The central argument in the Euthyphro is the one Socrates advances against the definition of piety as "what all the gods love." The argument turns on establishing that a loved thing (philoumenon) is 1) a loved thing because it is loved (phileitai), not 2) loved because it is a loved thing. I suggest that this claim can be understood and found acceptable if we take "because" to be used equivocally in it. Despite the equivocation, Socrates' argument is valid, showing that (...) Euthyphro cannot offer this definition consistently with his view that the gods have as a reason for loving pious things that they are pious things. (shrink)

Plato's Euthyphro is a dialogue about the virtue of piety. It is also one of the aporetic dialogues, ending in apparent failure to discover what piety is. It is common to understand the dialogue as teaching lessons about other things, about definition, for instance, or about the logic of refutation. About piety, however, it is thought to teach us only negatively, showing a few of the many things which piety is not.My thesis, on the contrary, is that there is a (...) positive account of the nature of piety in the dialogue; it is, moreover, an account which cannot be separated from the other lessons which the dialogue teaches. I shall find it necessary to expose the structure of the logical lessons in order to develop my account of the holy. (shrink)

I argue that in Plato's _Sophist, the account of true and false statement which emerges within the discussion of not being and falsehood neither entails nor outwardly suggests any of the traditional characterizations of a correspondence "theory" of truth. On the contrary, what emerges is a minimalistic "conception" of truth which requires neither positing the existence of facts nor formulating an explanatory definition of truth. I make comparisons with Aristotle's discussion of truth in the _Categories and _De Interpretatione, and I (...) offer reasons why one should not expect to find the emergence of a "theory" of truth in the _Sophist. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has proposed a theory of explanation based on the notion of unification. Despite the genuine interest and power of the theory, I argue here that the theory suffers from a fatal deficiency: It is intrinsically unable to account for the asymmetric structure of explanation, and thus ultimately falls prey to a problem similar to the one which beset Hempel's D-N model. I conclude that Kitcher is wrong to claim that one can settle the issue of an argument's explanatory (...) force merely on the basis of considerations about the unifying power of the argument pattern the argument instantiates. (shrink)

The official model of explanation proposed by the logical empiricists, the covering law model, is subject to familiar objections. The goal of the present paper is to explore an unofficial view of explanation which logical empiricists have sometimes suggested, the view of explanation as unification. I try to show that this view can be developed so as to provide insight into major episodes in the history of science, and that it can overcome some of the most serious difficulties besetting the (...) covering law model. (shrink)

(1) anything that fs does so because it participates in the f itself. (2) it is impossible that: a form phi fs because phi participates in phi. (3) the f itself fs. These are inconsistent all right, but (1) is not a doctrine of the theory of forms, and (2) is neither reasonable nor held by plato! but the tma does not involve any of these three. Rather, the tma is aimed at (4) anything that fs does so (a) because (...) it participates in the f itself and (b) because the f itself fs. And the tma uses only simple inference rules of the logic of 'because'–no suppressed premises. I also discuss causal regress arguments generally. (shrink)

In spite of its significance for everyday and philosophical discourse, the explanatory connective has not received much treatment in the philosophy of logic. The present paper develops a logic for based on systematic connections between and the truth-functional connectives.

That 'what all the gods love is holy (pious) and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy (impious)' is not an adequate account of the holy. The key to understanding the argument is found to rest in the epagogai and in the principle of substitutibility employed later in socrates' argument. I contend that not only is socrates' argument valid, but it is capable of application to a large class of accounts both theological and sociological.

A sizable literature exists concerning the structure of Socrates' argument at Euthyphro 9d–11b. Although there is some dispute, a substitutional reading has emerged as a leading interpretation. However, some rear‐guard maneuvers are in order to defend this reading against its competitors. In this paper, I articulate a substitutional reading and argue that it is invalid on two counts: one, Socrates oversteps the logic of his reductio ad absurdum, and two, he illicitly substitutes coreferring expressions in explanatory contexts. Next, I defend (...) the substitutional reading by (1) rebutting its leading contender, Sharvy's formal causation interpretation, and (2) showing how a similar substitutional argument is made in the Protagoras. (shrink)

A sizable literature exists concerning the structure of Socrates' argument at Euthyphro 9d–11b. Although there is some dispute, a substitutional reading has emerged as a leading interpretation. However, some rear‐guard maneuvers are in order to defend this reading against its competitors. In this paper, I articulate a substitutional reading and argue that it is invalid on two counts: one, Socrates oversteps the logic of his reductio ad absurdum, and two, he illicitly substitutes coreferring expressions in explanatory contexts. Next, I defend (...) the substitutional reading by (1) rebutting its leading contender, Sharvy's formal causation interpretation, and (2) showing how a similar substitutional argument is made in the Protagoras. (shrink)

Many philosophers take the point of Plato's Euthyphro to be an indictment of attempts to ground morality in religion, specifically in the attitudes of a deity or deities. It has been argued cogently in recent essays that Plato's case is far from conclusive. This essay suggests instead that the Euthyphro can be read more narrowly as raising critical questions about a specific religious virtue, Piety. Then it presents the ingredients of a reply to those questions. The reply proceeds by suggesting (...) that one need not accept the standards of definition used by Plato, and that one can provide an explanation of what Piety is by embedding Piety in a more comprehensive picture of the human, the divine, and the relations between the two. The picture makes use of a doctrine of divine sovereignty and a doctrine concerning love between God and humans. (shrink)

A. E. Taylor states the widely held view that Plato’s Euthyphro posed a question which figured prominently in later ethical controversies: “It amounts to asking whether acts of piety, or more generally virtuous acts, derive their character of being right from the mere fact of being commanded or are commanded because they are antecedently intrinsically right.” I argue against this characterization of the Euthyphro. The argument Socrates deploys against Euthyphro’s third and most serious definition of holiness or piety (to hosion) (...) is not the opening round in the debate over divine command theory nor is a discussion of the nature of holiness ipso facto an exercise in ethical theory. (shrink)

One of Euthyphro's proposed definitions of to hosion says: '[T]he pious is what all the gods love...'. Scholarly analyses of Socrates' refutation of this definition have focused on its validity or even its 'truth'. By contrast, this paper restricts itself to the refutation's logical structure, particularly the way Socrates juxtaposes the agreed-upon premises to derive a double or 'chiastic' contradiction. In this article, I lay out the details of Socrates' ingenious logical construction, without regard to its validity or fallaciousness, and (...) argue that the chiastic contradiction alone makes possible Socrates' refutation of Euthyphro's claim to expertise in the realm of to hosion. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates’s reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true—merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. (...) Finally, some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory. (shrink)

The Euthyphro might well be given to undergraduates to read early in their philosophical training. The arguments are apparently simple, but some of them, as I shall show, lead naturally on to thorny problems of modern philosophy. Another benefit that could be gained from reading the Euthyphro is that the reader may learn to be forewarned against some common fallacies and debating tricks in moral disputes.

The Euthyphro might well be given to undergraduates to read early in their philosophical training. The arguments are apparently simple, but some of them, as I shall show, lead naturally on to thorny problems of modern philosophy. Another benefit that could be gained from reading the Euthyphro is that the reader may learn to be forewarned against some common fallacies and debating tricks in moral disputes.

It has been an interpretative dogma to condemn Euthyphro's attempt to account for piety in terms of the gods' wishes as one totally repudiated by Socrates, and in itself untenable. Still at 15c8-9 Socrates expresses some scepticism about whether his refutation of Euthyphro's original account of piety in terms of what the gods love has established that it must be abandoned altogether. He then goes on to say that he and Euthyphro ought to investigate again (πάλιν σ[unrepresentable symbol]επτέον), from the (...) beginning (ἀξ ἀρχ[unrepresentable symbol]ς), what piety is (15c11-12), which may be taken to imply that Euthyphro's original account should be revisited. Interpreting Socrates' refutation of that account as having shown that it is one he rejects completely implies that no weight should be attached to Socrates' later reservations, even though he exhibits considerable care in expressing them. Unfortunately, as I argue, this interpretative stand has not brought us any closer to understanding the conception of piety Plato may be attributing to Socrates. If only for the purpose of interpretative completeness, we owe it to Plato actually to do as Socrates suggests at the end of the dialogue that one ought to, and revisit Euthyphro's thesis. In this paper, I propose to break ranks with the dogma. Instead, I follow Socrates' recommendation at 15c11 that we should look into what piety is from the beginning, simply to examine whether there are any insights that might be uncovered by doing so. (shrink)

Classical Philosophy is a comprehensive examination of early philosophy from the presocratics through to Aristotle. The aim of the book is to provide an explanation and analysis of the ideas that flourished at this time and considers their relevance both to the historical development of philosophy and to contemporary philosophy today. From these ideas we can see the roots of arguments in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and political philosophy. The book is arranged in four parts by thinker and covers: The Presocratics (...) Socrates Plato Aristotle Christopher Shields' style is inviting, refreshing and ideal for anyone coming to the subject for the first time. He provides a balanced account of the central topics and ideas that emerged from the period and includes helpful further reading and chapter overviews. (shrink)

This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...

Spanning 2,500 years of thought, this superb volume provides essential coverage of the most influential philosophers of the Western world, including Socrates, ...

Filling the need for an accessible, carefully structured introductory text in symbolic logic, Modern Logic has many features designed to improve students' comprehension of the subject, including a proof system that is the same as the award-winning computer program MacLogic, and a special appendix that shows how to use MacLogic as a teaching aid. There are graded exercises at the end of each chapter--more than 900 in all--with selected answers at the end of the book. Unlike competing texts, Modern Logic (...) gives equal weight to semantics and proof theory and explains their relationship, and develops in detail techniques for symbolizing natural language in first-order logic. After a general introduction featuring the notion of logical form, the book offers sections on classical sentential logic, monadic predicate logic, and full first-order logic with identity. A concluding section deals with extensions of and alternatives to classical logic, including modal logic, intuitionistic logic, and fuzzy logic. For students of philosophy, mathematics, computer science, or linguistics, Modern Logic provides a thorough understanding of basic concepts and a sound basis for more advanced work. (shrink)

Scholars of Plato are divided between those who emphasize the literature of the dialogues and those who emphasize the argument of the dialogues, and between those who see a development in the thought of the dialogues and those who do not. In this important book Russell Dancy focuses on the arguments and defends a developmental picture. He explains the Theory of Forms of the Phaedo and Symposium as an outgrowth of the quest for definitions canvassed in the Socratic dialogues, by (...) constructing a Theory of Definition for the Socratic dialogues based on the refutations of definitions in those dialogues, and showing how that theory is mirrored in the Theory of Forms. His discussion, notable for both its clarity and its meticulous scholarship, ranges in detail over a number of Plato's early and middle dialogues, and will be of interest to readers in Plato studies and in ancient philosophy more generally. (shrink)

The essay is a partial investigation into the semantics of the explanatory connective ‘because’. After three independently plausible assumptions about ‘because’ are presented in some detail, it is shown how their interaction generates a puzzle about ‘because’, once they are combined with a common view on conceptual analysis. Four possible solutions to the puzzle are considered.

In the dialogue Plato portrays a confrontation between Euthyphro, a self-appointed expert on matters divine, who is about to charge his own father with impiety for alleged mistreatment and eventual death of a slave, and Socrates, already charged with impiety, who exploits the coincidence to elicit from Euthyphro certain complexities of the concept of 'piety'.

If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...) the person moves her head, she may be indicating agreement or shaking an insect off her ear. Should we think of the consequences, conventional or causal, of physical behavior as constituents of an action distinct from but ‘generated by’ the movement? Or should we think that there is a single action describable in a host of ways? Also, actions, in even the most minimal sense, seem to be essentially ‘active’. But, how can we explain what this property amounts to and defend our wavering intuitions about which events fall in the category of the ‘active’ and which do not? (shrink)