Questions concerning whether current policies restricting the use of performance enhancing substances in sport are morally or ethically justified have not received the attention they deserve from philosophers of sport. The purpose of this study was to critically examine the conventional moral objections to the use of performance enhancers to determine if they could provide justificatory grounds for proscription. Two moral rationales were subjected to extensive philosophical analysis: unfair advantage, and unnaturalness. ;Neither the unfair advantage argument nor the unnaturalness argument (...) could provide compelling grounds for prohibiting the use of performance enhancing substances in sport. There were two critical difficulties with both arguments. First, neither argument was able to establish a consistent, rational basis for its claims. Regardless of the morally objectionable property that was assigned to a banned substance, that same property exists within accepted substances and features of sport. Principled distinctions could not be drawn between prohibited and allowable substances. Second, the concepts of fairness and naturalness proved to be most ambiguous; it is not clear how they are to be defined in sport. Thus, it was not clear that compromising these concepts would result in an unethical or immoral action. That is, the presupposition that unfair and unnatural are morally bad in sport is far from self-evident. (shrink)

Many believe that "doping" has no place in sport, especially no place in the Olympic Games. Yet despite, or indeed perhaps because of, this belief remarkably little has been done in the way of attempting to justify those bans. ;The arguments that are offered in support of bans fall into four categories: that doping is cheating or unfair, that it is harmful, that it perverts the nature of sport, and that is is dehumanizing or unnatural. ;I examine each of these (...) categories of argument in turn. The cheating or unfairness argument is readily dismissed as question-begging. The substances or practices concerned are only cheating or unfair after they have been banned. This argument is therefore unavailable to justify a ban. ;The argument from harm is inconsistent. Many sports, and many practices within sport, are more harmful and more risky, than the majority of the banned practices or substances. It is inconsistent to paternalistically ban some practices, claiming concern for athlete well-being as the justification, and then to permit other, equally harmful, activities. ;The dehumanization argument in general looks promising. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear why substances such as anabolic steroids should be considered dehumanizing. This is partly so because we do not have a clear and uncontroversial picture of what it is to be human to start with. ;There is a similar lack of clarity in the arguments that claim that doping perverts the nature of sport. While this may be so for some future possible performance-enhancing practice and sport, there are not extant arguments to show why, e.g., anabolic steroid use would pervert the nature of the 100 metre dash. ;I offer a two-tiered approach to justifying bans on doping. The first tier examines the internal goods of sport and shows why athletes would rationally want to avoid doping. The second tier works from the community level and shows why those concerned about sport, especially those concerned about Olympic sport would rationally seek to promote doping-free sport. (shrink)

(1993). Why Olympic Athletes Should Avoid the Use and Seek the Elimination of Performance-Enhancing Substances and Practices From the Olympic Games. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 64-81. doi: 10.1080/00948705.1993.9714504.