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  1. Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.
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  • Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.
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  • Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    A textbook on modal logic, intended for readers already acquainted with the elements of formal logic, containing nearly 500 exercises. Brian F. Chellas provides a systematic introduction to the principal ideas and results in contemporary treatments of modality, including theorems on completeness and decidability. Illustrative chapters focus on deontic logic and conditionality. Modality is a rapidly expanding branch of logic, and familiarity with the subject is now regarded as a necessary part of every philosopher's technical equipment. Chellas here offers an (...)
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  • Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion.John N. Williams - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166.
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  • Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
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  • An introduction to modal logic: the Lemmon notes.E. J. Lemmon - 1977 - Oxford: Blackwell. Edited by Dana S. Scott.
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  • Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen here offers a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of "blindspots": consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might by true.
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  • What one may come to know.van Benthem Johan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):95–105.
    The general verificationist thesis says that What is true can be known or formally: φ → ◊Kφ VT Fitch's argument trivializes this principle. It uses a weak modal epistemic logic to show that VT collapses truth and knowledge, by taking a clever substitution instance for φ: P ∧ ¬KP → ◊ K(P ∧ ¬KP) Then we have the following chain of three conditionals (a) ◊ K(P ∧ ¬KP) → ◊ (KP ∧ K¬KP) in the minimal modal logic for the knowledge (...)
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  • Moore's paradox: A Wittgensteinian approach.Jane Heal - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):5-24.
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  • Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
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  • Bonney on saying and disbelieving.Max Deutscher - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):184-186.
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  • Logicians who Reason about Themselves.Raymond M. Smullyan - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668-669.
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  • What one may come to know.J. van Benthem - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):95-105.
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  • Bonney on Saying and Disbelieving.Max Deutscher - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):184 - 186.
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  • Minimal doxastic logic: probabilistic and other completeness theorems.Peter Milne - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):499-526.
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  • Moore problems in full dynamic doxastic logic.Krister Segerberg - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):95-110.
    Dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) is the modal logic of belief change. In basic DDL a modal operator [* ϕ ] carries the informal meaning "after the agent has revised his beliefs by ϕ " or "after the agent has accepted the information that ϕ "; it is assumed that the arguments of the star operator * are pure Boolean formulae. That assumption is discarded in full DDL where any pure doxastic formula may be an argument. As noted by other authors, (...)
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  • Forever undecided: a puzzle guide to Gödel.Raymond M. Smullyan - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Collects a variety of mathematics and logic puzzles, some based on the theorems of the mathematician Kurt Godel.
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  • Moore's problem with iterated belief.Roy Sorensen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):28-43.
    Positive thinkers love Watty Piper's The little engine that could. The story features a train laden with toys for deserving children on the other side of the mountain. After the locomotive breaks down, a sequence of snooty locomotives come up the track. Each engine refuses to pull the train up the mountain. They are followed by a weary old locomotive that declines, saying "I cannot. I cannot. I cannot." But then a bright blue engine comes up the track. He manages (...)
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