A category of enhancement technologies target neural systems as a means of improving physical performance. The author calls these as neurophysical enhancements. This chapter demonstrates why neurophysical enhancements deserve an ethical assessment which is independent of those relating to physical and cognitive enhancements. It focuses almost exclusively on the use of neurophysical enhancements in the sporting arena, where they are for the most part prohibited. World Anti‐Doping Agency (WADA) does permit some drugs which are effective enhancements. Caffeine is permitted on (...) the rationale that it is ineffective at unsafe doses (and hence safe at an effective dose). It makes little sense to ban every performance enhancer from sporting competition, no matter what it is used for, and what the risks are, since sport is essentially a project of performance enhancement. If every form of enhancement is to be considered unethical, competitive sport must be abandoned. (shrink)

As cognitive neuroscience has advanced, the list of prospective internal, biological enhancements has steadily expanded. Education and training, as well as the use of external information‐processing devices, may be labeled as “conventional” means of cognition enhancement (CE). They are often well established and culturally accepted. By contrast, methods of enhancing cognition through “unconventional” means, such as ones involving deliberately created nootropic drugs, gene therapy, or neural implants, are nearly all to be regarded as experimental at the present time. Transcranial magnetic (...) stimulation (TMS), genetic interventions, brain‐computer interfaces and new senses are highly experimental and unlikely to be important over the next 15 years. Many of the concerns about enhancement are nonspecific to the tools used to achieve it, which means that enhancement–ethic scrutiny should also apply to nonbiological external enhancements. (shrink)

The standard therapy/enhancement distinction is usually related to health purposes and some sense of normality. In this paper, I will challenge the basis of the distinction arguing that only the first part of it is related to health and, consequently, the distinction should be better understood as differentiating between qualitative and quantitative consequences of interventions. As health and normality are broad concepts inside of which it is possible to make some ulterior distinctions, I will propose three different senses of normality (...) in order to more easily grasp the therapy/enhancement distinction. As with the distinction between therapy and enhancement, the difference between sports- and non-sports-persons is usually stated in terms of health and normality. I will challenge this assumption, too. In my opinion, the main difference between people, sportspeople and athletes should be related to the practice itself. Once the practice of a sport is taken seriously, along with its tough and demanding life... (shrink)