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  1. (2 other versions)Change blindness: Past, present, and future. [REVIEW]Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...)
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  • (1 other version)Two neural correlates of consciousness.Ned Block - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):46-52.
    Neuroscientists continue to search for 'the' neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal- detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for (...)
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  • The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control.Chris Frith - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.
    Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of (...)
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