual Harassment and Wrongful Communication.” The present article concentrates on what the author takes to be the main problem in Wall’s definition: by requiring that any act, even if intentional and cruel in nature, needs to be repeated to count as sexual harassment, Wall allows too much leeway and renders permissible a wide range of intentional, mean, and harmful (...)
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  20.  63
    The Paradox of the End.Iddo Landau - 1995 - Philosophy 70 (274):555 - 565.
    We set ourselves ends and strive to achieve them. We hope that their attainment will improve our condition. The closer we get to our goals, the happier we feel. Paradoxically, however, when we finally do achieve them our joy is sometimes diminished. We have a sense of insignificance and emptiness, and we feel that in attaining our goal we have lost the meaningfulness and balance we experienced while we were striving towards it. In some ways, it seems to us, the (...)
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  21.  32
    What's Old in Derrida?Iddo Landau - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (269):279 - 290.
    Revolutions often retain more characteristics of the pre-revolutionary state than their makers like to admit. Characterizing the pre-revolutionary state as bad , and wishing to accentuate the greatness of their doings, revolutionaries like to stress the differences between the previous state of affairs and the new one, and prefer to see the similarities as few and insignificant. They are frequently wrong. 1.
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  22. Meaning, autonomy, symbolic causality, and free will.Russ Abbott - 2018 - Review of General Psychology 22 (1):85-94.
    As physical entities that translate symbols into physical actions, computers offer insights into the nature of meaning and agency. • Physical symbol systems, generically known as agents, link abstractions to material actions. The meaning of a symbol is defined as the physical actions an agent takes when the symbol is encountered. • An agent has autonomy when it has the power to select actions based on internal decision processes. Autonomy offers a partial escape from constraints imposed by direct physical influences (...)
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  23. Immorality and the Meaning of Life.Iddo Landau - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (3):309-317.
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  24. The Meaning of Life Sub Specie Aeternitatis.Iddo Landau - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):727 - 734.
    Several philosophers have argued that if we examine our lives in context of the cosmos at large, sub specie aeternitatis, we cannot escape life's meaninglessness. To see our lives as meaningful, we have to shun the point of view of the cosmos and consider our lives only in the narrower context of the here and now. I argue that this view is incorrect: life can be seen as meaningful also sub specie aeternitatis. While criticizing arguments by, among others, Simon Blackburn, (...)
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  25. What Makes Complex Systems Complex?Russ Abbott - 2018 - Journal on Policy and Complex Systems 4 (2):77-113.
    This paper explores some of the factors that make complex systems complex. We first examine the history of complex systems. It was Aristotle’s insight that how elements are joined together helps determine the properties of the resulting whole. We find (a) that scientific reductionism does not provide a sufficient explanation; (b) that to understand complex systems, one must identify and trace energy flows; and (c) that disproportionate causality, including global tipping points, are all around us. Disproportionate causality results from the (...)
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  26. Abstractions and Implementations.Russ Abbott - manuscript
    Fundamental to Computer Science is the distinction between abstractions and implementations. When that distinction is applied to various philosophical questions it yields the following conclusions. -/- • EMERGENCE. It isn’t as mysterious as it’s made out to be; the possibility of strong emergence is not a threat to science. -/- • INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HIGHER-LEVEL ENTITIES. Physical interaction among higher-level entities is illusory. Abstract interactions are the source of emergence, new domains of knowledge, and complex systems. -/- • PHYSICS and the (...)
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  27. Causality, computing, and complexity.Russ Abbott - 2015
    I discuss two categories of causal relationships: primitive causal interactions of the sort characterized by Phil Dowe and the more general manipulable causal relationships as defined by James Woodward. All primitive causal interactions are manipulable causal relationships, but there are manipulable causal relationships that are not primitive causal interactions. I’ll call the latter constructed causal relationships, and I’ll argue that constructed causal relationships serve as a foundation for both computing and complex systems. -/- Perhaps even more interesting are autonomous causal (...)
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  28. An argument for marriage.Iddo Landau - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (3):475-481.
    This paper replies to two arguments against marriage presented by Dan Moller (Philosophy 78, 2003: 79–91). One of Moller's arguments examines several ways in which the marriage promise could be explained, and shows that none of them is viable. The other argument suggests that marriage may not be a worthwhile enterprise since marriages frequently fail, in that they become loveless or end up in divorce. I argue that the marriage promise can be explained in a way unconsidered by Moller, which (...)
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  29.  60
    Conceptualizing great meaning in life: Metz on the good, the true, and the beautiful.Iddo Landau - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (4):505-514.
    This article is a reply to Thaddeus Metz's (2011). I suggest that Metz's theory is too broad since it entails that merely understanding Einstein's or Darwin's views can make a life highly meaningful. Furthermore, it is unclear whether , toward which highly meaningful lives are oriented, may or may not be necessary conditions to , how completely the former should explain the latter, and whether Metz's account is indeed non-consequentialist. While acknowledging the importance of Metz's contribution, I consider alternative directions (...)
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  30. Why has the question of the meaning of life arisen in the last two and a half centuries?Iddo Landau - 1997 - Philosophy Today 41 (2):263-269.
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  31.  73
    Foundationless Freedom and Meaninglessness of Life in Sartre's: Being and Nothingness.Iddo Landau - 2012 - Sartre Studies International 18 (1):1-8.
    This paper critically examines Sartre's argument for the meaninglessness of life from our foundationless freedom. According to Sartre, our freedom to choose our values is completely undetermined. Hence, we cannot rely on anything when choosing and cannot justify our choices. Thus, our freedom is the foundation of our world without itself having any foundation, and this renders our lives absurd. Sartre's argument presupposes, then, that although we can freely choose all our values we have a meta-value that we cannot choose: (...)
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  32.  95
    Foundationless Freedom and Meaninglessness of Life in Sartre's: Being and Nothingness.Iddo Landau - 2012 - Sartre Studies International 18 (1):1-8.
    This paper critically examines Sartre's argument for the meaninglessness of life from our foundationless freedom. According to Sartre, our freedom to choose our values is completely undetermined. Hence, we cannot rely on anything when choosing and cannot justify our choices. Thus, our freedom is the foundation of our world without itself having any foundation, and this renders our lives absurd. Sartre's argument presupposes, then, that although we can freely choose all our values we have a meta-value that we cannot choose: (...)
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  33.  79
    Objectivism, Hybridism, and Meaning in Life: Reply to Evers and van Smeden.Iddo Landau - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):306-313.
    In a recent article in this journal, Daan Evers and Gerlinde Emma van Smeden () defend Wolf's hybridism against objectivist counterexamples advanced by Metz, Smuts, and Bramble. They also offer their own new hybridism, which they take to be even less vulnerable to such counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Evers and van Smeden's defense of their and Wolf's hybridizing from objectivist counterexamples is problematic and that they do not, in fact, succeed in meeting the challenge the objectivist counterexamples (...)
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  34.  79
    Sexual harassment and the "repetition requirement".Iddo Landau - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):79-83.
    In his "Reply to Iddo Landau," Edmund Wall responds to the author’s critique of some of the views expressed in his "Sexual Harassment and Wrongful Communication." The present article concentrates on what the author takes to be the main problem in Wall’s definition: by requiring that any act, even if intentional and cruel in nature, needs to be repeated to count as sexual harassment, Wall allows too much leeway and renders permissible a wide range of intentional, mean, and harmful (...)
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  35.  28
    Perfectionism and Non-Perfectionism in Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus.Iddo Landau - 2013 - In Beatrix Himmelmann (ed.), On Meaning in Life. De Gruyter. pp. 139-152.
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  36.  56
    The “Why Be Moral?” Question and the Meaning of Life.Iddo Landau - 2015 - In Robert Louden & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), Why Be Moral? De Gruyter. pp. 159-172.
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  37.  19
    Violence and Postmodernism: A Conceptual Analysis.Iddo Landau - 2010 - Reason Papers 32:67-73.
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  38.  59
    Are You Entitled to Affirmative Action?Iddo Landau - 1997 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):17-22.
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  39.  85
    Sexual harassment as "wrongful communication".Iddo Landau - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2):225-234.
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  40. Sartre’s Absolute Freedom in Being and Nothingness.Iddo Landau - 2012 - Philosophy Today 56 (4):463-473.
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  41.  43
    Why has the Question of the Meaning of Life Arisen in the Last Two and a Half Centuries?Iddo Landau - 1997 - Philosophy Today 41 (2):263-269.
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  42.  94
    Neurology, psychology, and the meaning of life: On Thagard's The Brain and the Meaning of Life.Iddo Landau - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):604-618.
    The Brain and the Meaning of Life Paul Thagard Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010 274 pages, ISBN: 9780691142722 (hbk): $29.95 This paper criticizes central arguments in Paul Thagard's The Brain and the Meaning of Life, concluding, contrary to Thagard, that there is very little that we can learn from brain research about the meaning of life. The paper offers a critical review of Thagard's argument against nihilism and his argument that it is love, work, and play, rather than other activities, (...)
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  43. To kill a mandarin.Iddo Landau - 2005 - Philosophy and Literature 29 (1):89-96.
    IN LE P È R E GO R I O T, Balzac has the main character, Rastignac, ask his friend Bianchon whether he would agree to the killing of a Chinese Mandarin in far-away China if this would yield Bianchon a great fortune. After some joking, Bianchon answers negatively.1 For Rastignac, this thought experiment is connected to a practical dilemma: he is deliberating whether to agree that a man he has never seen, and who has done Rastignac no harm, should (...)
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  44.  37
    After postmodernism: meaning of life and education.Iddo Landau - 2018 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (14):1539-1540.
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  45.  36
    Coherentism, brain science, and the meaning of life: A response to Thagard.Iddo Landau - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):622-624.
    In his ?Nihilism, Skepticism, and Philosophical Method,? Paul Thagard claims that my critique of his The Brain and the Meaning of Life misapprehends his argument. According to Thagard, the critique wrongly assumes that the book offers foundationalist justifications for Thagard's views whereas, in fact, the justifications his book presents are coherentist. In my response, I show that the claim that my critique depends on foundationalist assumptions is ungrounded. Moreover, the appeal to coherentist rather than foundationalist justifications does not salvage Thagard's (...)
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  46.  31
    Mendus on philosophy and pervasiveness.Iddo Landau - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):89–93.
    In ‘How Androcentric is Western Philosophy?’ (The Philosophical Quarterly, 46 (1996), pp. 48–59), I criticized five claims for the androcentrism of philosophy. In her ‘How Androcentric is Western Philosophy? A Reply’ (ibid., pp. 60–6), Susan Mendus finds my arguments faulty in a number of ways. Much of her criticism has to do with the distinction introduced in my article between pervasive and non-pervasive androcentrism. Pervasive androcentrism in a philosophical theory calls for substantial reform, complete rejection or replacement by a feminist (...)
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  47.  79
    On the definition of sexual harassment.Iddo Landau - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):216 – 223.
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  48.  75
    On the Marginalization of Feminist Philosophy.Iddo Landau - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):551-568.
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  49.  31
    Smuts, Aaron. Welfare, Meaning and Worth. New York: Routledge, 2018. Pp. 168. $140.00.Iddo Landau - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):140-144.
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  50.  69
    Should There Be Separatist Feminist Epistemologies?Iddo Landau - 1994 - The Monist 77 (4):462-471.
    Many questions may be asked about the efforts to construct feminist epistemologies. One such question is whether epistemologies really imply values and practices in any significant way. Another is whether the values and practices most epistemologies are taken to be immersed in are indeed masculine. Yet another is what precisely are the feminist values and practices that feminist epistemologies should involve. A fourth is whether women and men really do think so differently from each other. And a fifth possible question (...)
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