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  1. Representing Metarepresentations: Is There Theory of Mind-Specific Cognition?Marc Egeth - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254.
    What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.
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  • A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture.David Pierre Leibovitz - 2013 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...)
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  • Implicit Processing of Tactile Information: Evidence From the Tactile Change Detection Paradigm.David Pritchett, Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):534-546.
    People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was (...)
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  • Exploring the Visual (Un)Conscious.Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Markus Kiefer & Michael Niedeggen - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:178-184.
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  • High Confidence and Low Accuracy in Redundancy Masking.Fazilet Zeynep Yildirim & Bilge Sayim - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 102:103349.
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  • The Modeling and Control of Visual Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2007 - In Wayne Gray (ed.), Integrated Models of Cognitive Systems. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-148.
    Recent developments in vision science have resulted in several major changes in our understanding of human visual perception. For example, attention no longer appears necessary for "visual intelligence"--a large amount of sophisticated processing can be done without it. Scene perception no longer appears to involve static, general-purpose descriptions, but instead may involve dynamic representations whose content depends on the individual and the task. And vision itself no longer appears to be limited to the production of a conscious "picture"--it may also (...)
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  • Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness.David Rosenthal - unknown - In P. W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  • On the Applications of Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2008 - Psychologia 51:100-106.
    An overview is presented of the ways that change blindness has been applied to the study of various issues in perception and cognition. Topics include mechanisms of change perception, allocation of attention, nonconscious perception, and cognitive beliefs. Recent work using change blindness to investigate these topics is surveyed, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways that these approaches may further develop over the next few years.
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  • Change Blindness, Representations, and Consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...)
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  • Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  • Breaking the Silence: Motion Silencing and Experience of Change.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):693-707.
    The naïve view of temporal experience (Phillips, in: Lloyd D, Arstila V (eds) Subjective time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, forthcoming-a) comprises two claims. First, that we are perceptually aware of temporal properties, such as succession and change. Second, that for any temporal property apparently presented in experience, our experience itself possesses that temporal property. In his paper ‘Silencing the experience of change’ (forthcoming), Watzl argues that this second naïve inheritance thesis faces a novel counter-example in the form (...)
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  • How to Build a Robot That is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  • Naïve Realism: Folk Fallacies in the Design and Use of Visual Displays.Harvey S. Smallman & Maia B. Cook - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (3):579-608.
    Often implicit in visual display design and development is a gold standard of photorealism. By approximating direct perception, photorealism appeals to users and designers by being both attractive and apparently effortless. The vexing result from numerous performance evaluations, though, is that increasing realism often impairs performance. Smallman and St. John (2005) labeled misplaced faith in realistic information display Naïve Realism and theorized it resulted from a triplet of folk fallacies about perception. Here, we illustrate issues associated with the wider trend (...)
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  • Gorillas in the Missed : Reevaluating the Evidence for Attention Being Necessary for Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    Mind &Language, Volume 34, Issue 3, Page 299-316, June 2019.
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  • Trans-Saccadic Perception.David Melcher & Carol L. Colby - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (12):466-473.
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  • Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...)
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  • Experience of and in Time.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
    How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the order the words are experienced as having? (...)
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  • Change Blindness and Priming: When It Does and Does Not Occur.Michael E. Silverman & Arien Mack - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.
    In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness . Using 3 × 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report . In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether (...)
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  • Change Blindness Blindness: Beliefs About the Roles of Intention and Scene Complexity in Change Detection.Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie Angelone - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
    Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants’ beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants (...)
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  • Recognition and the Perception–Cognition Divide.Greyson Abid - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
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  • Measures of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):285-297.
    Consciousness is now a hot topic in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences, yet there is much controversy over how to measure it. First, it is not clear whether biased subjective reports should be taken as adequate for measuring consciousness, or if more objective measures are required. Ways to benefit from the advantages of both these measures in the form of ‘Type 2’ metacognitive measures are under development, but face criticism. Research into neurophysiological measures of consciousness is potentially very valuable, (...)
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  • Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
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  • Simulation Theory and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons Reconsidered.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1185-1210.
    According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...)
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  • The Experience of Watching Dance: Phenomenological–Neuroscience Duets. [REVIEW]Corinne Jola, Shantel Ehrenberg & Dee Reynolds - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):17-37.
    This paper discusses possible correspondences between neuroscientific findings and phenomenologically informed methodologies in the investigation of kinesthetic empathy in watching dance. Interest in phenomenology has recently increased in cognitive science (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 ) and dance scholars have recently contributed important new insights into the use of phenomenology in dance studies (e.g. Legrand and Ravn (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(3):389–408, 2009 ); Parviainen (Dance Research Journal 34(1):11–26, 2002 ); Rothfield (Topoi 24:43–53, 2005 )). In vision research, coherent neural (...)
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  • Confabulation Does Not Undermine Introspection for Propositional Attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.
    According to some, such as Carruthers (2009, 2010, 2011, 2015), the confabulation data (experimental data showing subjects making false psychological self-ascriptions) undermine the view that we can know our propositional attitudes by introspection. He believes that these data favour his interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory—the view that self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes always involves self-interpretation of our sensations, behaviour, or situational cues. This paper will review some of the confabulation data and conclude that the presence and pattern of these data do (...)
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  • The Pre-Reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):623-637.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...)
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  • Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory.Edmund T. Rolls - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Problems are raised with the global workspace hypothesis of consciousness, for example about exactly how global the workspace needs to be for consciousness to suddenly be present. Problems are also raised with Carruthers's version that excludes conceptual representations, and in which phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to physical processes, with instead a different levels of explanation approach to the relation between the brain and the mind advocated. A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described, in which there is a particular (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    There are two kinds of epistemic theories about self-knowledge: the traditional account, and the inferentialist account. According to the traditional view of self-knowledge, we have privileged access to our propositional attitudes. “Privileged access” means that one can gain knowledge of one’s own propositional attitudes directly via an exclusive, first-personal method called introspection. On the other hand, the inferentialist view of self-knowledge postulates that we don’t have privileged access to our propositional attitudes and must infer or self-attribute them instead. In this (...)
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  • No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Melanie Wilke, Stefan Frässle & Victor A. F. Lamme - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (12):757-770.
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  • The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis: Drivers of Prediction Accuracy in World Politics.Barbara Mellers, Eric Stone, Pavel Atanasov, Nick Rohrbaugh, S. Emlen Metz, Lyle Ungar, Michael M. Bishop, Michael Horowitz, Ed Merkle & Philip Tetlock - 2015 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 21 (1):1-14.
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  • Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  • Twin Memory.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2016 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 7 (1-2):147-163.
    In this article, I examine a new concept of “Twin Memory’ which has emerged in memory classification research of conscious and unconscious memory representations. It is to analyse the presence of twin memory among the various memory systems, and also to provide a platform for the twin memory “anatomy” in the field of cognitive science, neuropsychology and neuroscience.
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Mindful Movement and Skilled Attention.Dav Clark, Frank Schumann & Stewart H. Mostofsky - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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  • Perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2012 - In W. Ramsey & K. Frankish (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
    To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish.
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  • Non-Local Consciousness A Concept Based on Scientific Research on Near-Death Experiences During Cardiac Arrest.Pim van Lommel - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    In this article a concept of non-local consciousness will be described, based on recent scientific research on near-death experiences . Since the publication of several prospective studies on NDEs in survivors of cardiac arrest, with strikingly similar results and conclusions, the phenomenon of the NDE can no longer be scientifically ignored. In the last thirty years several theories have been proposed to explain an NDE. The challenge to find a common explanation for the cause and content of an NDE is (...)
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  • Towards a True Neural Stance on Consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  • Encoding Higher-Order Structure in Visual Working Memory: A Probabilistic Model.Timothy F. Brady & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 411--416.
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  • Individual Differences in Change Blindness.Katharina Verena Bergmann - unknown
    The present work shows the existence of systematic individual differences in change blindness. It can be concluded that the sensitivity for changes is a trait. That is, persons differ in their ability to detect changes, independent from the situation or the measurement method. Moreover, there are two explanations for individual differences in change blindness: a) capacity differences in visual selective attention that may be influenced by top-down activated attention helping to focus attention onto relevant stimuli b) differences in working memory (...)
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  • Invisibility and Interpretation.Michael H. Herzog, Frouke Hermens & Haluk Öğmen - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
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  • Generality and Content-Specificity in the Study of the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness.Tomas Marvan - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (2).
    The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The (...)
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  • Musical Change Deafness: The Inability to Detect Change in a Non-Speech Auditory Domain.Kat R. Agres & Carol L. Krumhansl - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 969--974.
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  • Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted.Pierre Jacob - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...)
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  • Change Blindness and Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):37-56.
    Some proponents of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness. CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued (...)
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  • From Physical Time to a Dualistic Model of Human Time.Ronald P. Gruber, Carlos Montemayor & Richard A. Block - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (4):927-954.
    There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component has both an illusory and non-illusory aspect. With the dualistic (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal (...)
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  • Implicit Detection Observation in Different Features, Exposure Duration, and Delay During Change Blindness.Wang Xiang - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    To investigate whether implicit detection occurs uniformly during change blindness with single or combination feature stimuli, and whether implicit detection is affected by exposure duration and delay, two one-shot change detection experiments are designed. The implicit detection effect is measured by comparing the reaction times of baseline trials, in which stimulus exhibits no change and participants report “same,” and change blindness trials, in which the stimulus exhibits a change but participants report “same.” If the RTs of blindness trials are longer (...)
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  • Dynamics of Perceptual Learning in Visual Search.Bernhard Schlagbauer - unknown
    The present work is concerned with a phenomenon referred to as contextual cueing. In visual search, if a searched-for target object is consistently encountered within a stable spatial arrangement of distractor objects, detecting the target becomes more efficient over time, relative to non-repeated, random arrangements. This effect is attributed to learned target-distractor spatial associations stored in long-term memory, which expedite visual search. This Thesis investigates four aspects of contextual cueing: Study 1 tackled the implicit-explicit debate of contextual cueing from a (...)
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  • Contextual Cueing Accelerated and Enhanced by Monetary Reward: Evidence From Event-Related Brain Potentials.Guang Zhao, Qian Zhuang, Jie Ma, Shen Tu & Shiyi Li - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15.
    The vital role of reward in guiding visual attention has been supported by previous literatures. Here, we examined the motivational impact of monetary reward feedback stimuli on visual attention selection using an event-related potential component called stimulus-preceding negativity and a standard contextual cueing paradigm. It has been proposed that SPN reflects affective and motivational processing. We focused on whether incidentally learned context knowledge could be affected by reward. Both behavior and brain data demonstrated that contexts followed by reward feedback not (...)
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