(1999). Princess Elizabeth and Descartes: The union of soul and body and the practice of philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 503-520. doi: 10.1080/09608789908571042.

: This paper focuses on Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia's philosophical views as exhibited in her early correspondence with René Descartes. Elisabeth's criticisms of Descartes's interactionism as well as her solution to the problem of mind-body interaction are examined in detail. The aim here is to develop a richer picture of Elisabeth as a philosophical thinker and to dispel the myth that she is simply a Cartesian muse.

Bien que Descartes n’emploie que rarement les mots officium ou « devoir », sa morale confère une place centrale à la notion d’action appropriée, dans un sens qui rappelle le kathekon des stoïciens. Cette notion enveloppe les devoirs de l’être humain envers Dieu et envers les autres êtres humains, ainsi que les actions qui trouvent leur justification dans le fait qu’elles favorisent la conservation et la santé du corps. Tout en relevant ces parallèles, je montre également que Descartes, dans son (...) analyse de la vertu et des passions, s’écarte des doctrines stoïciennes ; divergence que j’explique en partie par l’acceptation de la tripartition des biens (bien moral, biens du corps, biens extérieurs) que rejettent les stoïciens. (shrink)

This paper examines Elisabeth of Bohemia’s critique of Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness. According to this conception, we can all become happy because we can all make full use of our rational faculties and constantly follow our best judgments. Happiness is nothing but an “internal satisfaction” that arises when we act in accordance with these judgments. Elisabeth challenges this conception by pointing out that it is far too optimistic and that it neglects what is external to our own mind. Quite (...) often, we cannot make full use of our rational faculties because we are in the grip of passions and diseases or because we are under time pressure and can neither make the best decisions nor foresee their consequences. The paper focuses on these two objections, arguing that Elisabeth replaces Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness with a more complex conception that takes both internal and external factors into account. On her view, not only the right use of our rational faculties but also the right conditions for using them are required for obtaining happiness. In defending this view, Elisabeth presents an alternative to Descartes’ position and should therefore be seen as an original thinker engaging in a philosophical debate. (shrink)