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  1. Putting the image back in imagination.Amy Kind - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...)
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  • On the aim of belief.J. David Velleman - manuscript
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  • (2 other versions)What might nonconceptual content be?Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:339-352.
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  • (1 other version)Imagination, delusion and hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 1991 - In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. pp. 168-183.
    Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capacity in schizophrenia. I argue that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.
    Chris Frith has argued that a loss of the sense of agency is central to schizophrenia. This suggests a connection between hallucinations and delusions on the one hand, and the misidentification of the subject’s imaginings as perceptions and beliefs on the other. In particular, understanding the mechanisms that underlie imagination may help us to explain the puzzling phenomena of thought insertion and withdrawal. Frith sometimes states his argument in terms of a loss of metarepresentational capacity in schizophrenia. I argue that (...)
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  • (2 other versions)What might nonconceptual content be?Robert Stalnaker - 2003 - In York Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 95-106.
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  • (1 other version)Imagination, delusion, and self-deception.Andy Egan - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press. pp. 263–280.
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife (...)
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  • Imaginative contagion.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
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