Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion

Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires to make true in fiction do not differ from regular desires in kind, but only in content. I argue for these three desiderata in turn by critically discussing several recent accounts of imagination. 
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 5 (2015-11-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
2,979 ( #1,211 of 71,335 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
135 ( #4,651 of 71,335 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.