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  1. Autonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection.Jens Timmermann - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):379-397.
    Is Kant’s ethical theory too demanding? Do its commands ask too much of us, either by calling for self-sacrifice on particular occasions, or by pervading our lives to the extent that there is no room for permissible action? In this article, I argue that Kant’s ethics is very demanding, but not excessively so. The notion of ‘latitude’ does not help. But we need to bear in mind that moral laws are self-imposed and cannot be externally enforced; that ‘right action’ is (...)
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  • Kant on Persons and Agency ed. by Eric Watkins.Krista K. Thomason - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):175-176.
    This new essay collection edited by Eric Watkins features distinguished and established scholars, and it will be an attractive volume for those who work in the field. The essays are divided under three headings: Part I contains essays on agency, Part II features essays on freedom, and Part III is dedicated to essays on persons. An essay by Karl Ameriks on Kant’s work “The End of All Things” concludes the collection. Most of the essays in the collection were originally presented (...)
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  • Eric Watkins . Kant on Persons and Agency Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018 Pp. xii + 242, hbk ISBN 9781107182455, £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin Marshall - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):327-333.
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  • Kate A. Moran (ed.), Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity. [REVIEW]Reza Hadisi - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (4):668-672.
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  • Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
    There is a fairly widespread—and very infl uential—hope among philosophers interested in the status of normativity that the solution to our metaethical and, more generally, metanormative problems will emerge from the philosophy of action. In this essay, I will argue that these hopes are groundless. I will focus on the metanormative hope, but—as will become clear—showing that the solution to our metanormative problems will not come from what is constitutive of action will also devastate the hope of gaining significant insight (...)
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  • Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):177-179.
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