States restrict immigration on a massive scale. Governments fortify their borders with walls and fences, authorize border patrols, imprison migrants in detention centers, and deport large numbers of foreigners. Unjust Borders: Individuals and the Ethics of Immigration argues that immigration restrictions are systematically unjust and examines how individual actors should respond to this injustice. Javier Hidalgo maintains that individuals can rightfully resist immigration restrictions and often have strong moral reasons to subvert these laws. This book makes the case that unauthorized (...) migrants can permissibly evade, deceive, and use defensive force against immigration agents, that smugglers can aid migrants in crossing borders, and that citizens should disobey laws that compel them to harm immigrants. Unjust Borders is a meditation on how individuals should act in the midst of pervasive injustice. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that susceptibility to suitable emotional responses is part of what it is to value something. Indeed, the value of at least some things calls for such emotional responses – if we lack them, we don’t respond appropriately to their value. In this paper, I argue that susceptibility to anger is an essential component of valuing other people, ourselves, and our relationships. The main reason is that various modes of valuing, such as respect, self-respect, and love, ground (...) normative expectations towards others and ourselves. And holding someone accountable for violating legitimate normative expectations involves emotions from the anger family, such as resentment and indignation. I hold that such forms of anger, which aim at getting the target to conform to expectations or lower their unduly elevated status, are neither inherently problematic or dispensable parts of the package of attitudes involved in valuing. Finally, thinking about anger’s role in valuing also helps see when it is out of place or immature – roughly, it is often excessive, because we easily exaggerate the magnitude of the value involved, the harm or threat to it, or the degree of the target’s moral responsibility. (shrink)

Emotions shape our mental and social lives, but their relation to morality is problematic: are they sources of moral knowledge, or obstacles to morality? Fourteen original articles by leading scholars in moral psychology and philosophy of mind explore the relation between emotions and practical rationality, value, autonomy, and moral identity.

This chapter argues that people have a human right to immigrate to other states. People have essential interests in being able to make important personal decisions and engage in politics without state restrictions on the options available to them. It is these interests that other human rights, such as the human rights to internal freedom of movement, expression and association, protect. The human right to immigrate is not absolute. Like other human freedom rights , it can be restricted in certain (...) extreme circumstances. Outside these circumstances, however, immigration restrictions are unjust. Having presented the argument for a human right to immigrate, the chapter responds to objections from distributive justice, culture and scarcity. (shrink)

In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The (...) second section proposes and explains in detail a definition of envy tout court. The third section presents a recurring distinction between behavioral tendencies of envy, which has been explained in two distinct ways, one mostly proposed by psychologists, the other discernible in the philosophical tradition. The fourth section argues that these models of explanation track two variables, whose interplay is responsible for the existence of the four envies. The fifth section illustrates four paradigmatic cases, and provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenology, motivational structure, and typical behavioral outputs of each. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the implications of the taxonomy for moral education. (shrink)

The mass movement of people across the globe constitutes a major feature of world politics today. -/- Whatever the cause of the movement - often war, famine, economic hardship, political repression or climate change - the governments of western capitalist states see this 'torrent of people in flight' as a serious threat to their stability and the scale of this migration indicates a need for a radical re-thinking of both political theory and practice, for the sake of political, social and (...) economic justice. -/- This book argues that there is at present a serious gap between the legal and social practices of immigration and naturalisation in liberal democratic states and any theoretical justification for such practices that can be made within the tradition of liberal political philosophy. How can liberal states develop institutions of democratic citizenship and at the same time justifiably exclude 'outsiders' from participating in those institutions? The book examines various responses to this contradiction within the liberal tradition, and finds none of them satisfactory - there are no consistently liberal justifications for immigration control and this has serious implications both for liberal practice and theory. (shrink)

The question seldom discussed among political philosophers is: How are liberal democracies maintained after they are established? In a liberal democratic state, the ultimate political values are: liberty, equality, political participation, tolerance, loyalty to the state, and its reproduction. This work is founded on the observation that ultimate political values cannot be based on purely rational considerations, prevailing tradition, or an overlapping consensus. I propose "veil politics" as a solution to the problem of establishing and maintaining those values. Veil politics (...) recognizes and uses nonrational methods to fix and sustain those values. It is distinguished from "transparency politics" which exposes all states of affairs about the liberal society to all of its citizens, and from "opacity politics," which entirely hides states of affairs from its citizens. ;The inspiration for this dissertation derives from my background as a member of an African community where tradition and secrecy or aura play an integral and honorable role. In my community, aura is not used to hide information too awful to stand the light of the day, or to manipulate citizens for the interests of the Fon, the paramount chief. In my community it is understood that political arrangements should inspire citizens, since the arrangements are otherwise too ordinary to be inspiring. Embellishment excites the imagination of citizens and help to move them from the position of inertia to attitudes that motivate them to participate in the political processes. Finally, it helps align their fundamental desires with the core values of the community. ;Traditional liberal theorists start theorizing by assuming a consensus--choosing, as it were, with whom to coexist. I start by assuming a dissensus. We will always find ourselves alongside others with whom we have fundamental disagreements. I argue that it is not the business of liberal states to pick and choose with whom we ought to coexist. (shrink)

Brettschneider extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and he shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.

Eminent political theorist Joseph Carens tests the limits of democratic theory in the realm of immigration, arguing that any acceptable immigration policy must be based on moral principles even if it conflicts with the will of the majority.

A significant number of –mostly Western European– countries have recently newly introduced citizenship tests or have added stricter requirements of civic knowledge to previously existing language tests. This working paper collects the contributions to a EUDO-CITIZENSHIP forum debate on whether such tests can be defended from a liberal perspective. The question: ‘How liberal are citizenship tests?’ can be interpreted in two ways: as a question whether applicants for naturalisation should be tested at all, or as a question about specific modes, (...) contents and consequences of such tests that may make them either liberal or illiberal. In his kickoff contribution, Christian Joppke suggests an answer in line with the second interpretation by focusing on modes and contents. In his view, citizenship tests are defensible if applicants have reasonable opportunities to prepare for them and if questions are not inquisitive about individuals values and beliefs. Other authors claim instead that the most problematic feature of citizenship tests is the intention or effect of raising hurdles for naturalisation among long-term resident immigrants. Joseph Carens defends the view that ‘the most liberal citizenship test is none at all’. Ten authors have contributed to this lively and controversial debate, which concludes with a rejoinder by Christian Joppke. (shrink)